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Abstract
China’s economic engagement with Africa has garnered considerable attention in academic 
and policy circles as well as in the global media over the past two decades. The implications 
of the engagement for Africa’s development have been a subject of debate in popular and 
academic literature, with experts offering differing views on Africa’s development trajectory. 
Among the contentious issues in China–Africa discourse is the impact of Chinese 
engagement on human capital development (HCD) in Africa. Many valid questions have 
been raised about the potential of Chinese investments to add value to African industries 
and contribute to HCD in Africa.
Drawing on dependency theory and human capital theory, this dissertation investigates 
China’s economic engagement with Africa. Specifically, it examines in what ways, if any, 
Chinese economic engagement contributes to HCD in Africa and the role of the host 
African governments in leveraging the engagement for HCD. This study employs both 
a conceptual research and an empirical research approach. The empirical part of the 
dissertation investigates the contributions and implications of the engagement for HCD 
by drawing on the case of a Chinese multinational company, Huawei, operating in Nigeria. 
This dissertation comprises two main parts: Part I is the synthesis, also referred to as the 
summary, and Part II consists of four original research articles, referred to as sub-studies. 
Together, they address the aims of this study.
Sub-studies 1 and 2 are conceptual are in nature and are aimed at unpacking the China–
Africa economic engagement. Relying on dependency theory, Sub-study 1 analyses China’s 
presence in Africa and creates a basis for understanding the engagement and what it means 
for Africa’s development trajectory. Sub-study 2 draws on dependency theory and human 
capital theory to propose a framework for investigating the potential outcomes of new 
forms of economic engagements between countries. It also illustrates how the framework 
can be utilised to study the potential outcomes of the China–Africa economic engagement. 
xSub-studies 3 and 4 are empirical works that investigate the contributions of Chinese 
enterprises to HCD in Africa and the role of the host government in leveraging the 
engagement for HCD. Sub-studies 3 and 4 focus on the case of Huawei. 
The findings show that China–Africa engagement signifies a growing interdependency 
between China and African countries, driven by their strategic interests and objectives. 
The engagement is economically pragmatic, offering African countries an alternative 
in their choice of development partners. The engagement presents both opportunities 
and challenges for Africa – opportunities to realise concrete economic gains that foster 
development in their respective economies and a challenge to steer the engagement in a 
direction that is beneficial for Africa’s development and mitigate the potential negative 
effects of the engagement. 
This study finds that the China–Africa economic engagement also offers opportunities 
for HCD in Africa. Findings from the Huawei case study indicate that Chinese enterprises 
operating in Africa are well placed to contribute to HCD by way of local employment 
generation, training and skill building and technology and knowledge transfer through 
their operations and investments in their host country. Importantly, these opportunities 
tend to vary across sectors and countries because of the differences in sectoral and contextual 
conditions. With the help of local content policies and strategies for active collaboration 
with Chinese enterprises, host African governments can successfully leverage Chinese 
economic engagement for HCD in their countries. 
This study contributes to one’s understanding of the China–Africa economic 
engagement and provides case-based empirical evidence on the possible implications for 
HCD in Africa. 
Keywords: China–Africa economic engagement, human capital development, dependency 
theory, human capital theory, multinational corporations, foreign direct investments 
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Tiivistelmä
Kiinan ja Afrikan maiden välinen taloudellinen yhteistyö on saanut osakseen kasvavaa 
huomiota viimeisen kahden vuosikymmenen aikana. Yhteistyöstä ovat olleet kiinnostuneet 
poliittiset päättäjät, media sekä tutkijat. Kiinan taloudellisen toiminnan vaikutuksista 
on Afrikan kehitykselle keskusteltu tutkijoiden toimesta runsaasti. Yksi Kiina–
Afrikka-keskustelun kiistanalaisista kysymyksistä koskee Kiinan taloudellisten toimien 
vaikuttavuutta Afrikan inhimillisen pääoman kehitykselle. Useita aiheellisia kysymyksiä 
on esitetty Kiinan investointien mahdollisesta myönteisestä vaikutuksesta lisätä Afrikan 
liike-elämän arvoa ja yleisemmin tukea inhimillisen pääoman kehittymistä Afrikassa. 
Tämä väitöskirja tutkii Kiinan ja Afrikan maiden taloudellista yhteistyötä riippu vuus-
teorian ja inhimillisen pääoman teorian näkökulmasta. Tutkimus kohdistuu erityisesti sii-
hen, vaikuttaako kiinalainen taloudellinen toiminta inhimilliseen pääomaan Afrikassa ja 
osana Afrikan maiden hallitusten osaamiseen liittyvää kehittämispolitiikkaa. Tutkimuk-
sessa sovelletaan sekä käsitteellistä että empiiristä lähestymistapaa. 
Osatutkimukset yksi ja kaksi ovat käsitteellisiä artikkeleita ja pyrkivät erittelemään 
Kiinan ja Afrikan maiden välistä taloudellista yhteistyötä ja sen muotoja. Nojaten riippu-
vuusteoriaan osatutkimus yksi analysoi Kiinan läsnäoloa Afrikassa ja luo perustan talo-
udellisen yhteistyön merkityksen ymmärtämiselle osana Afrikan taloudellista kehitystä. 
Osatutkimus kaksi hyödyntää riippuvuusteoriaa ja inhimillisen pääoman teoriaa ja esittää 
viitekehystä maiden välisten uusien taloudellisten kanssakäymisten mahdollisten seuraus-
ten tutkimiselle. Se myös havainnollistaa, miten viitekehystä voidaan hyödyntää tutkit-
taessa Kiinan ja Afrikan taloudellisen kanssakäymisen mahdollisia seurauksia. Osatut-
kimukset kolme ja neljä ovat empiirisiä tapaustutkimuksia, jotka selvittävät kiinalaisten 
suuryritysten myötävaikutusta Afrikan inhimilliselle pääomalle ja hallituksen toiminnal-
le. Osatutkimukset keskittyvät Huawein toimintaan Nigeriassa.
Tulokset osoittavat, että Kiinan ja Afrikan maiden taloudellinen yhteistyö merkitsee 
kasvavaa strategista keskinäisriippuvuutta Kiinan ja Afrikan maiden välillä. Kanssakäy-
minen on taloudellisesti pragmaattista, ja tarjoaa Afrikan maille vaihtoehdon kehitys-
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kumppaneiden valinnassa. Taloudellinen yhteistyö tuo sekä mahdollisuuksia että haasteita 
Afrikalle, mutta se tarjoaa mahdollisuuksia toteuttaa kunkin kansantalouden kehitystä 
tukevia kehityskulkuja. Kuitenkin se haastaa valtioita pitkäjänteiseen kehitys politiikkaan, 
joka hillitsee kanssakäymisen mahdollisia kielteisiä vaikutuksia. 
Tutkimus osoittaa, että Kiinan ja Afrikan välinen taloudellinen yhteistyö tarjoaa 
mahdollisuuksia myös Afrikan inhimillisen pääoman kehitykselle. Huawein tapaustutki-
muksen löydökset viittaavat siihen, että Afrikassa toimivat kiinalaiset suuryritykset ovat 
hyvässä asemassa voidakseen tukea inhimillisen pääoman kehittymistä paikallista työl-
lisyyttä edistämällä, koulutuksella ja taitojen kasvattamaisella sekä teknologian ja osaa-
misen siirroilla kohdemaissa tapahtuvan toimintansa ja sijoitustensa kautta. On merkit-
tävää, että nämä mahdollisuudet vaihtelevat sektorien ja maiden välillä johtuen sektori- ja 
konteksti sidonnaisten olosuhteiden eriäväisyyksistä. Afrikan maiden hallitukset voivat 
onnistuneesti hyödyntää kiinalaista taloudellista toimintaa omien maidensa inhimillisen 
pääoman kehittämisen tukena. Tämä kuitenkin edellyttää toiminnan integrointia isäntä-
maan kansallisiin kehitysohjelmiin ja -politiikkalinjauksiin. 
Tutkimus antaa panoksensa Kiinan ja Afrikan maiden välisen taloudellisen yhteistyön 
ymmärtämiselle ja tarjoaa tapauspohjaista empiiristä näyttöä mahdollisista vaikutuksista 
inhimilliselle pääomalle Afrikassa.
Avainsanat: Kiina-Afrikka taloudellinen kanssakäyminen, inhimillisen pääoman kehitys, 
riippuvuusteoria, inhimillisen pääoman teoria, monikansalliset yhtiöt, ulkomaiset suorat 
investoinnit
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1 Introduction
1.1 China–Africa economic engagement
Over the last two decades, the world has witnessed renewed economic engagements between 
China and Africa. This engagement is largely visible in the form of trade, investments and 
exchange of aid between African countries and China. Driven partly by China’s need to 
secure resources to sustain its own economic development (Konings, 2007), the current 
Chinese presence in Africa is said to be economically motivated, unlike its previous 
stint, which was ideologically driven and during which China supported independence 
movements across African nations (Schiere, 2011). Currently, China – officially, the People’s 
Republic of China – has trade, investment and aid links with 53 African countries, with 
the exception of Swaziland, which is the sole African country to recognise the Republic of 
China (Taiwan) as the official representative of China. 
While the scale of the China–Africa economic engagement remains significant today, 
it has undoubtedly been affected by shifting global economic trends in the past few years 
(Atkins, Brautigam, Chen, & Hwang, 2017; Brautigam, Diao, McMillan, & Silver, 2017; 
Calabrese, 2016). The sharp decline in global commodity prices in 2014 and China’s domestic 
economic slowdown have significantly influenced the economic engagement, most notably 
in trade (Atkins et al., 2017). China remains Africa’s largest trade partner, after surpassing 
the United States (US) in 2009 (Atkins et al., 2017). In 2016, China–Africa bilateral trade 
volumes stood at US$128 billion, which was lower than the 2014 value of US$215 billion 
(China Africa Research Initiative (CARI), 2018a). In 2016, the largest importers of goods 
from China were South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria, while the largest exporters of goods to 
China were Angola, South Africa and the Republic of Congo (CARI, 2018a). The main 
constituents of China’s imports from Africa are natural resources such as crude oil, iron ore 
and copper products (Eom, Hwang, Xia, & Brautigam, 2016). Following the decrease in 
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global commodity prices, the value of African exports has been adversely affected, leading 
to an increase in the trade imbalance between Africa and China (Atkins et al., 2017).
Although trade has been the backbone of Sino–African economic engagement, China’s 
foreign direct investments (FDIs) in Africa are equally significant and continue to grow 
at a steady rate (Atkins et al., 2017). He and Zhu (2018, p. 110) note that ‘China’s FDI 
into Africa started late, grew fast and stabilized in the 2010’s’. While Chinese FDI flows to 
Africa witnessed a decline from 2013 (US$3.4 billion) to 2016 (US$2.4 billion), which 
was attributed to the global slump in commodity prices and China’s economic slowdown 
(Atkins et al., 2017), the overall stock of Chinese FDI in Africa continues to grow. In 2016, 
Chinese FDI stocks in Africa reached US$40 billion, an increase from the 2015 figure of 
US$34 billion (CARI, 2018b). In terms of location, Chinese FDIs are distributed among 
the ‘most promising, high growth and economically diverse’ African countries (Brautigam 
et al., 2017). Although, resource rich countries such as Nigeria and Zambia have hitherto 
attracted much of the Chinese investments, a growing number of investments are also 
being made in non-resource rich countries, including Kenya and Tanzania (Atkins et al., 
2017; Chen, Dollar, & Tang, 2015). Thus, the driver of Chinese investments is not just the 
presence of natural resources but a range of factors such as market size, availability of labour 
and other country factor endowments (Chen et al., 2015). 
The sectoral composition of Chinese FDI in Africa is increasingly varied with 
mining, construction, manufacturing, finance and research and development (R&D), 
and technology services representing the top five recipients in 2015. These trends in 
Chinese investments represent opportunities to bridge the infrastructure deficit, foster 
industrialisation in African countries and facilitate the integration of African economies 
into the global economy (Chen, Ukaejiofo, Xiaoyang, & Brautigam, 2016; He & Zhu, 2018). 
The most visible Chinese FDI actor in Africa is the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) of the 
central government; however, other actors such as SOEs owned by the local government 
and non-SOEs all play crucial roles in shaping the investment relations. Investments in 
the extractive sectors and infrastructure projects are mostly controlled by the central 
government SOEs, while medium- to large-sized Chinese private enterprises and local 
government SOEs invest mainly in manufacturing and agriculture. Small-sized Chinese 
private enterprises are mostly found in the retail and light industry sectors (He & Zhu, 
2018; Renard, 2011).
Apart from trade and investments, another prominent feature of China’s economic 
engagement with Africa is financial aid. Although China’s development assistance to Africa 
is still not on par with that of traditional Western donors, the country is fast becoming 
an important development partner for Africa (Brautigam, 2011). China’s development 
assistance to Africa is mainly directed towards infrastructure development, agricultural 
projects and industry development through grants, concessional loans and zero-interest 
loans (Brautigam, 2011; Zafar, 2007). In the past, such financial packages have funded 
heavy infrastructure projects such as the Kribi deep-water port in Cameroon and the 
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Addis Ababa–Adama Expressway in Ethiopia. At the most recent summit of the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held in Beijing in September 2018, China pledged 
a sum of US$15 billion in foreign aid to Africa (FOCAC, 2018). Included in the pledge 
was debt relief on interest-free loans due to mature by the end of 2018 for ‘least developed 
countries, heavily indebted and poor countries, landlocked developing countries and small 
island developing countries that have diplomatic relations with China’ (FOCAC, 2018). 
As illustrated above, China’s economic engagement is robust, and running alongside 
the deepening engagement are concrete expectations from China and African countries. 
Through its economic activities on the African continent, China seeks to promote its own 
economic interests. It expects to gain access to natural resources to fuel its industrialisation, 
access to new markets for its exports and to new frontiers for its multinational companies 
to expand into in view of its Go Out policy (㉮ฟཤㇿ␎) (Agbebi, Stenvall, & Virtanen, 
2018; Alessi & Xu, 2015; Haroz, 2011). Likewise, African governments expect the economic 
relationship with China to yield concrete gains that will contribute to socio-economic 
development in their respective countries and in the continent as a whole. 
African governments seek economic gains that will spur industrialisation and 
infrastructure development, catalyse growth in several economic sectors and lead to job 
creation, skill development and technology transfer (Ayodele & Sotola, 2014; Hanauer & 
Morris, 2014). On another level, some African leaders view China as a viable development 
partner and model (Adem, 2016; Sautman & Hairong, 2007). This is largely due to the fact 
that increased economic activities, as a result of China’s engagement, have the potential 
to trigger economic modernisation in Africa on an ongoing basis (Adem, 2016). Further, 
China’s economic success, which saw it emerge as the second largest economy in the world 
and lift a large proportion of its population out of poverty, in a relatively short period is 
a feat that most African leaders aspire to replicate (Adem, 2016). The goal for African 
countries is to mitigate the potential negative effects of the engagement while maximising 
the opportunities for socio-economic development in their respective countries
While this engagement no doubt presents opportunities, it also presents challenges 
for both parties. Valid concerns have been raised about the effects of the engagement 
on local manufacturing industries and the difficulties it presents for macro-economic 
management, industrialisation and governance in Africa (Ajakaiye, 2006; Kaplinsky, 
McCormick, & Morris, 2007; Oyejide, Bankole, & Adewuyi, 2009; Wang, 2007; Zafar, 
2007). Consequently, China’s increasing influence and economic engagement on the 
African continent has garnered intense scrutiny, evoking varied reactions across the world 
(He & Zhu, 2018). While some hold the view that the engagement will positively impact 
development in Africa, others have adopted a more cautious approach and yet others have 
challenged it by labelling it as neo-colonialism. The prominence of this topic, whether 
in popular media or academic discourse, reinforces the notion that China can heavily 
influence the development of African economies (Brautigam et al., 2017), and this could 
be either negative or positive. 
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Though numerous articles have been written on this topic in popular media, primarily 
questioning the motives behind China’s presence on the continent and speculating the 
effects of its engagement on Africa’s development trajectory, Brautigam (2009) argues 
that their conclusions do not hold up to scrutiny. Despite wide-ranging interest in this 
phenomenon, academic literature based on rigorous empirical studies are few compared to 
non-academic articles (Brautigam et al., 2017), Thus, there is a need for systematic studies 
that aim to examine the economic engagement, its characteristics and its effects on Africa’s 
development (Ado & Su, 2016; Brautigam et al., 2017). 
Ado and Su (2016), in their exploration of the current state of knowledge on Sino–
African economic engagement, note that many existing studies analyse the engagement 
from the perspective of China’s need for Africa’s natural resources and report findings in 
win-lose terms. Further, these studies lack methodological and theoretical rigour, which 
in turn necessitates more ‘institutional and theoretically demanding perspectives’ on 
the Sino–African engagement (Ado & Su, 2016, p. 56). In response, this study uses the 
theoretical lens of dependency theory to understand China’s engagement in Africa, its 
characteristics and its implications. Further, this study employs human capital theory and 
related literature on human capital to understand the human capital development (HCD) 
dynamics of the engagement and the possible outcomes from an HCD perspective. 
The HCD effects of China’s engagement in Africa constitute one of the most 
contentious issues in Sino–African discourse (King, 2013). Many experts have questioned 
the potential of the investments to add value to African industries and contribute to 
HCD (Ancharaz, 2013; Tull, 2006). Adding to these doubts are claims of nefarious labour 
practices used by Chinese enterprises operating in Africa. Chinese companies have been 
accused of importing workers from China (Chellaney, 2010), being reluctant to hire local 
workers (Flynn, 2013), offering low wages to local employees, providing little or no training 
or opportunities for career advancement (Gandolfo, 2015; Kamwanga & Koyi, 2009) and 
subjecting workers to poor working conditions (Human Rights Watch, 2011) (see Agbebi, 
2018, 2019). While some studies have addressed the HCD-related issues of the engagement, 
their coverage is nested within broader issues (see Agbebi, 2018, 2019) such as Chinese aid 
in Africa; industrialisation (Brautigam, 2009); social and cultural dimensions of Chinese 
investments in Africa (Liu, 2009); and trade unionisation and labour conditions in Africa 
(Baah & Jauch, 2009). In other words, while these studies offer a glimpse into issues, they 
lack an in-depth discussion of the HCD dynamics of the engagement (Agbebi, 2019). 
Although a few research studies have investigated the claims of nefarious labour practices 
by Chinese companies in Africa, and some have refuted or provided nuanced insights into 
these claims, there remains a gap in the knowledge of Sino–African economic engagement 
from a HCD perspective. This gap particularly concerns the issue of how the relationship 
enhances or constrains HCD on the continent (Kaplinsky et al., 2007). Bridging this gap 
calls for more in-depth research and reliable evidence on the HCD dynamics, opportunities 
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and contributions of Chinese economic engagement (CEE) in Africa (King, 2013; Oya & 
McKingley, 2016).
1.2 Research aim, objectives and questions
The overall aim of this research is to enhance the understanding of CEE in Africa and 
its implications for HCD in Africa. Specifically, this research aims to examine the HCD 
contributions of CEE in Africa and the host government’s role in leveraging the engagement 
for HCD. The objectives of this research are to examine the nature and characteristics of 
CEE in Africa and empirically investigate in what ways, if any the engagement contributes 
to HCD in Africa by exploring the case of a Chinese multinational company (MNC) – 
Huawei – operating in Nigeria. Thus, this study seeks to answer the following research 
questions: 
RQ1: What are the nature and characteristics of CEE in Africa?
RQ2: In what ways, if any, does CEE contributes to HCD in Africa?
RQ3: Do African governments leverage CEE for HCD? If so how?
This thesis comprises the following four sub-studies that address the research questions and 
objectives. 
Sub-study 1: Dependency theory: A conceptual lens to understand China’s presence 
in Africa?
Sub-study 2: Towards a framework for understanding the outcomes of economic 
engagement with Africa: A human capital development perspective
Sub-study 3: China in Africa’s telecom sector: Opportunities for human capital 
development? A case of Huawei in Nigeria. 
Sub-study 4: Exploring the human capital development dimensions of Chinese 
investments in Africa: Opportunities, implications and directions for further 
research
Table 1 below shows the research questions that are addressed in each sub-study.
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Table 1. Research questions covered in sub-studies
Research questions Sub-study 
1
Sub-study 
2
Sub-study  
3
Sub-study 
4 
What are the nature and characteristics of 
CEE in Africa? X X
In what ways, if any, does CEE contributes 
to HCD in Africa? X X
Do African governments leverage CEE for 
human capital development? If so how? X
Sub-studies 1 and 2 are both conceptual studies that are aimed at unpacking the 
phenomenon of CEE in Africa. Using dependency theory, Sub-study 1 analyses China’s 
presence in Africa and examines the nature and characteristics of the relationship by 
explaining what it is, what it is not, how it works, why it is important and what it means 
for Africa’s development. This sub-study addresses the research gaps explained earlier, 
contributes to a better understanding of Sino–African engagement and its dynamics, and 
creates a basis for understanding the possible effects of the engagement. Sub-study 2 utilises 
both dependency theory and human capital theory to further explore Sino–African 
economic engagement and what it means for HCD in Africa. The framework presented in 
Sub-study 2 can guide investigations on the potential outcomes of economic engagements 
such as the Sino–African one. 
Sub-studies 3 and 4 are empirical in nature; they investigate the contributions and 
implications of CEE for HCD in Africa with the help of a case study involving a Chinese 
multinational enterprise (MNE). Specifically, these sub-studies analyse the HCD-related 
effects of Huawei’s operations and practices in Nigeria. While Sub-study 3 focuses on 
the effects of Huawei’s investment on training and skills transfer in Nigeria, Sub-study 
4 examines three HCD dimensions: employment, training and skill building, and the 
knowledge and technology transfer effects of Huawei’s investment in Nigeria. Further, Sub-
study 3 also addresses how the government leverages the engagement for HCD. It generates 
reliable evidence on the HCD dynamics of the Chinese engagement, its contributions and 
its implications for HCD in Africa. Taken together, Sub-studies 1 to 4 address all the 
research questions of this study. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis
This doctoral thesis is a compilation thesis comprising two main parts: Part I is the synthesis 
or the summary, and Part II consists of four original research articles, which are referred to 
as sub-studies. Part I consists of six chapters. They are organised as follows.
This introductory chapter presents the background of the study, along with the research 
aims, objectives and questions. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical and conceptual frame 
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of this research, examining the dependency theory and the concept of human capital 
from a theoretical and practical lens. The chapter, first, explains dependency theory and 
its relevance to this study. Secondly, it discusses HCD by examining HCD strategies, 
the role of MNEs in human capital formation and how the government policies of a host 
country may influence human capital formation. Third, the chapter presents a framework 
developed on the basis of the two theoretical underpinnings of this study – dependency 
theory and human capital theory. Chapter 3 discusses the HCD dimensions of China–
Africa engagement. It outlines the modalities that underpin China’s human resource 
development partnerships with Africa, starting with the China–Africa education 
cooperation and moving on to the HCD dimensions of Chinese enterprises’ presence in 
Africa. Chapter 4 presents a detailed account of the research methodology, including the 
philosophical foundations of this study; the research design; the research process in terms 
of case selection, data collection and analysis; ethical considerations of the study; and an 
evaluation of the research quality. Chapter 5 introduces and summarises the four original 
research articles (i.e. the sub-studies) that make up Part II of this thesis. Chapter 6, the 
concluding chapter, summarises the main contributions and conclusions of this study as 
well as directions for future research.
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2 Theoretical Background
This chapter introduces the theoretical background of this study. It consists of three parts. 
The first part reviews dependency theory and uses it to examine and understand the nature 
and characteristics of CEE in Africa. Dependency theory has been instrumental in analysing 
cross-national economic relations and systems and how they influence development at the 
national level. It remains a prominent theory within the development discourse particularly 
as it pertains to the global south. Thus, it is appropriate for understanding China’s presence 
in Africa and its implications for Africa’s development. 
The second part focuses on human capital and begins with a theoretical discussion of 
the concept. The chapter then progresses to explain the link between MNEs and human 
capital formation and the importance of host country policies to human capital formation. 
Extant literature is reviewed to highlight the crucial role that human capital plays in 
development and the role that the government plays in strengthening the stock of human 
capital. The link between MNEs and human capital formation is useful for explaining the 
potential role that Chinese MNEs could play in HCD in Africa. 
Within this thesis, dependency theory is instrumental in analysing China’s engagement 
with Africa as well as the nature and characteristics of the engagement, and its implications 
for Africa’s development. Human capital theory and related literature on human capital 
development is utilized in the analysis on the HCD dynamics and implications of China’s 
economic engagement with Africa and the role of the government in leveraging CEE for 
HCD in Africa. These two theory traditions guide and contribute individually to providing 
an analytical frame for this study. 
The third part of this chapter introduces a framework developed on the basis of the two 
theoretical underpinnings of this study – dependency theory and human capital theory 
– and related literature presented in the preceding sections. This framework is designed 
to enable management researchers to investigate the outcomes of economic engagements 
between nations. It can also be used to better understand CEE in Africa and investigate its 
potential HCD outcomes. 
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2.1 Dependency theory
Dependency theorists attempt to explain underdevelopment in many countries of the world 
by examining the patterns of interactions among nations; they argue that inequality is an 
intrinsic part of those interactions (Agbebi et al., 2018; Ferraro, 2008). Dependency theory 
is a strand of political economic thought that developed out of United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America (UNECLA) in the late 1950s, under the tutelage of Raul 
Prebisch. The theory emerged as a response to modernisation theory, which that posits 
that nations move linearly through successive growth stages, and underdevelopment is a 
result of internal deficiencies in the underdeveloped countries. Notable theorists such as 
Raul Prebisch and Andre Gunder Frank argued against this assumption that the global 
economic structure allows all nations to successfully pass through these stages of growth 
(Frank, 1966; Prebisch, 1968).
Dependency theorists argue that underdevelopment as experienced across the third 
world is a result of capital intervention rather than a condition of underdevelopment. 
Grouping global economies into central and peripheral, they stress that the same processes 
that generate development in the centre maintain the rest of the world in a dependent state 
by routing extracted wealth from the periphery to the centre. Thus, global economic forces 
rather than country-level characteristics seem to explain the disparities between and within 
nation-states. One of the key theoretical insights of dependency theory is that global capital 
flows condition development and underdevelopment.
Theotino Dos Santos (1970, p. 231), defines dependency as follows:
a situation in which the economy of certain countries perhaps the most prevailing is 
conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former 
is subjected. The relation of inter-dependency between two or more economies, and 
between these and world trade assumes the form of dependency when some countries 
(the dominant ones) can expand and can be self sustaining, while other countries (the 
dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either 
a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development.
While there is no single ideology that encapsulates dependency theory (Brown, 1985), 
Ferraro (2008) notes that the various strands of dependency theory meet on the following 
three notions. First, the international economic system is made up of an industrial centre 
and an agrarian periphery, where the centre dominates the periphery. Second, external 
forces including MNCs and international commodity markets are of significant importance 
to the economic activities in the periphery. Additionally, the ‘underdevelopment in third 
world countries is closely connected to the expansion of the advanced capitalist countries’ 
(Namkoong, 1999, p. 126). Third, the interactions between the centre and the periphery 
reinforce and intensify unequal patterns of development (Ferraro, 2008). Dependency 
theorists hold differing viewpoints on the forms of dependencies, their impact on societies 
and the solutions to overcome it. In an attempt to capture these varied viewpoints, several 
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scholars including Cardoso (1973), O’Brien (1975), Chilcote (1974) and Lall (1975) 
classified dependency theorists into three categories. Similarly, in this study, dependency 
theory is classified into three intellectual strands or schools of thought: ECLA, moderate 
and radical. 
Economists under the ECLA school of thought, such as Raul Prebisch, Osvaldo Sunkel 
and Celso Furtado, advocated for inward-directed development as a solution to dependency 
(Agbebi et al., 2018). They argued for targeted policy interventions that could help periphery 
states achieve economic development. They posited that a series of protectionist economic 
policies that allowed for the development of domestic markets and industries could lead to 
economic development in the peripheries (Namkoong, 1999). 
In the 1940s, Prebisch formulated his centre–periphery thesis, implying the existence 
of a hegemonic relationship between two elements in the world economic system, 
characterised by unequal exchange and the existence of a centre (rich advanced countries) 
that derived part of its wealth from the periphery (poor underdeveloped countries) (Love, 
1980). Prebisch (1968) attributed Latin America’s underdevelopment to its position in the 
world economy and its adoption of capitalist economic policies (see Agbebi et al., 2018). He 
rejected the idea that international division of labour was beneficial to all parties involved 
and argued that a structure whereby peripheral countries export primary commodities 
to the global north and re-import manufactured goods from those countries results in 
deteriorating terms of trade for the south and causes underdevelopment. 
Adopting neither a liberal nor Marxist stance, Prebisch still saw a way for peripheral 
countries to adjust to international economic conditions (Prebisch, 1980). He pushed for 
the adoption of import substitution policies to overcome underdevelopment in peripheral 
countries (Namkoong, 1999). He also argued for the centrality of the state in coordinating 
public and private enterprise towards overcoming the obstacles between the centre and the 
periphery. 
Osvaldo Sunkel, adopted a structuralist view, arguing that in any given structure, some 
positions lose value while others acquire value, which leads to development for some and 
underdevelopment for others (Herath, 2008). Similar to Prebisch, Sunkel (1972) believed 
that the structure of international trade led to the underdevelopment of some countries. 
He viewed dependency as a problem of relations as opposed to scarcity (see Agbebi et 
al., 2018). Sunkel argued that transnational integration increases the disparities between 
poor and rich countries, intensifying underdevelopment and national disintegration in 
the peripheral countries (Herath, 2008). To overcome dependency, he advocated agrarian 
reforms and primary exports that support the reorganisation of the industrial sector 
and satisfy the basic needs of the masses instead of an elite few (see Agbebi et al., 2018; 
Namkoong, 1999). 
Celso Furtado, also a structuralist, posited that capitalist expansion leads to an 
international economic structure where some function as part of the capitalist system, and 
others are saddled with features of a pre-capitalist system (see Agbebi et al., 2018; Furtado, 
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1973). Furtado challenged the modernisation theory argument of an evolutionary model 
of economic development. He saw underdevelopment as the result of modern capitalist 
systems penetrating into archaic structures (see Agbebi, 2018; Furtado, 1973). He believed 
that development reflected the dynamics at the centre and internal and external factors, but 
mainly external factors (Herath, 2008). To overcome dependency and underdevelopment, 
he recommended structural reforms and an increase in inter-regional trade in Latin 
America. 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto belong to the moderate school of thought, 
and they both adopted a similar approach in their analysis of dependency. While they 
recognised ECLA’s critique of the modernist notion that international division of labour 
brought advantages to all involved (Herath, 2008), they also criticised the ECLA perspective 
for not being based on an ‘analysis of the social process’, for not emphasising the ‘imperialist 
relations among countries’, and lastly for not taking into account the ‘asymmetric relations 
between classes’ (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979, p. viii).
Cardoso and Faletto did not view ‘dependency and imperialism as external and internal 
sides of a single coin’ (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979, pp. xv–xvi). Instead, they viewed it part 
of the development of underdeveloped countries, wherein the industrialisation process 
was assisted by foreign capital (Herath, 2008; Namkoong, 1999). According to Cardoso 
and Faletto (1979, p. xx), ‘a system is dependent when the accumulation and expansion 
of capital cannot find its essential dynamic component inside a system’. They identified 
three dependency situations and suggested that these forms could change (see Agbebi 
et al., 2018). The first of three is enclave economies. In such economies, external foreign 
investment capital is incorporated into the local productive process in the form of taxes and 
wages, and value is realised and increased by exploiting the local labour force for the export 
of raw materials. The second one is economies dominated by the local bourgeoisie, where 
capital accumulation and exploitation of local labour force occur internally rather than 
externally. Contemporary dependent industrialising economies signify a third new form of 
dependency, whereby MNCs dominate peripheral economies. Here, production is for the 
consumption of a privileged few and not the masses (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). 
Cardoso and Faletto argued that development in peripheral countries assumes the form 
of dependent capitalist development (see Agbebi et al., 2018). This dependent development 
evolves cyclically, producing wealth and poverty, accumulation and shortage of capital, 
employment and unemployment. They argued that such development does not result in 
a more egalitarian or just society. Their recommendations for peripheral countries were 
different from those of the ECLA theorists. They called for a ‘profound political-structural 
change’ in the form of a ‘radical political move towards socialism’ (Cardoso & Faletto, 
1979, p. xxxiv).
Scholars of the radical school of thought viewed the system as based on the excesses of 
capitalism controlled by the global north (Ferraro, 2008). Scholars who subscribed to this 
view include André Gunder Frank, Theotonio Dos Santos, Samir Amin and Immanuel 
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Wallerstein, though Wallerstein is also classified as a world system theorist. They believed 
that the core–periphery structure constrains development in the periphery and subjects 
some countries to an indefinite state of dependency. Unlike the non-Marxist ECLA 
theorists, they argued that the system could not be restructured to accommodate the 
global south as the benefits from the prevailing system largely accrued to the north. They 
concluded that the dependency cycle could only be escaped through a socialist revolution 
(see Agbebi et al., 2018; Namkoong, 1999).
In line with the non-Marxist scholars of dependency theory, André Gunder Frank 
argued that underdevelopment is the result of the historical, economic and political relations 
between the underdeveloped countries in the satellite (periphery) and the developed 
countries in the metropolis (centre) (see Agbebi et al., 2018; Frank, 1966). According 
to him, the capitalist economic system imposed a rigid international division of labour, 
in which the centre expropriated and appropriated surplus capital from the periphery 
leading to underdevelopment in many parts of the world (satellites) and development 
in a few (metropolises). Frank rejected the modernist notion that development and 
underdevelopment were related stages of growth. Instead, he viewed development and 
underdevelopment as opposite sides of a capitalist system. 
Distinguishing between the concepts of ‘undeveloped’ and ‘underdeveloped’ (see Agbebi, 
2018), he explained, ‘underdevelopment is neither original nor traditional and that neither 
the past nor present of the underdeveloped countries resembles in any important aspect the 
past of the now developed countries. The now developed countries were never underdeveloped, 
though they may have been undeveloped ’ (Frank, 1969, p. 4). Thus, Frank rejected the idea 
that underdeveloped states can achieve development by adhering to the same routes as the 
developed countries. As a solution to achieve development in the peripheries, he called for a 
socialist revolution and disengagement from the global north (Frank, 1966). 
Like Frank, Theotonio dos Santos viewed dependency as a ‘conditioning situation’ 
within the capitalist system that causes peripheral countries to remain backward and 
exploited (see Agbebi et al., 2018). According to Dos Santos, underdevelopment was a 
consequence of world capitalist expansion that perpetuated unequal relations and ensured 
development in some parts of the system at the expense of other parts (Namkoong, 1999). 
He asserted that dependency must be seen ‘as a part of a system of world economic relations 
based on monopolistic control of large scale capital, on control of certain economic and financial 
centres over others, on a monopoly of a complex technology that leads to unequal and combined 
development at a national and international level ’ (Dos Santos, 1970, p. 235).
Dos Santos rejected the idea that underdevelopment was the result of failure to 
modernise or that the relations in the international economic system are based on free 
competition. He considered trade relations as based on monopolistic control of the markets 
by the centre, which resulted in surplus generated at the peripheries being transferred to the 
dominant centre. Dos Santos (1970, p. 231) termed measures recommended by the ECLA 
theorists as ‘intermediate solutions’ as he believed that dependency ‘cannot be overcome 
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without a qualitative change in their internal structures and external relations’. Thus, he 
too proposed a social revolution as key to overcoming dependency (see Agbebi et al., 2018).
Samir Amin is another prominent dependency theorist, who subscribed to the Marxist 
approach. In line with other dependency scholars, he believed that growth at the centre 
negatively impacted the periphery (see Agbebi, 2018). Amin posited that for third world 
countries to overcome underdevelopment and dependency, they should delink from 
the world capitalist system. He believed third world countries can achieve self-reliant 
development via a socialist revolution (Amin, 1990). 
Another theorist in the Marxist tradition, though he identified as a ‘world systems 
theorist’, is Immanuel Wallerstein (Chilcote, 1984). Wallerstein, like other world system 
theorists, differed from the ECLA reformists and moderates owing to his insistence on 
a socialist revolution and from the radicals for his views that stressed the existence of a 
single world economic system and socialism at the world level (Chilcote, 1984). Wallerstein 
posited that the ‘modern world system’, which refers to the capitalist world economy, ‘with a 
single division of labour and multiple cultural systems’, characterised by unequal exchange, 
had created a new international division of labour whereby the states at the core achieved 
development at the expense of those at the periphery (see Agbebi et al., 2018; Wallerstein, 
1974). Unlike other dependency theorists, he subscribed to a model of the world economy 
that consisted of a ‘core, semi-periphery and a periphery’, where all the states played their 
respective roles in the capitalist world system (see Wallerstein, 1976). Wallerstein called for 
revolutionary socialism brought about ‘within the single division of labour that is the world 
economy and one that will require a single government’ (Wallerstein, 1974, p. 23).
Even though dependency theory has been criticised by liberal (see, Smith, 1979; Lall, 1975; 
Ray, 1973) and non-dependency Marxists (see Weaver & Berger, 1973; Weisskoph, 1979), 
and its applicability to developing countries has been challenged, particularly in the context 
of the rapid development of East Asian countries, it remains useful for analysing systems-
level relationships and cross-national economic relations and their implications for national 
level development. By challenging the basic assumptions emanating from modernisation 
theory that previously structured development policies and strategies, dependency theory 
remains a relevant construct in the search for new development paradigms for Africa 
(Lumumba-Kasongo, 2015). It has played an important role in questioning some Western 
ideas on development in the global south, particularly policies and ideas that have largely 
ignored the specific developmental needs of the third world (Agbebi & Virtanen, 2017; 
Mason, 2015). Dependency theory has and continues to influence development discussions 
today, bringing to the fore the need to examine patterns of economic development 
specific to countries in the global south and strategies that recognise the specific needs 
and development priorities of these countries (Mason, 2015; Bohkari, 1989). Ideas from 
dependency theory have influenced discussions on south-south cooperation and provided 
a framework for investigating south-south economic relations (Amanor, 2013). Although, 
dependency theory has traditionally been used to analyse North-South relations, it remains 
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a relevant theory in the development discourse and at the forefront of the discourse and 
literature on African international relations (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2015; Mason 2015), as 
such it is an appropriate lens from which to examine Sino–African economic engagement 
(Friedrichs, 2019). For these reasons, dependency theory has been used in this study to 
analyse China’s presence and economic engagement in Africa. 
Within the international political economy theory traditions, dependency theory 
has been utilised in analysing the increasing engagement between China and Africa, the 
impact of the engagement on Africa’s development trajectory and its international relations 
(Friedrichs, 2019; Mason, 2015; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2011). Examined through the lens of 
dependency theory, Friedrichs (2019) argues that increased economic engagement between 
China and African countries can be said to have a positive effect in that it reduces Africa’s 
dependency on the west in the areas of foreign trade and investments. From a dependency 
point of view, increasing trade relations between China and Africa challenges US hegemony 
and western capitalism (Friedrichs, 2019; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2015; Campbell 2007). 
However, Mason (2017) argues that while Africa’s engagement with non-traditional 
partners such as China, presents Africa with numerous viable alternative options, which 
gives some African countries the leeway to challenge, negotiate or avoid negative aspects of 
their engagement with traditional partners and IFI’s in the west, this, doesn’t necessarily 
translate to mean African countries can escape the dependency trap. According to Mason 
(2017:87) with economic motives being the driving force of the engagement, it could be 
argued that this engagement ‘simply establishes a new form of dependency in place of the old 
one’. Mason proposes that two new kinds of dependency can be observed today in Africa, 
a ‘self-imposed dependency’ which reflects a situation where a country fails to balance 
their engagement with China against their engagement with the west such as the case 
of Zimbabwe and an ‘oscillating dependency’ such as the case of Angola, which reflects 
a situation whereby a country experiences advances and set-backs and in its attempt to 
balance its economic engagement with China against the West. He concludes that the 
entrance of other non-traditional actors like China could lead to a case of ‘managed multi-
dependency’ that could see African countries achieve relative autonomy in their economic 
dealings with other countries.
On the question of dependency in China-Africa engagement, Friedrichs (2019), leaning 
on arguments on interdependency in cross-national economic relations, hold the view of 
interdependency in China-Africa engagement. On the level of symmetry or asymmetry of 
interdependence between China and Africa, Friedrichs (2019) concludes that it is impossible 
to reach a definite conclusion as asymmetries point to opposite directions and cancel 
each other out. According to him, patterns of interdependence are highly asymmetrical 
in non-resource rich countries that lack commodities to balance their trade with China, 
while resource rich countries can rely on commodity exports to counter balance Chinese 
imports, while resource poor countries run huge trade deficits that further exacerbates 
their dependence. Similar to Mason (2017), Friedrichs’ argument holds that some countries 
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might be more dependent on China than others, however there exists mutual sensitivities 
and vulnerabilities for both China and African countries within the engagement. 
Chapter 6.1, Sub-study 1 (see Agbebi & Virtanen 2017) and to a lesser extent sub-study 2 
(Agbebi, Stenvall & Virtanen 2018) encompasses this study’s analysis on China-Africa 
economic engagement using dependency theory. Leaning on arguments from dependency 
theory, this study holds the view that China-Africa relationship suggests a case of growing 
interdependency. Furthermore, beyond the promise of economic partnership, solidarity 
and cooperation, China’s engagement with Africa poses a challenge for Africa to question 
the status quo, re-orient their values and adopt an inward focus on their developmental 
needs and priorities. 
While dependency theory is useful in analysing China’s engagement in Africa and 
implications for development in Africa, and as such addresses one of the aims of this 
research, its uses are limited to analysing systems level relationships, and holds no usefulness 
in understanding the HCD dynamics and implications of Chinese engagement with Africa. 
Thus, this study engages HC theory and literature on human capital formation in order 
to understand the HCD dynamics and implications of Chinese engagement with Africa. 
The next section introduces human capital theory as the second theory underpinning this 
study. 
2.2 Human capital theory
2.2.1 Human capital: A conceptual and theoretical discussion
The theory of human capital (Fitzsimons, 1999) has its roots in Adam Smith’s The Wealth 
of Nations and the emergence of classical economics in 1776. Human capital theory is one 
of the foundational theories of socio-economic development. It is a modern extension of 
Adam Smith’s idea that worker’s capabilities are a kind of capital (Agbebi et al., 2018) and 
that the ‘skill, dexterity, and judgment of labor’ are ‘one of the two great determinants of 
the wealth of nations’ (Leslie & Brinkman, 1988, p. 5). This idea was then popularised in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s by leading economists, such as Mincer (1958), Schultz (1961) 
and Becker (1964), who claimed that human capital, like physical and financial capital, is 
a core element of production and economic growth. They argued, for instance, that the 
component that explained the economic success of the US was its people – their skills, 
abilities, knowledge and competencies together made up the country’s human capital (see 
Agbebi et al., 2018; Denison, 1962; Krueger, 1968; Schultz, 1961). Schultz (1961) later 
popularised the idea that the quality of human capital can be linked to economic growth. 
He explained that human capital refers to the knowledge and skills that people acquire 
through education and training and that this capital is a product of deliberate investment 
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that yields profitable returns for the individual, organisation and society if effectively 
utilised (see Agbebi et al., 2018). 
It is widely acknowledged that ‘the wealth of nations is highly dependent on the 
extensiveness of the knowledge of its people’ (Alexander, Salmon, & Alexander, 2015, p. 
113). This is because the knowledge and skills embedded in a nation’s population, or an 
organisation’s work force, is ultimately what drives other factors of production (Harbison, 
1973). Hall and Jones (1999, p. 84) attributed the significantly higher productivity of some 
nations to their ‘social infrastructure’, which refers to ‘the institutions and government 
policies that determine the economic environment within which individuals accumulate 
skills and firms accumulate capital and produce output’. Implicit in the literature on human 
capital theory is the understanding that this so-called social infrastructure can only be built 
by humans with adequate level of skills. In other words, human capital is the intellectual 
force behind social infrastructure that explains the differences in economic development 
and productivity among countries of the world. 
The concept of human capital is multidimensional and operates at various levels, such 
as national, organisational and individual. While organisations see it as the economic value 
of their workforce’s core competencies and skills, nations see it as the capacity of their 
population to generate economic growth. (Kwon, 2009; Mincer, 1981; World Economic 
Forum, 2013). Kwon (2009) studied different approaches to the concept, including the 
individual perspective – how human capital is linked to the knowledge, skills, education, 
abilities, attitudes and behaviours embedded in an individual (Beach, 2009; Garavan, 
Morley, Gunnigle, & Collins, 2001). He also identified a second viewpoint under which 
human capital is considered the accumulation of skills and knowledge through educational 
activities. Importantly, this view does not concede that knowledge and skills can be acquired 
throughout an individual’s lifespan and experiences. The third viewpoint, identified by 
Kwon (2009), focuses on the productive capability of human capital. Here, human capital is 
seen as a source of economic productivity (Frank & Bemanke, 2007; Rodriguez & Loomis, 
2007; Romer, 1990). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) similarly defines the concept as ‘the knowledge, skills, competencies and attributes 
embodied in individuals that facilitate the creation of personal, social and economic well-
being’ (2001, p. 18). 
Human capital can be seen as the target of investments in education and training as well 
as a means to generate economic benefit through the utilisation of workers’ capabilities in 
the production process along with other factors of production like financial capital, land 
and machinery. In fact, it is increasingly seen as the most important factor of production 
(Blair, 2011). As noted earlier, human capital is of importance at all levels – individual, 
organisation/firm and national – as summarised below:
1. Individual level: At the individual level, human capital has an impact on individual 
wage growth (Becker, 1993; Denison, 1962; Schultz, 1961). At the core of human 
capital theory is the notion that workers with different levels of skills and knowledge 
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differ in productivity, and this in turn accounts for the differences in their earnings 
(Blair, 2011). Thus, investments in training and education can result in an increase 
in skills and knowledge and thus promote an increase in earnings. 
2. Organisation/firm level: Human capital affects organisational/firm productivity 
(Denison, 1962; Ferreira & Hamilton, 2010; Schultz, 1961) via core competencies, 
competitive advantage (Lepak & Snell, 1999) and workers productivity (Lucas, 
1988; Rosen, 1999).
3. National/societal level: At a national level, the stock of human capital in a country 
positively affects national economic growth (Romer, 1990) as well as socio-political 
development (Alexander, 1996; Sen, 1999).
The following section takes a closer look at human capital at a national level, as this level is 
the most relevant to this study. 
Human Capital at a National Level
Becker (1995, p. 1) highlights the importance of human capital by stating that ‘the primary 
determinant of a country’s standard of living is how well it succeeds in developing and 
utilizing the skills, knowledge, health and habits of its population’. As proposed in classical 
human capital theory (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1958; Schultz, 1971), human capital at a 
national level consists of the education, skills and know-how of a country’s population, and 
it is positively and strongly correlated with national economic growth (Becker, 2002; Jones 
& Romer, 2010; Romer, 1990). By increasing their stock of human capital, countries can 
attract both foreign and domestic investments, and through such investments, countries 
acquire capital that in turns contributes to economic growth and development (Kapstein, 
2002). 
Although many factors other than human capital like business climate, availability 
of infrastructure, accessibility of institutions, and regulations, are known to impact 
national socio-economic growth and development, these factors are ultimately based on 
human factors; in that, they are created by human beings. Thus, human capital serves as 
the fundamental intellectual power driving all the other factors. Human capacity is the 
foundation for organisational and institutional capacity. It can be argued that without 
human development, social, economic or political development cannot be achieved 
(Burkey, 1993). 
Human capital comprises education, skills acquisition, and work-related values and 
attitudes. It plays a critical role in economic growth and poverty reduction (Florida, 
Mellander, & Stolarick, 2008; Schultz, 1961). From a macro-economic perspective, 
accumulating human capital improves productivity of labour, increases returns on capital, 
enables technological innovations and thus facilitates sustainable growth (Son, 2010; 
Wilson & Briscoe, 2004). 
Effective development and deployment of human capital is crucial to realising Africa’s 
economic potential. In fact, it is seen as the first step to eradicating poverty and overcoming 
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other socio-economic challenges (Hall & Jones, 1999; Lynham & Cunningham, 2006). 
Mincer (1993) buttresses the importance of human capital to economic development by 
suggesting that unlike the success of the Marshall plan in Europe, foreign aid to least 
developed countries failed mainly because of the absence of human capital. Although 
lacking in physical capital at the end of the Second World War, Europe possessed the 
necessary skilled labour force required for a modern economy; therefore, the injection 
of physical capital was sufficient to spur economic recovery. However, in the case of least 
developed countries, physical and human capital and other essential elements for economic 
development were lacking. Hence, the injection of only physical capital in the form of 
financial aid was simply not enough to spur economic growth. 
The development and deployment of human capital is crucial for economic growth 
on the African continent. Concrete human capital policies and strategies, alongside 
investments in education and capacity building, are needed to build Africa’s stock, which 
in turn can positively impact economic growth and development (Hall & Jones, 1999; 
Lynham & Cunningham, 2006). Many countries in Africa have opened up their markets 
to FDI with the hope of fostering economic growth and development in their economies. 
FDI inflows help generate increased economic activities in host countries, which in turn 
generate increased revenue that could be invested in education and training (Slaughter, 
2002). 
Various studies have shown that FDI not only represents a source of capital for 
growth in host countries but can also facilitate HCD through interactions between the 
host countries’ policies, education and training systems on the one hand and the MNEs’ 
education and training activities on the other (Blomström & Kokko, 2002; Ritchie, 2002; 
Slaughter, 2002; te Velde, 2002). This is particularly important for developing countries, 
especially African countries, that struggle with a weak institutional framework for HCD, 
resource constraints and negligible investments in education and training (Agbebi, 2018). 
FDIs are capable of addressing several HCD challenges that African countries face, as 
MNCs are active providers of employment, education and training, skills enhancement and 
technology transfer (Majeed & Ahmad, 2008) – crucial elements in achieving economic 
growth and development. Additionally, the influx of FDI can prevent brain drain, as many 
African countries lose highly educated and skilled members of their working population 
to employment opportunities abroad. Higher inflow of FDIs, with more MNEs setting up 
subsidiaries, can result in employment opportunities in the host countries and potentially 
stem the flow of highly skilled labour out of Africa.
The growth of human capital is both a condition and consequence of economic growth 
and development (see Agbebi et al., 2018; Blomström & Kokko, 2002; Mincer, 1981). 
Studies on the links between FDI and human capital have shown that not only is human 
capital enhancement one of the long-lasting benefits of FDI but also an increasingly 
important factor in attracting FDI (Blomström & Kokko, 2002; Kapstein, 2002). This 
study argues that the influx of Chinese MNEs into Africa brings opportunities for HCD 
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in Africa. These organisations can potentially contribute to HCD in their host countries by 
employing local workers and training and equipping local workers with industry-specific 
skills, which will ultimately increase the stock of the host country’s human capital. 
2.2.2 Multinational enterprises (MNEs) and human capital formation
Various streams of research have identified human capital and FDI as the key drivers of 
growth in both developed and developing countries. While individually both human capital 
and FDI affect growth, Miyamoto (2003) notes that they also reinforce each other. Human 
capital has been identified as one of the determinants of inward FDI (Noorbakhsh, Paloni, 
& Youssef, 2001). On the one hand, the presence of a highly skilled workforce attracts FDI, 
and on the other hand, FDI plays an important role in human capital formation as MNEs 
are increasingly seen as active providers of education and training to host countries. This 
complementary effect is referred to as the virtuous circle of human capital and FDI as ‘host 
countries experience continuous inflow of FDI overtime by increasingly attracting higher 
value-added MNEs, while at the same time upgrading the skill contents of pre-existing 
MNEs and domestic enterprises’ (Miyamoto, 2003, p. 9). 
Understanding the role of FDI in development still remains the focus of research across 
many fields (Narula & Pineli, 2019): some studies have focused on the importance of human 
capital as a determining factor for FDI (Dunning, 1988, 2009; Lucas, 1990; Zhang & 
Markusen, 1999), some studies have investigated the link between FDI and human capital 
formation (Blomström & Kokko, 2002; Kapstein, 2002; Miyamoto, 2003; Slaughter, 2002) 
and others have focused on the impact of government policies on human capital formation 
(te Velde, 2002). 
Most importantly for developing countries, FDI not only induces an influx of capital but 
also potentially enhances skills and fosters technology transfer in host countries through 
MNEs’ interactions with the host country’s labour market and local industry (Majeed & 
Ahmad, 2008; Slaughter, 2002). Noorbakhsh et al. (2001) note that in developing countries, 
the role FDI plays is even more crucial given their resource and skill constraints. The key 
potential benefits of FDI for a host country include access to capital, new technology, new 
management know-how and skills transfer to improve local competitiveness, development 
of local industry through forward and backward linkages and increased participation in 
global and regional supply chains. Drawing on the aforementioned studies, specifically 
those examining the linkages between FDI and human capital formation, this study 
identifies the following three dimensions by which FDI, through the activities of MNCs, 
can facilitate human capital formation in host countries: employment creation, training and 
skills building, and knowledge and technology transfer. The following sections examine 
these dimensions in detail, enumerating how the interactions between MNCs and the host 
country’s labour market, policies and industry could enhance human capital formation. 
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Employment Creation
Among the many potential benefits of inward FDI to host countries is employment 
creation. FDI is said to have a direct and indirect effect on job creation, as well as qualitative 
and quantitative effects on employment (Abor & Harvey, 2008), which could be positive 
or negative. Quantitatively, MNEs could potentially affect the volume of employment in 
host countries, as jobs are created directly when MNEs set up new subsidiaries or expand 
existing ones in host countries (Golejewska, 2002). Indirectly, MNEs can contribute to 
employment through linkages with local distributors and suppliers and spillovers in the 
host economy (Golejewska, 2002; Peng, 2014). 
Some studies have argued that the indirect employment effects of MNEs are more 
significant than the direct employment effects (Lall, 2000; Miranda, 1994). According to 
Miranda (1994), the number of direct employment opportunities created by MNEs can 
be limited; however, their potential to contribute to indirect employment in their value 
chains is abundant. Lall (1979) speculates that MNE contributions to indirect employment 
may possibly outweigh its contributions to direct employment. In order to realise indirect 
employment creation, linkages between MNEs and local firms are essential, where foreign 
MNCs subcontract to local companies and thus contribute to increased economic activity 
and the creation of additional jobs in the host country. In addition, MNEs can generate 
indirect employment through their contribution to higher wages, which in turn can lead 
to an increase in employment through multiplier effects in the host economy (Golejewska, 
2002). While the positive effects on employment abound, MNEs can also negatively impact 
employment quantitatively by, for example, divestment or closure of subsidiaries in a host 
country or changes to the parent company’s structure and strategies (Golejewska, 2002)
In terms of qualitative effects on employment, FDI can affect job security, wages, skills 
and labour productivity (Abor & Harvey, 2008; Golejewska, 2002). MNEs generally pay 
higher wages than domestic firms operating in the same industry, particularly in developing 
countries (Aitken, Harrison, & Lipsey, 1996) and in high technology and high skilled 
sectors (Golejewska, 2002). This is often a strategy to inhibit labour turnover. Additionally, 
MNEs tend to invest more in employee training than their local counterparts in order to 
enhance the skills and know-how of their employees, which promotes skills upgrade in 
the host country (Abdullah, 1994; McKendrick, Doner, & Haggard, 2000; Ritchie, 2002; 
Tan & Batra, 1995). They can also influence local suppliers to invest more in employee 
training to meet their quality standards. This training effect can also percolate to local 
competitors, who may emulate MNE practices. Further, MNEs are likely to offer greater 
job security than local firms because of their size, competitiveness and the need for a stable 
workforce. However, this is also dependent on the motives of the MNE as those seeking 
low-wage labour are less likely to offer secure employment – they may choose to move their 
operations to other locations if wage levels rise (Golejewska, 2002). 
In short, the employment effects of MNEs – whether quantitative or qualitative – are 
highly dependent on the sector and host country characteristics. Golejewska (2002) notes 
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that the ‘size, resources endowment and development levels’ of the host country as well as 
the effectiveness of the local institutions in creating conditions favourable for inward FDI 
influence employment opportunities. More importantly, the quality of the labour force 
plays a key role in attracting employment-generating FDI. The presence of human capital 
has been identified as one of the main determinants of FDI (Dunning, 1977, 1988, 2009; 
Lucas, 1990; Zhang & Markusen, 1999). The size of the local markets, access to other markets 
and the growth prospects of the host country also affect MNEs’ location decisions and 
subsequently the employment effects (Golejewska, 2002). Vacaflores, Mogab and Kishan 
(2017) observed that the host country’s FDI policies mainly determine the country’s ability 
to attract employment-generating FDI and influence the overall employment effects.
Factors particular to the MNE such as the size of the investment, particularly in 
labour-intensive sectors, also have an impact on the employment-generation effect of the 
MNE (Brancu & Bibu, 2014; Golejewska, 2002). Countries with export-oriented regimes 
and abundant low cost labour can promote employment generation by attracting export-
oriented FDI (Golejewska, 2002). The sector and industry of investment also affect 
employment generation: some sectors are more labour-intensive than others (Brancu & 
Bibu, 2014). Other influential factors include the MNE strategy, motivation and mode of 
entry. For example, the direct employment effect of a greenfield investment is remarkably 
different from that of a brownfield investment (merger and acquisition). With greenfield 
investments, the setting up of new MNE subsidiaries generates more positive employment 
(Brancu & Bibu, 2014) opportunities than mergers or acquisitions, which rarely create jobs, 
especially at the initial stages (Brancu & Bibu, 2014). MNEs seeking low-skilled labour 
also have an impact on the quality of employment generated in the host country. Such 
MNEs lead to a concentration of low-skilled jobs in the subsidiary, while high-skilled jobs 
are localised in the parent company or another subsidiary (Golejewska, 2002).
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
(2010), jobs created by MNE subsidiaries have risen steadily over the years in both 
industrialised and developing countries, but particularly in developing countries. The 
employment effects of FDI are important for developing countries (Brancu & Bibu, 2014), 
especially African countries, because of the prevalence of low wages and unemployment 
(Asiedu, 2004). In order to tackle unemployment and underemployment in Africa, 
increase in economic growth needs to be accompanied by further creation of decent 
jobs (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2019). Given that over half the working 
population in Africa lives in poverty, the ILO (2019) stresses that the creation of quality 
jobs remains ‘the greatest challenge’. 
Many developing countries in Africa strive to attract FDI as a means to create new jobs 
in their economies (Javorcik, 2012). This is because MNEs are known to create jobs and in 
particular ‘good jobs’ – ones that offer higher earnings, better security and greater prospects 
for personal and career development (Javorcik, 2012) than their local counterparts in the 
host country.
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Employment generation is one of the most crucial objectives of economic development 
planning in many African countries. Many of these countries have a growing working-age 
population and are likely to face rising levels of unemployment and underemployment as 
a result. In addition, many African countries hope to leverage their population growth for 
economic development, and to achieve this, they need to foster the creation of quality jobs. 
Attracting FDI is a promising route for African governments to generate employment and 
foster development in their countries, and the intention is no different with Chinese FDI 
in Africa. 
The influx of Chinese FDI presents opportunities for employment creation in many 
African countries. The sectoral diversity of Chinese FDI in Africa, especially investments 
in manufacturing and infrastructure development, has created ample potential for job 
creation in many of the host African countries (Calabrese, 2016; He & Zhu, 2018). Chinese 
investments in labour-intensive manufacturing industries such as apparel, footwear and 
retail have been a key contributor to employment creation. Calabrese (2016) notes that 
changes in the Chinese economy have enhanced employment generation in Africa. As 
China restructures its production from light manufacturing to higher-value activities, it 
will relocate its light manufacturing sectors, which employ up to 85 million people, to low-
income, developing countries with abundant workforce. With the right policies in place, 
African countries can capitalise on this opportunity, leveraging it for job creation in their 
respective economies (Brautigam, 2016; Lin, 2016). 
While existing research has discussed the employment-generation potential of 
Chinese FDI, most studies have focused on certain sectors such as manufacturing or 
construction. Very little is known about the job creation potential in high-tech sectors 
such as telecommunications. This research draws on empirical evidence from Huawei, 
a leading Chinese telecommunications MNE operating in Africa’s telecom industry, 
to provide a complete picture of the employment effects of Chinese FDI in a high-tech 
sector and deeper insights into the processes and channels involved. This research argues 
that continued Sino–African economic engagement offers opportunities for employment 
creation in African countries; however, these opportunities depend on several factors 
including the sector, workforce composition of the host country in terms of skills and host 
country policies and linkages with local industry.
Training and Skills Building
Training is one of the modes through which MNEs influence HCD in host countries. 
Transfer of technology and managerial knowledge to the host country is achieved 
through the training of local employees. For MNEs, employee training forms the basis of 
their growth and competitiveness. They often provide some training to their employees, 
typically more than the local counterparts (McKendrick et al., 2000; Ritchie, 2002; Tan & 
Batra, 1995; te Velde, 2002). Blomström and Kokko (2002) note that the type and extent 
of training imparted depends on factors specific to the host country (local workforce 
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education and skills level, policy) and the MNE (size, level of operations, mode of entry, 
industry). For example, MNEs operating in high-tech sectors, characterised by the use 
of complex technology, rapid development of new technologies and innovation, have 
to engage in regular employee training to keep their employees abreast of technological 
advancements (te Velde, 2002).
MNEs in the service sector often invest more in training in order to strengthen the 
skills and know-how of their employees (Blomström & Kokko, 2002). Large firms, that 
employ a skilled workforce, invest in R&D, are export-oriented, have foreign capital 
participation, and use quality control measures are more likely to train their employees 
(Blunch & Castro, 2007; Tan & Batra, 1995). The training opportunities provided by the 
MNEs are also guided by their investment motive. For example, while efficiency-seeking 
MNEs may offer limited employee training, as the availability of low skill and low wage 
labour is their motive for investing in the host country, strategic asset-seeking MNEs tend 
to engage in regular and specific training as they often implement new complex technology 
that requires highly skilled and trained workers (te Velde, 2002).
The training activities of MNEs in host countries often extend to other beneficiaries 
such as the employees of MNE’s suppliers, subcontractors and customers. The training 
could be formal or informal and may be delivered on the job, in seminars, in classrooms 
sessions, via formal schooling, in international training courses, or through overseas 
education, depending on the skills needed (Blomström & Kokko, 2002). In addition to 
training, MNEs also play a role in the formal education of the host country, though their 
impact is mostly visible in tertiary education than in primary or secondary education 
(Blomström & Kokko, 2002). MNEs contribute to educational development, mostly 
through scholarships to employees, scholarships and grants to benefit communities in 
the host country, financial and general support to tertiary institutions, and by setting up 
educational centres as part of their corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Blomström & 
Kokko, 2002; te Velde, 2002). Te Velde (2002) shares the example of Shell’s subsidiary 
in Nigeria, which spent up to US$60 million on community development, with US$1.2 
million on vocational training and US$2.5 million on secondary and tertiary scholarships. 
While such voluntary contributions to education and training in the host country are 
often driven by commercial and image-building motives, their positive effects on the host 
country, particularly in developing countries, cannot be denied. 
Blomström and Kokko (2002) argue that the training effects of MNEs are more 
significant in developing countries as most struggle with a weak public education system, 
which results in a relatively weak knowledge base. To the extent that MNCs offer more 
training than the local firms in the host country, MNEs can have a significant effect on 
human capital formation in the host country (te Velde, 2002). 
Within the context of CEE in Africa, Brautigam (2016) notes that increasing Chinese 
investment in manufacturing and construction sectors may yield reasonable learning and 
skills transfer for the local industry and workers. According to Oya and McKinley (2016), 
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Chinese FDI has the potential to catalyse the process of building an industrial workforce 
in Africa. This is because Chinese firms specialise in those sectors and activities that 
African countries have limited expertise in, such as large-scale infrastructure construction 
of dams, roads, bridges and railway systems. This situation creates opportunities for the 
development of specific technical skills acquired mainly through on-the-job training. 
Further, the potential for HCD via training and skills building in African countries is 
immense, particularly for large enterprises operating in high-tech sectors, where the use of 
complex technologies is common and requires specific training of the local workers. This 
study examines the training and skills-building effects of the Chinese MNE Huawei in 
Nigeria. 
Knowledge and Technology Transfer
According to Blomström and Kokko (2002, p. 10), FDI remains one of the most important 
channels for knowledge transfer along with international trade. This is because MNEs 
‘produce, own and control most of the world’s advanced technology’ as they fund a large 
proportion of the world’s R&D activities. The interaction of an MNE subsidiary with the 
local economy via subcontractors, suppliers, distributors and labour market can result in 
the transfer of technology to the host country. According to Rugraff and Hansen (2011), 
scholarly discussions on the interactions between MNEs and the local industry often revolve 
around two main concepts: ‘spillovers’, which are simply the impacts of the interactions, 
and ‘linkages’ which denote the mode of the interactions. 
Knowledge spillovers from MNCs to the local industries are often highlighted as one 
of the benefits of inward FDI and constitute, possibly, the most important reason that 
countries strive to attract FDI (Slaughter, 2002). Kokko (1994) notes that host countries 
hope to gain from FDIs in terms of product, process and distribution technology as well 
as managerial and marketing skills. According to Blomström and Kokko (1998), these 
spillover effects often occur in host countries where MNEs, through their operations, 
influence local firms in their own industry or in other industries. MNEs serve as channels 
for the transfer of technology from developed to developing countries (UNCTAD, 2010). 
Although, it can be argued that the transfer of knowledge and technology in many cases 
is incidental and not central to the MNE’s mission, diffusion of technologies may also 
occur in host countries through external effects or spillovers (Blomström & Kokko, 2002). 
Technology transfer could occur through linkages between MNCs and local suppliers 
and distributors (Batra & Tan, 2002; Saggi, 2004). Linkages between MNEs and local 
producers in the host country can also benefit local companies. For instance, Botelho and 
Pfister (2011, p. 211) note that business linkages between ‘MNCs and SMEs can allow 
small local producers to benefit from an exchange of relevant information and technical 
knowledge, promote production efficiency, production growth and market diversification, 
among other benefits’. 
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Spillovers from FDI can be categorised into two groups: horizontal and vertical (Blyde, 
Kugler, & Stein, 2004; Rugraff & Hansen, 2011). Horizontal spillovers are intra-industry 
spillovers that occur between firms at similar stages of the production process (see Agbebi, 
2019). Spillovers in this category involve the transfer of sector-specific knowledge that 
would benefit the foreign firm’s competitors (Rugraff & Hansen, 2011). 
One of the horizontal spillover mechanisms is via labour turnover/mobility. The mobility 
of employees from MNCs to local firms contributes to the diffusion of knowledge from the 
MNC to the local host economy. MNCs train their employees when they join the firm and 
on an ongoing basis in order to keep them abreast of the latest technology and industry 
advancements. When these employees leave the firm to join other local firms or start their 
own firms, the knowledge and skills they have acquired may spillover to the local industry 
(Kokko, 1994). Despite attempts by MNEs to protect their valuable stocks of knowledge, 
spillovers are still likely to occur as MNCs cannot completely prevent its advantages from 
spilling into the local industry (Rugraff & Hansen, 2011). Markusen (1991, p. 19) sums up 
this situation as follows: ‘It is difficult to prevent knowledge from being transferred to the local 
employees of the firm who work with and observe the technical and managerial techniques of 
the firm. After some initial learning period, the worker becomes capable of opening a rival 
firm or transferring their knowledge to new firms in related industries. This becomes a positive 
externality effect for the local economy arising from, the presence of the multinational ’. 
Labour turnover though traditionally viewed as a hindrance to industry growth, because 
of the loss of human capital, is viewed more favourably in certain sectors than others, 
including the high-tech industry. Shankar and Ghosh (2013) identify two distinguishing 
features of high-tech industries with regard to labour mobility: the persistence of 
substantial labour turnover and the positive perception of labour turnover in relation to 
other industries. This is so because labour mobility enhances the flow of knowledge and 
skills across firms and in turn benefits the firms in the high-tech industries. Shankar and 
Gosh (2013, p. 120) posit that ‘high tech industries are likely to experience both very high 
rates of turnover among productive workers and positive industry outcomes resulting from 
such turnover’. 
Fosfuri, Motta and Ronde (2001) note that the more general the on-the-job training 
is, the higher the mobility of trained workers, whereas the more specific the on-the-
job training is, the lower the expected mobility of trained workers, which affects the 
technological spillovers in the host country. The level of technological advancement in 
the host country as well as the presence of a skilled workforce also determines the level 
of technological or knowledge spillovers that can occur. High labour mobility and more 
technological spillovers are likely to occur in host countries that have a highly skilled labour 
force and are technologically advanced (Fosfuri et al., 2001). Studies have shown that low 
levels of absorptive capability among local firms because of technological backwardness 
may reduce the potential for FDI to generate spillovers (Fosfuri et al., 2001). Kokko (1994) 
adds that spillovers can only occur to the level at which the host economy is capable of 
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absorbing them. They increase when the absorptive capability of host country firms is high 
(Borensztein, de Gregorio, & Lee, 1998; Kokko, 1994). 
It is important to note that certain MNEs are more likely to contribute to knowledge 
and technology transfer in the host countries. O’Donnell and Blumentritt (1999) argue 
that factors such as the strategic role of the subsidiary within the corporation; the level of 
technology used in its processes; the type and level of training it provides to its employees, 
suppliers and customers; and the level of international interdependence of the subsidiary, 
all determine knowledge and transfer effects of the MNE to its host country. 
Another form of spillover is vertical spillovers. Batra and Tan (2002) argue that vertical 
spillovers tend to occur between firms in a customer–supplier relationship. This typically 
occurs via exposure to MNC products and services, provision of technical support by 
MNCs to clients, supplier/distributor training and discussions leading to knowledge 
transfer that enhance the productivity and capabilities of the firms involved (Agbebi, 
2019; Slaughter, 2002). MNEs often provide their suppliers with technical and managerial 
training to improve their capabilities in the value chain (Botelho & Pfister, 2011). Close 
linkages between foreign MNCs and their local suppliers and customers create an 
environment where the local suppliers and customers can assimilate some technology and 
skills from the MNC (Porter, 1980). Access to or the use of a MNE’s advanced products, 
inputs and services can enhance the productivity of domestic firms (see Agbebi, 2019; 
Driffield, Munday, & Roberts, 2002; Miozzo & Grimshaw, 2008). 
While knowledge diffusion may occur via formal training organised by the MNE for its 
suppliers and distributor, it can also occur informally (Agbebi, 2019). Local firms can also 
learn informally from MNCs through trade shows, marketing events, supplier/distributor 
discussions and training, exposure to MNC products, technical support and reverse 
engineering (Slaughter, 2002). Through interactions with MNCs, local supplier firms 
can gain basic knowledge of products, quality control measures and technology processes 
(Wisarn & Bunluasak, 1995). Kokko (1994) concludes that spillovers can only occur to the 
level at which the host economy is capable of absorbing them. Thus, substantial linkages 
between MNCs and the local industry may promote knowledge transfer and technology 
diffusion. 
With regard to Chinese FDI in Africa, Mohan (2016) argues that substantial backward 
and forward linkages between Chinese MNEs and local suppliers and distributors, even in 
extractive sectors, could lead to gains in local technical expertise, which in turn can foster 
industrialisation in the host countries. He adds that with the help of local content policies 
and a well thought-out strategy to support the establishment of linkages, host African 
countries can maximise the opportunity for knowledge and technology diffusion via 
CEE. In addition, as Chinese enterprises gain more knowledge and confidence in the local 
industries, the potential to build substantial linkages increases along with workforce and 
supply chain localisation in the host African countries. This study examines the knowledge 
and technology transfer effects of CEE in Africa via the case of Huawei in Nigeria. It 
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explores the presence and the level of linkages between the Chinese MNE Huawei and 
local firms in Nigeria.
2.2.3 Implications of host country policies on human capital formation 
Understanding the role of FDI in development remains the focus of many research 
efforts (Narula & Pineli, 2019). While studies support the notion that FDI contributes 
to economic growth, the negative effects of FDI and MNE operations have also received 
considerable attention. MNEs are important contributors to education; skills, knowledge 
and technology transfer; and employment opportunities, particularly in developing 
countries (te Velde, 2002). However, their activities may also crowd out domestic firms 
(Kokko & Thang, 2014), deepen socio-economic disparities, increase income inequality 
(Tsai, 1995) and cause economic fragmentation in the host countries (Firebaugh & Beck, 
1994). This is why Rugraff and Hansen (2011) call MNEs both a ‘boon’ and ‘bane’ for 
the host economy. Whether actively or unintentionally, the activities of MNEs in host 
countries have the potential to impact the host country, its people and its economy. Hence, 
governments must develop strong policies and strategies to maximise the benefits while 
mitigating the negative effects of FDI (te Velde, 2002). 
Narula and Pineli (2019) note that the presence of FDI is not ‘a sine qua non’ for 
development. That is, while MNE operations in a host country could contribute to human 
capital formation, the primary goal of MNEs is to maximise profit for its shareholders, and 
not to catalyse development. Studies have highlighted various factors that determine the 
impact of FDI on the host country, including host government policies (Dunning, 1997), 
MNE investment motives (Enderwick, 2005), MNE entry strategies (Görg & Grenaway, 
2004), the absorptive capacity of the local industry (Lall & Narula, 2004) and the linkages 
between MNEs and local firms (Altenburg, 2000; Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2006). 
Te Velde (2002) posits that to enhance MNC contributions to human capital formation, 
host country governments should develop effective and strategic education policies, which 
will improve the chances of attracting MNCs into their country, and incentivise training 
and skill-upgrading activities. Te Velde (2002) identifies myriad policies targeting FDI 
attraction, FDI upgrade, and linkage promotion between MNCs and local firms, noting 
that successful strategies often address these ideas in an integrated manner. Strategies 
that involve a combination of specific FDI policies (fiscal and financial incentives, FDI 
promotion, export processing zones, tax subsidy systems, etc.) as well as macro-economic 
polices (liberal trade regime, competition policy, privatisation, infrastructure and 
workforce skills, education and skill generation, etc.) have been employed successfully in 
attracting FDI for development (te Velde, 2002). Domestic education policies designed to 
increase the skills and knowledge of locals are vital to ensure quality skilled labour in the 
host country, which is an attractive factor for asset-seeking MNCs (Blomström & Kokko, 
2002; Noorbakhsh et al., 2001).
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Rugraff and Hansen (2011) find that host governments are increasingly seeking avenues 
to promote knowledge and technology spillovers directly through the use of local content 
requirements, tariffs or subsidies and indirectly through infrastructure programmes and 
education policies. While host governments strive and compete to attract FDI for the 
many benefits it can foster in their economies, Narula and Pineli (2016) argue that an 
effective FDI policy should, apart from attracting funds, prioritise the enhancing of ‘local 
embeddedness of the MNEs’. In an effort to develop and deepen linkages between MNEs 
and the local industry, some host governments actively provide support to local suppliers 
so as develop their capabilities and absorptive capacity (Rugraff & Hansen, 2011). In some 
cases, host governments promote the development of clusters to attract MNEs and thus 
increase the potential for local firms to benefit from MNE presence (de Propis & Driffield, 
2005; Thompson, 2002)
Although the activities of MNEs can promote HCD in host countries, it is important 
to remember that their primary motive is profitmaking. Thus, host country governments 
need to deploy policies to steer inward FDI towards their nation’s developmental objectives 
and leverage these investments for HCD. This study examines the role of the Nigerian 
government in leveraging Chinese investments for HCD.
In summary, this section introduced human capital theory and its theoretical 
foundations. Perspectives of various scholars have been presented to concretise the 
importance of human capital at the individual, organisational and national level, for 
development. Subsequently, the section explored the links between human capital and 
FDI, stressing that while both boost economic growth, they also reinforce one another: 
the presence of human capital attracts FDI, and FDI plays an important role in human 
capital formation. The discussion further explored the role that FDI plays in human 
capital formation in host countries, noting specifically the benefits in terms of employment 
creation, skills building and training and knowledge and technology transfer. Recognising 
the crucial role that host country policies and strategies play in leveraging FDI for HCD, the 
section discussed different policy measures and strategies that host country governments 
can adopt. 
2.3 Towards a framework for understanding the 
outcomes of economic engagement
Leaning on dependency theory, human capital theory and related literature on the 
interactions between FDI and HCD detailed in the preceding sections, this study proffers 
a framework that can enable management researchers investigate the outcomes of economic 
engagements between nations. It can be used to better understand CEE in Africa and 
investigate the potential outcomes of the engagement for HCD in Africa. The framework 
has been discussed in detail in Sub-study 2 of this thesis (see Agbebi et al., 2018). 
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The proposed framework is based on the premise that economic and political 
transformations around the world have led to significant adjustments in the way nations 
interact with each other economically. These new forms of economic engagements, such 
as the emergence of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), the growing 
engagement among BRICS nations, increasing economic engagement between developing 
countries from the global south, and intercontinental/regional economic engagement 
(ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations, NAFTA – North American Free 
Trade Agreement, EU – European Union, ECOWAS – Economic Community of West 
African States etc.), are all relevant to the development discourse in general and to Africa 
in particular (Mason 2017). They also open up new avenues for research, particularly on the 
effects and outcomes of these engagements for countries and business organisations. 
Research from disciplines such as economics, political science, international relations 
and international business (Boateng & Glaister, 2002; Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Leung, 
Bhagat, Buchan, Erez, & Gibson, 2005; Wenping, 2007) have embraced this discourse. 
However, its influence on mainstream management and international development 
research remains limited. Specifically, management researchers lack an overarching 
framework such as this which combines theoretical arguments that cuts across international 
political economy, economics and management theory traditions. Such a framework can 
guide them in investigating these new patterns of economic engagements – how these 
engagements interact with the context of a country, its institutions and organisations, as 
well as the potential outcomes of such engagements. The framework put forward in this 
study can also be used to investigate policy transfer, the diffusion of management practices 
and technological innovation and how countries and organisations can leverage and 
appropriate benefits from economic engagements with other countries to achieve their 
domestic and strategic objectives.
This framework presented in Sub-study 2 (see Agbebi, Stenvall & Virtanen, 2018) 
identifies three variables as crucial to understanding the outcomes of economic engagement: 
the nature and dynamics of the economic engagement, the national context i.e. the 
contextual features of the nation state, and the degree of readiness of the nation state and 
its institutions to appropriate the benefits of the economic engagement. The subsequent 
paragraphs explain each variable in this framework. Figure 1 presents an illustration of the 
framework. 
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Nature and dynamics of the economic engagement: This study argues that in order to 
understand the outcomes of an economic engagement between countries, it is important to 
understand the nature of the engagement. This entails an analysis of the overall relationship 
between the countries involved; their historical, cultural and economic ties; and the 
dynamics of their relationship. 
The importance of historical, cultural and economic ties in bilateral relations among 
countries cannot be overemphasised. Dependency theorists have long argued that the 
rampant exploitation and inequality witnessed in north-south relations have its roots in 
the colonial past and the imperial links that persisted after decolonisation (Frank, 1966; 
Haq, 1976; Prebisch, 1968). Frank (1966) argues that it is impossible to formulate a robust 
development theory and policy without an analysis and understanding of the past economic 
history that led to the current economic state. An analysis of historical economic events 
remains a large part of the development discourse today. For instance, China’s historical ties 
with Africa, its solidarity and support for African states in their independence movements 
and its anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist stance are still largely relevant to the present 
day China–Africa engagement and its implications for development in Africa (Alden & 
Alves, 2008; Cooke, 2009; Power & Mohan, 2008). History influences policies (Brands & 
Suri, 2016) and thus the relations among countries. 
Figure 1. A conceptual framework for studying the outcomes of economic engagement in Africa 
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Understanding the nature and characteristics of an engagement can offer insights into 
the potential benefits, costs, unintended outcomes and implications of the relations for 
the countries involved. Researchers could seek to identify the type of relationship (for 
example south-south, north-south), the economic and political power relations between 
the countries involved in the engagement, the motives of the engagement and the extent 
of the economic relations (for example, is it based on reciprocal trade and investments, or 
primarily dominated by aid and development assistance). Such an exploration can reveal the 
dependent/interdependent nature of the relations, the costs and potential to appropriate 
benefits from the engagement, the possible outcomes both negative and positive of the 
engagement. Further, compatibility in motives can be indicative of how likely the engaged 
countries are to benefit or lose from the engagement. Incongruent motives could lead to 
exploitation as posited by the dependency theory (Frank, 1966; Dos Santos, 1970). Thus, 
examining the nature and dynamics of the economic engagement is useful to understanding 
the engagement and predict or explain its potential outcomes.
National context: The contextual features and endowments of the host country can also 
influence the potential outcomes of an economic engagement. Endowments and features 
such as the presence of natural, human and cultural resources; the level and potential of 
socio-economic development and HCD; the potential for economic growth; the governance 
system; and political leadership all constitute aspects by which a nation’s attractiveness 
can be determined (Dunning, 2009; Jelinek, 1992; Krueger, 1968; Porter, 1990). These 
features also partly determine the potential outcomes of economic engagements with other 
countries. Although the role of these factors in influencing international business and 
attracting FDI has been highlighted by management researchers (Davies & Ellis, 2000; 
Hodgetts & Rugman, 1995), they have not, to the best of the author’s knowledge, been used 
to develop a comprehensive framework to study the outcomes of economic engagements in 
Africa. 
National and organisational readiness: The third variable included in this framework 
is the degree of readiness of the country’s institutions and organisations. The level of 
national and organisational readiness and capability – the ability of a country’s institutions 
and organisations (public and private) to effectively harness the opportunities within 
the engagement while limiting the risks – will determine the outcomes of economic 
engagement with other countries. The level of readiness can be determined by examining 
the presence or absence of vision, socio-economic agenda, policy and policy-making and 
implementation infrastructure (Krueger, 1984; Stone, 1999). 
The influence of government policies on economic conditions is indisputable (Porter, 
1990), Through policy decisions, governments can to some degree manage the impact of 
economic engagements on their economies (O’Donnell & Blumentritt, 1999). Research 
has shown that local organisations can benefit from economic engagement depending on 
their capabilities and absorptive capacity (Lall & Narula, 2004; Narula & Pineli, 2016; 
Rugraff & Hansen, 2011). The readiness and capacity of the institutions and organisations 
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can also be determined by the country’s stock of human capital, as successful design and 
implementation of policies are dependent on the human resources in the institutions and 
organisations. As mentioned in several studies, human capital is critical for national and 
organisational success (Becker, 2002; Lepak & Snell, 1999; Romer, 1990; Schultz, 1961).
It is important to stress that the outcomes of economic engagements vary, can be 
positive or negative and are not limited to economic benefits (Hirst & Thompson, 1999; 
Stiglitz, 2006). Studies have shown that economic engagement between countries via trade 
and investments have contributed to and in some cases negatively impacted economic, 
social, human and cultural development. Local organisations through their interactions 
with foreign firms stand to benefit from the diffusion of knowledge, technology and 
management practices (Boateng & Glaister, 2002; Liu & Song, 1997). Likewise such 
interactions can also have adverse effects on local firms (Kokko & Thang, 2014; Tsai, 1995; 
Firebaugh & Beck, 1994). Engagement outcomes may also be at a societal level: interactions 
between different societies could lead to the adoption or adaptation of behaviour, traditions 
or norms affecting communication, lifestyle, and cuisine, all of which can in turn impact 
social and economic behaviour and business activities. While the framework presented 
in this study has highlighted some relevant variables that can influence the outcomes of 
economic engagements, it is by no means exhaustive or adequate for every research study 
examining these new patterns of economic engagements and their outcomes. Thus, this 
framework can be adapted by researchers to fit their research aims and objectives. Sub-
study 2 of this thesis (see Agbebi, Stenvall & Virtanen, 2018) discusses this framework at 
length and demonstrates how it could be deployed to investigate the potential outcomes of 
CEE in Africa from an HCD perspective. 
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3 Human Capital Development Dimensions 
of China–Africa Economic Engagement
The preceding chapter presented dependency theory and human capital theory as the 
main theoretical underpinnings of this research. This was used to analyse the nature 
and characteristics of the engagement and the implications for HCD as well as develop a 
framework that can guide in investigating the potential outcomes of CEE from a human 
capital development perspective. This chapter builds on the discussions in the earlier 
sections by focusing on the HCD dimensions of CEE in Africa. The discussion in this 
chapter highlights the primacy of HCD within China-Africa economic engagement. It is 
important to clarify that though the terms HRD and HCD can be said to be conceptually 
distinct, it has been used synonymously in this chapter to follow the convention within the 
official framework and documents of FOCAC. 
3.1 China’s human resource development partnerships in Africa 
China’s human resource development (HRD) partnership with Africa is enacted through 
different modalities such as educational cooperation (scholarships, student exchanges, 
Chinese language training, vocational education, educational projects, Chinese teachers 
in Africa, higher education cooperation and exchanges between China and Africa, short-
term professional training) and enterprise training. The significance of HRD cooperation 
in China–Africa engagement is illustrated in China’s official position, which states that 
the following: 
The Chinese government will give full play to the role of its “African Human 
Resources Development Foundation” in training African personnel. It will identify 
priority areas, expand areas of cooperation and provide more input according 
to the needs of African countries so as to achieve greater results. Exchange of 
students between China and Africa will continue. China will increase the number 
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of government scholarships as it sees fit, continue to send teachers to help African 
countries in Chinese language teaching and carry out educational assistance project 
to help develop Africa’s weak disciplines. It intends to strengthen cooperation 
in such fields as vocational education and distance learning while encouraging 
exchanges and cooperation between educational and academic institutions of both 
sides (People’s Republic of China, 2006: Part IV).
The official rationale suggests that by engaging in HRD cooperation, China acts as partner 
to African countries and will assist them on their journey towards ‘self-reliance and 
independent economic development’ (FOCAC, 2000). According to King (2013), China’s 
HRD cooperation with Africa can be positioned as a ‘collaboration for development’ 
within the discourse of south-south cooperation. However, elements of it can also be traced 
to the soft power discourse that stresses China’s role as ‘agency and strategist’. While the 
official narrative is one of cooperation and partnership, espousing principles of mutual 
benefit and solidarity, in practice, the Sino–Africa HRD cooperation does not levy equal 
financial costs on both parties. The majority of the awards, scholarships, volunteers and 
experts are provided by China to Africa. King (2013, p. 10) surmises that mutual benefit 
in this case does not refer to an ‘exact financial symmetry in China-Africa relations’, but 
to overall reciprocity when the entirety of China–Africa economic engagement and HRD 
cooperation are considered. While Africa benefits from HRD support in education, 
health and agriculture, Chinese enterprises also seek to gain from the China–Africa 
Development (CAD) fund, which supports their establishments in African countries and 
the internationalisation of Chinese firms. In addition, through culture and education 
promotion, the internationalisation needs of Chinese universities and Chinese enterprises 
are fulfilled (King, 2013). 
The following sub-sections will briefly outline the modalities of China–Africa HRD 
cooperation, starting with the China–Africa education cooperation, followed by a 
literature-based analysis of the HCD dimensions of Chinese enterprises in Africa. 
3.2 China–Africa education cooperation
King (2013) identified seven modalities by which China’s education cooperation with 
Africa is actioned. One of them is cooperative educational programmes that sees African and 
Chinese universities partnering on education and research. A flagship programme under 
this is the 20+20 project that pairs 20 Chinese universities/higher education institutes 
(HEIs) with 20 African universities/HEIs. Two other modalities are Chinese teachers in 
Africa and Chinese language teaching in Africa. Currently, there are 59 Confucius institutes 
in 46 countries across Africa. Another modality is short-term professional training courses 
for African civil servants to learn about and from China’s development experience. Further, 
under African studies and training of professionals in China, 10 universities in China 
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have established African research institutes or centres and two African universities have 
research centres for Chinese studies. Chinese education cooperation also consisted of (1) 
high-level exchanges, wherein delegations of African professionals visit China and Chinese 
professionals visit Africa, and (2) student exchanges between China and Africa.
However, there is still a dearth of research on Chinese educational cooperation in 
Africa. For instance, little is known about the selection criteria for awarding Chinese 
scholarships to African students – it is not clear if the selection is done by the local elite or 
by merit. Similarly, a number of questions about the outcomes of the cooperation remain 
unanswered, such as, do the students return to their home countries after their studies? 
When they do, how are they received by their own public and private sectors? Are they 
recruited by Chinese or local firms in their home countries? More investigations in this 
area can contribute to wider discussions on the socialisation of African youth via Chinese 
higher education, brain drain in African countries, and Chinese soft power elements 
in Africa. While a few studies, to some extent, have addressed the short-term training 
programmes offered to African civil servants (King, 2013; Tugendhat, 2014), no systematic 
assessments have been undertaken to determine the knowledge transfer effects of these 
trainings and their political implications, if any. 
3.3 Human capital development dimensions of 
Chinese enterprises in Africa
Aid, trade and investments appear to be intricately linked within China–Africa engagement. 
King (2013) notes that there are multiple links and connections between formal training 
support by the Chinese government and the presence of Chinese enterprises in Africa. 
According to King (2013), the inclusion of the private sector was a key part of China’s aid 
reform. The establishment of the foreign aid fund in 1993 enabled Chinese enterprises to 
build joint ventures or business cooperation with recipient countries. 
The CAD fund was also set up to ‘enhance China-Africa economic cooperation and 
promote Africa’s development’ by encouraging and supporting Chinese enterprises 
to invest in Africa (CADFund, 2019). The fund covers investment in sectors such as 
agriculture, manufacturing, energy, electric power, transportation, telecommunication, 
urban infrastructure, logistics, oil and gas, mineral resources and industrial parks. Perhaps, 
the differentiating factor between China’s economic aid to Africa and the CAD fund is 
that projects are allocated by countries in the latter, while the former operates through 
market-based mechanisms. 
Whether or not there is a clear and coherent strategy on the part of China for linking 
its HRD commitments in Africa, it is clear that the presence of Chinese business in Africa 
has shored up interest in acquiring Chinese language skills, in establishing China as a study 
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destination for African students and in acquiring specialised training in key areas with 
substantial Chinese investments such as infrastructure construction, agriculture, etc. 
The presence of Chinese enterprises in Africa, whether linked to development assistance 
from China or the result of project-based investments by large, medium and small Chinese 
enterprises, carries implications for HCD in Africa, particularly in the areas of training, 
skills development and knowledge and technology transfer. According to Liu (2013), Chinese 
operations in Africa can be traced back to the late 1980s when the Chinese government 
granted a batch of companies the right to operate externally, including in Africa. Many of 
those companies had experience in dealing with aid projects in Africa since the 1960s and 
were thus experienced in areas of transportation, communication, electricity, water and 
housing infrastructure. These Chinese SOEs subsequently implemented similar projects 
funded by the Chinese government and other parties such as the African development 
bank, World Bank, Arab funds, etc. (Liu 2013). The launch of the Go Out strategy in the 
year 2000 saw more Chinese outward foreign investments abroad, including from Chinese 
private enterprises into Africa.
With regard to skills and technology transfer, perhaps one of the earliest projects 
– which was seen as a symbol of China–Africa relations from the 1960s to the 1980s 
(Sautman & Hairong, 2007) and studied extensively by Sino–African scholars, Jamie 
Monson and Liu Haifang – is the TAZARA railway. It is a 1860-km long bi-national 
railway line, linking Tanzania and Zambia (see Liu & Monson, 2013; Monson, 2008, 2009, 
2013). The TAZARA railway was designed and constructed between 1968 and 1976 with 
technical and financial assistance from China in the form of long-term free interest loan 
of over US$400 million. In her study of the impact of the railway project on the African 
workers, Monson (2008) concludes that there was significant exposure to and acquisition 
of new skills among African individuals working on the project. The TAZARA railway 
project, which is the biggest infrastructure project in the history of Chinese development 
cooperation in Africa, stresses the importance of technology transfer, technical skills and 
knowledge acquisition in Chinese-financed projects in Africa.
Outside of projects like the TAZARA railway, there are several avenues for HCD 
within Chinese enterprises operating in Africa. While the employment-creation, skills-
building and training or technology transfer effects will differ across Chinese enterprises, 
investments from SOEs, private MNEs and small- and medium-sized enterprises all present 
opportunities for HCD gains and challenges. 
In terms of employment creation, several studies show evidence of substantial 
employment creation and increasing workforce localisation via Chinese enterprises in 
Africa (Sautman & Hairong, 2015; Tang, 2016). Sautman and Hairong (2015) in a survey of 
over 400 Chinese enterprises and projects in Africa found workforce localisation rates to be 
over 85%. The construction sector is a notable example of the scale of the employment effect 
generated by Chinese companies in Africa. The labour-intensive nature of the construction 
sector has seen high demand for unskilled and semi-skilled workers. He and Zhu (2018) 
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note that for every US$1 billion of Chinese investments in infrastructure, around 110,000 
jobs have been generated in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. The construction of the Chinese-
funded Imboulou dam in Congo Brazzaville reportedly employed up to 2000 Congolese, 
400 Chinese and 20 German workers (Tang, 2016). Of course, the employment effects of 
Chinese investments may differ according to the skills composition in the host country, 
the duration or time sensitivity of a project, the size of the enterprise, its strategy and the 
sector it operates in. 
A report published by the Angolan Ministry of Finance listing the employment 
composition in 30 infrastructure projects by Chinese enterprises declared that out of a 
total of 3136 employees, 1872 (59.7% of the entire workforce) were Angolans and 1264 were 
Chinese (Tang, 2016). The relatively high number of Chinese workers was explained by the 
lack of skilled labour in post-war Angola and the need to meet the completion deadline of 
the project (Tang, 2016). There are economic benefits to supporting workforce localisation 
in Chinese enterprises in Africa; in that, it is relatively cheaper to employ local labour than 
to bring in Chinese workers. For efficiency-seeking Chinese enterprises, drawn by cheap 
labour costs to African countries, a workforce localisation strategy – to take advantage of 
the low labour costs – is in line with the investment motive. 
Further, as many African governments are keen to leverage Chinese investments for 
employment creation in their respective countries, some governments have placed strict 
regulations on employing locals and offer only a restricted number of work permits for 
expatriate workers. For example, the local content policy in Angola has strict regulations 
on employing foreign employees and mandates a workforce localisation rate of 70% for 
companies, though exceptions may be made under certain circumstances and in certain 
sectors, where the required skills are not locally available (Tang, 2016). Countries such 
as Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia and Tanzania have employed local content initiatives to 
various degrees in various sectors of their economy to leverage foreign investments for 
local job creation, knowledge transfer and linkages between MNCs and local industries. 
Eom’s (2018) study on the impact of Chinese investments on skills transfer in Rwanda’s 
manufacturing sector underscores the role of policies and strategies of the host government 
in leveraging Chinese investments for job creation. The study finds that the Rwandan 
government has collaborated directly with Chinese enterprises in light manufacturing 
sectors (e.g. garment, footwear, consumer electronics assembly) to realise the aims of its 
national employment programme, which is to create 200,000 off-farm jobs yearly (Eom, 
2018). The study emphasises how host country policies that require MNCs to implement 
training and skills transfer programmes can contribute to structural transformation. 
The duration of operations of Chinese businesses also determines their level of 
workforce localisation. Evidence suggests that the longer a business operates in Africa, 
the higher its workforce localisation rate. Tang (2016), in an analysis of the employment 
practices of Chinese firms in Africa, surmises that unfamiliarity with the quality of local 
workforce and urgent completion deadlines of certain public projects often contribute to 
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the initial low localisation rates in Chinese projects and enterprises in Africa. He further 
notes that these short-term measures tend to change when Chinese companies reach a more 
stable development phase in the host country. Tang cites an example of the Huajian Shoe 
factory in Ethiopia. At the start of their operations in January 2012, the Chinese enterprise 
had over 300 Chinese workers, but by July 2012, local workers had replaced around 100 
of the Chinese employees. Sustained Chinese investments in labour-intensive sectors such 
as manufacturing, mining, construction can lead to employment gains for host African 
countries. 
Corkin (2012) offers another perspective on the issue of skills and local employment 
in Chinese enterprises. Corkin’s study of the construction sector in Angola highlights the 
importance of context and skills culture in understanding the labour dynamics within 
Chinese construction companies in Angola. The study identifies the lack of adequately 
skilled labour in Angola to be one of the biggest barriers to workforce localisation in 
Chinese companies. Moreover, in cases where skilled Angolan labour is available, it is 
usually expensive, sometimes equal to or more than expatriates with considerably more 
experience. Differences in cultural understanding of work ethics and communication 
barriers, stemming from language issues, also have implications for local labour training 
and employment. 
Training and technology transfer is an important component for most organisations 
– ‘a means to an end, a way of ensuring sustained income generation’ (King, 2013, p. 
112). While most Chinese enterprises engage in some form of training, whether formal 
or informal, the level of training differs depending on the nature of their operations and 
the sector they operate in. According to Tang (2016), the most common form of training, 
particularly in low-tech enterprises, is delivered on-site. Here experienced Chinese workers 
train their African counterparts via hands-on tutoring, and the African workers acquire 
skills while on the job. This form of training is cost-effective and in line with the training 
and skills requirement for such enterprises. However, this is not the case with enterprises 
operating in high-tech sectors, which call for regular, systematic, job-specific training 
because of the level of technology used in such companies. 
King (2013) cites the example of ZTE, a Chinese state-owned telecommunications 
firm that undertook the training of 1000 Ethiopian engineers as part of a contract to 
install telecommunications infrastructure in the country. Engineers were given on-the-job 
training, virtual training and advanced training at the ZTE University in Shenzhen, China 
(King, 2013). The large training requirement of the high-tech sector and the weak knowledge 
environment in the host countries often necessitate the provision of rigorous training to 
local employees by Chinese telecommunication firms. Apart from telecommunications, 
the infrastructure and construction sectors can also contribute to substantial gains in 
skills and technology transfer (King, 2013; Tang, 2010). However, government policy plays 
a role in leveraging the investments for skills and technology transfer. For example, the 
‘training for immigration scheme’ adopted by the Ethiopian government in agreement 
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with Shanghai Construction Company, to bring in 50 Chinese workers, ensures that for 
every skilled Chinese worker employed, 10 Ethiopians are trained (King, 2013). 
In a study of employment patterns in Chinese companies in Angola and Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Tang (2010) identifies two main patterns – ‘bulldozer and 
locomotive’ – adopted by Chinese companies that have implications for HCD, including 
training and technology transfer in African host countries. According to Tang, under the 
bulldozer pattern, Chinese companies bring in workers from China to the host African 
country, do not establish any links with the local environment and focus on speedy and 
cost-efficient delivery of a project. Tang (2010, p. 262) likens this pattern ‘to a powerful 
bulldozer, it cleans the ground very efficiently but has no essential interaction with 
others and its impact is limited to the work it has done’. In sharp contrast to this is the 
locomotive pattern. Here, Chinese companies seek integration into the local community 
and establish linkages with the local industry. According to Tang, such companies pursue 
‘long-term profit by creating synergic growth together with Africans. Using the strength 
of the Chinese side, such as capital, technology, efficiency, this model, like a locomotive, 
can contribute to a much larger scale of local development, including training, indirect 
employment and market prosperity’. (Tang, 2010, p. 263).
Tang (2010) argues that the choice of patterns is not dependent on the Chinese company 
but on the African host government. For example, in the case of public projects awarded by 
politicians, the quick execution of projects just in time for elections is particularly attractive 
to politicians; thus, they may encourage the bulldozer model over the locomotive model, 
which has more long term benefits to the host country and favours the long-term interests 
of the Chinese companies. 
While the motivations of African governments and the presence of clear policies and 
strategies, such as local content policies, are crucial for leveraging Chinese investments 
for HCD, African and Chinese business networks also play a role in realising HCD gains 
from Chinese FDI. Brautigam’s (2003) study of the role of Chinese business networks 
as catalysts for industrial development in sub-Saharan Africa stresses the importance 
of receptive business communities in Africa, who are willing to absorb and utilise the 
skills and information necessary to foster industrialisation. The study finds that years of 
business interactions between Nigerian Igbo traders in Nnewi (a city in south-east Nigeria 
that hosts one of the largest automotive parts markets in the West African region) and 
Chinese trading networks has led to substantial skills and technology transfer, which in 
turn has enabled a transition from importing to local manufacturing of automotive parts. 
These interactions, driven by a network of traders and businesses, have contributed to 
industrialisation in a city known as a major industrial hub in Nigeria. Thus, Brautigam 
(2003) concludes that business networks can catalyse industrial development in Africa 
as Chinese business networks have shown in Nigeria’s automotive spare parts cluster. A 
supportive policy environment can further facilitate this.
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The labour practices of Chinese enterprises in Africa remains a contentious issue, rife 
with claims and criticisms such as Chinese companies are unwilling to hire local workers, 
they import large numbers of Chinese workers to Africa and they subject African workers 
to unfair working conditions. This thesis and the studies such as those discussed above 
attempt to offer a nuanced understanding of the labour practices and HCD effects of 
Chinese enterprises in Africa. For example, a high number of Chinese workers on a project 
in Africa does not necessarily indicate unwillingness to hire local workers. It could be the 
result of shortage of skilled local labour in some host countries, lax labour regulations or 
deadline compulsions. Unfair working conditions relating to long working hours may 
point to differences in work ethics, where the Chinese work ethic is concerned with timely 
completion of a job, irrespective of the number of hours worked in a day. These explanations 
do not imply that all observations and criticisms are unfounded, but this study stresses 
the importance of context in order to fully understand the labour practices and HCD 
implications of Chinese enterprises in Africa. 
This chapter focused on providing insights into the HCD dimensions of CEE in Africa, 
starting with the Chinese government’s HRD partnerships with Africa. Second, the chapter 
outlined China’s education cooperation with Africa, and, third, it examined the HCD 
dimension of Chinese enterprises in Africa, from different viewpoints discussed in the 
existing research. It is clear that whatever the modalities and official discourse of Chinese 
HRD partnership with Africa may be, China’s engagement with Africa undoubtedly has 
implications for HCD in Africa. 
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4 Methodology
This chapter presents the methodological considerations and research design of this study. 
The philosophical assumptions guiding this study are presented first, followed by the 
research design and procedures for case selection, data collection, data analysis, ethical 
considerations and an evaluation of the research quality using the constructs of validity 
and reliability.
4.1 Philosophical foundations of the study
‘Every research tool or procedure is inextricably 
embedded in commitments to particular versions of 
the world and ways of knowing that world made by 
researchers using them’.
– Hughes (1980, p. 13)
Social science research cannot be conducted without a researcher taking particular 
positions on philosophical issues and answering philosophical questions (Corbetta, 2003; 
Rosenberg, 2012). Researchers have to conduct their research within a certain paradigm or 
world view, and two world views have mainly framed social science research: positivism and 
interpretivism. According to Corbetta (2003), these paradigms are distinguishable based 
on how they answer three interrelated questions: (1) the ontological question – does reality 
exist; (2) the epistemological question – can it be understood; and (3) the methodological 
question – how can knowledge about it be generated. Thus, they have contradictory visions 
of social reality, how it should be understood and different methods of inquiry. 
Corbetta (2003) views the ontological question as the question of ‘what’, as it is 
concerned with the ‘nature and form of social reality’. On ontology, Blaikie (2000, p. 8) 
states the following:
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Ontological claims are claims and assumptions that are made about the nature of 
social reality, claims about what exists, what it looks like, what units make it up 
and how these units interact with each other. In short, ontological assumptions are 
concerned with what we believe constitutes social reality.
The epistemological question according to Corbetta (2003) is the ‘question of the 
relationship between the “who” and the “what” and the outcome of this relationship’. It is 
concerned with how social reality can be understood and the link between the observer and 
the reality being observed. The methodological question concerns the ‘how’ – how social 
reality be can studied. It pertains to the techniques of social inquiry (Corbetta, 2003). 
The interrelatedness of these questions has been confirmed by various scholars. They 
explain that answers to the epistemological question are dependent on those to the 
ontological question; that is, if social reality exists independently from human action/
influence, then the aim to understand it in an objective manner will be legitimate (Corbetta, 
2003; della Porta & Keating, 2008). Similarly, the methodological question is dependent on 
answers to the ontological and epistemological question. As Corbetta (2003, 13) notes that 
‘a vision of social reality as an external object that is not influenced by the cognitive research 
procedures of the scientist will accept manipulative techniques (e.g. experimentation, the 
control of variables, etc.) more readily than a perspective that underlines the existence of 
interactive processes between the scholar and the object studied’. Corbetta (2003) adds 
that the interrelatedness between these three questions is also evident in the difficulties in 
outlining the boundaries between them. 
The following paragraph explains the two aforementioned paradigms – positivism and 
interpretivism – in relation to the fundamental questions. 
Ontologically, positivism adopts the view that social reality is real and knowable 
(Corbetta, 2003). With regard to the epistemological question, positivism believes that 
knowledge is attainable based on the assumption that the researcher and the object of study 
are independent entities, and thus objects can be studied without being influenced by the 
researcher (i.e. objectively). Simply put, social facts are considered ‘given’ and ‘unmodifiable’ 
(Corbetta, 2003). The positivist view of society holds that social life is subject to natural 
laws, and it is for the researcher to discover such laws. Positivists adopt the epistemological 
position of empiricism; that is, knowledge of the world can be justified only by sensory 
evidence such as experience, observation and experiment (Corbetta, 2003; Rosenberg, 
2012). The techniques of positivist research are derived from the empiricist approach to 
natural sciences (Corbetta, 2003). Thus, theories that cannot be verified or falsified by 
experience are meaningless (Rosenberg, 2012). 
Contrary to the positivist paradigm, the interpretive paradigm adopts a constructivist 
view of social reality, suggesting that ‘the knowable world is that of the meanings 
attributed by individuals’ (Corbetta, 2003, p. 21). Under this school of thought, a common 
universal social reality does not exist; instead, there are multiple realities formed by the 
different perspectives from which individuals view and attach meanings to social facts. 
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Ontologically, interpretivists reject the existence of an objective world. They hold the 
epistemological position that the researcher and the research object are interdependent and 
cannot be separated. This is because the objective of social science research is to understand 
individual behaviour/events and search for meanings that human beings attribute to their 
behaviour and to the world (della Porta & Keating, 2008). 
The methodological view under the interpretive paradigm differs from that of the 
positivist paradigm. Here, reality is interpreted based on the interactions between the 
researcher and the research subject. Qualitative and subjective research techniques 
are favoured as they help understand the meanings research subjects attribute to their 
behaviour. Knowledge is ‘discovered in reality by the researcher who approaches it without 
prejudices or preconceived theories’ (Corbetta, 2003, p. 24). 
The fundamental differences in each paradigm at the levels of ontology, epistemology 
and methodology are reflected in the different research techniques and procedures used in 
the social science research today. Of these two paradigms, Schell (1992, p. 10) posits that 
very few researchers ‘occupy either of these polar positions, but rather, there is a spectrum 
of beliefs which span the epistemological spectrum’. This is reflected in this study as the 
subsequent paragraphs present the philosophical positions taken in this research. 
As adeptly summarised by Sayer (1992, p. 5) ‘particular philosophies are not simple 
or self-contained but exist through their opposition to a range of alternative positions’. 
Post-positivist approaches such as realism emerged to counter the criticisms against the 
ontological and epistemological positions of the positivist paradigm (Corbetta, 2003; 
Given, 2008). The post-positivist approach of critical realism holds the ontological position 
that there is some level of objective reality to the world and that reality exists independent 
of observers (Easton, 2010; Sayer, 1992). Corbetta (2003) notes that post-positivism adopts 
a position similar to positivism in that social reality is real and objective; however, it departs 
from the positivist assumption that reality is knowable. Post-positivists hold that it is 
knowable only in an imperfect manner. 
Epistemologically, critical realism assumes that there is a level of detachment between 
the observer and the observed; however, the observer may influence the observed, causing a 
reaction (Given, 2008; Sayer, 2000). Critical realism acknowledges the role of the researcher 
as the interpreter of knowledge but affirms that it exists regardless of the researchers’ 
interpretation (Given, 2008; Sayer, 2000). Sayer 1992 notes that ‘our knowledge of the 
world is fallible and theory-laden’. Critical realists view knowledge production as a ‘social 
activity’. Similar to the interpretive notion, realism acknowledges that social phenomena 
are ‘concept dependent’ in that they are affected by the meanings ascribed to them; however, 
this does not rule out causal explanations (Sayer, 2000). Nonetheless, critical realists aspire 
to generate knowledge by emphasising rigour in the research process, use of multiple sources 
of data and employing theory in data analyses, theory building and testing (Given, 2008). 
This research is guided by the post-positivist paradigm and adopts a critical realist view 
of reality. This is in line with the purpose of my research, which is to examine how Sino–
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African economic relations might affect HCD in Africa by investigating the nature and 
characteristics of the engagement and its opportunities and implications for HCD. 
For critical realists, a social phenomenon has to be evaluated critically in order for it 
to be explained and understood. This entails ‘identifying the causal mechanisms, how 
they work and discovering if they have been activated and under what conditions’ (Sayer, 
2000, p. 14). Accordingly, this study undertakes a critical evaluation of CEE in Africa 
in order to understand its opportunities and implications for HCD in Africa. The study 
identifies the different contextual factors and conditions and how they interact to produce 
certain HCD-related outcomes. In line with the critical realist notion on theory, which 
considers theory an ordering framework with which observational data are used to predict 
and explain empirical events, this study acknowledges the role of theory and concepts to 
structure data and explain social phenomena.
On methodology, critical realism employs a range of research methods. Methodological 
choices should be based on the nature of the object of study and the objective of the study 
(Sayer, 2000). Easton (2010, p. 119) argues that critical realism is well suited for case study 
research. He notes that it ‘justifies the study of any situation, regardless of the numbers of 
research units involved but only if the process involves thoughtful in-depth research with 
the objective of understanding why things are as they are’. 
The critical realist approach to methodology supports the focus of this study, which is 
studying Sino–African relations to understand and explain the nature and characteristic 
of the relationship and its implications. Further, this study realises that it is crucial to move 
beyond a general overview of China–Africa relations and delve into case studies for a more 
nuanced and deeper understanding of the relations and its outcomes and implications for 
Africa. The methodological choices of this study are in line with critical realism as this 
study employs a conceptual research approach which aims to make sense of Sino–African 
engagement, understand what it is, explaining how it works, why it is important and what 
it means for Africa’s development. This research also adopts a case study method, relies 
on multiple sources of data and conducts a theory driven analysis to investigate the HCD 
implications of CEE in Africa.
4.2 Research design
Two main research methodology approaches were chosen for this study: the conceptual 
research approach and empirical research using a qualitative case study method. Figure 
2 shows the methodological features of the sub-studies that make up this study. The 
subsequent sub-sections will present the conceptual research approach and the qualitative 
case study approach. 
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4.2.1 The conceptual research approach
Conceptual research focuses on using a concept or theory to explain or describe a 
phenomenon (Corley & Gioia, 2011; Fawcett et al., 2014; MacInnis, 2011). This approach 
is driven by conceptual thinking, which according to MacInnis (2011, p. 5) is ‘the process of 
understanding a situation or problem abstractly by identifying patterns or connections and 
key underlying properties’. According to Fawcett et al. (2014) conceptual research ‘helps 
us see the world through new lenses, enabling us to find new trailheads for existing and 
emerging problem-solving quests’. 
This research approach is particularly suited to understanding the nature and 
characteristics of CEE in Africa as it aims to bridge the knowledge gap and encourages 
delving deep into the conversations that shape the understanding of a phenomenon. 
Fawcett et al. (2014) find that conceptual research allows for moving beyond the process 
of just reporting the phenomenon to a process of ‘sensemaking’ and ‘sensegiving’ – in 
other words making sense of the phenomenon. Sub-studies 1 and 2 of this thesis use the 
conceptual research approach to make sense of Sino–African economic engagement and 
what it means for HCD in Africa. This approach has been instrumental in shedding light 
on the evolving contemporary China–Africa engagement. 
Conceptual articles rely on thought-based conceptions as opposed to empirical 
data (MacInnis, 2011; Yadav, 2010). MacInnis (2011) classifies conceptual articles into 
four categories according to their general and specific goals. According to MacInnis’s 
classification, Sub-studies 1 and 2 can be classified as academic articles with the specific goal 
Figure 2. The Research process and methodological features of this study
Focus: Contributions and implications 
of Chinese economic engagement with 
Africa for HCD in Africa
Case Study
• Organisation – Huawei technologies, 
Nigeria
Relies on empirical qualitative data 
to investigate the opportunities, 
contributions and implications of CEE 
for HCD in Africa and the role of the 
host government in leveraging CEE for 
HCD.
Conceptual
Sub-study 1 and 2 
Qualitative Case Study
Sub-study 3 and 4
Focus: Nature and characteristics of 
Chinese economic engagement in 
Africa.
• In-depth review of dependency 
theory literature
• In-depth review of human capital 
theory and human capital 
development literature
Relies on dependency theory to unpack 
the complexities of CEE in Africa and 
human capital theory to understand the 
implications for HCD in Africa.
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of delineating. Delineating articles describe what an entity under study is, why it should 
be studied, how it works and its relationship to other entities. The main contribution of 
delineating articles is in the form of a conceptual framework or structural framework, as is 
the case in this thesis.
In an attempt to shape and provide an understanding of CEE in Africa, Sub-studies 
1 and 2 rely on dependency theory and human capital theory to unpack the complexities 
of Sino–African relations, China’s presence in Africa, and its implications for Africa, 
specifically in relation to HCD. Sub-studies 1 and 2 approach the phenomenon of CEE in 
Africa with the goal of delineation. They attempt to clarify the Sino–African engagement, 
understanding what it is and is not, explaining how it works, why it is important and what 
it means for Africa’s development. This is an important initial approach as it guides this 
study towards fully addressing its research objectives. 
The research materials used in the literature review and analysis in sub-study 1 and 2 
consists of existing literature in the form of journal articles, books, monographs, reports, 
commissioned studies, statistical data, official reports etc. These research materials mainly 
focused on the review of dependency theory, human capital theory, human capital 
development and China–Africa relations. 
Publications on Dependency theory are in the form of books, monographs and journal 
articles which include seminal works of scholars such as Amin, Dos Santos, Frank, Furtado, 
Haq, Lall, Prebisch, Wallerstein, authors who can be credited for the development of 
Dependency theory. These works are classics and have shaped the discourse on development 
and in the field of international political economy. Other recent articles on Dependency 
theory were also reviewed in the conceptual articles. Likewise, publications on Human 
capital theory and related literature on human capital development are in the form of 
books, monographs, and journal articles, featuring both early seminal works on Human 
capital theory and more recent literature on human capital development. Publications 
on China–Africa relations are in the form of texts, journal articles, reports and official 
statistical data derived from the UN, China, USA collated by reputable research institutes. 
Materials utilised on China–Africa were relatively recent to capture the resurgence in 
China–Africa relations. 
Journal articles utilised in the conceptual studies were sourced from reputable 
international peer reviewed journals mainly in the fields of development studies, 
international political economy, economics, management, area studies – Africa, Asia, 
Global south. Reports, commissioned studies, working papers were sourced from 
international institutions such as the world bank, the united nations, African development 
bank, and official reports from countries such as China, the United states etc. News reports 
were also featured particularly to capture popular opinion and commentary on China-
Africa relations. Together these research materials formed the body of literature used in 
the conceptual articles – sub-study 1 and 2 – that make up a part of this thesis. 
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Following a detailed conceptualisation of Sino–African engagement, this study 
progresses to provide deeper insights by empirically investigating the contributions of 
CEE to HCD in Africa. This reflects the use of a second methodological approach in this 
thesis, which is the qualitative case study, in Sub-studies 3 and 4. The qualitative case study 
method, as adopted in Sub-studies 3 and 4 of this thesis, is discussed in the next sub-section. 
4.2.2 Qualitative case study approach
The case study as a research approach facilitates the investigation of a phenomenon in its 
real-life context (Yin, 2009). According to Schell (1992), the case study is unparalleled as a 
research method due to its ability to consider a research question within an environment 
rich with contextual variables. This feature of the case study method makes it well suited 
for this study, as there is a need for more research to generate an in-depth and nuanced 
understanding of Sino–African engagement and its implications for HCD in Africa. 
Prominent researchers on Sino–African engagement have called for more investigation 
via country-specific case studies based on fieldwork (Brautigam, 2017; King, 2013). The 
use of case studies in the study of China–Africa relations is particularly important due 
to the contemporary and evolving nature of the economic engagement. Moreover, despite 
the multilateral nature of the FOCAC platform, China’s relations with African countries 
are realised on a bilateral basis and as a result, the level of engagement varies from country 
to country. This is particularly apparent in the diverse levels and volumes of its economic 
engagement with different African countries, necessitating the need for a method that seeks 
to make sense of the phenomenon, taking into account the various contextual variables at 
play. Sub-studies 3 and 4 use the qualitative case study method, as it helps move beyond just 
a general overview of China–Africa relations to a more detailed analysis.
The case study research method is known for its use of multiple sources of data – 
an approach that increases data credibility (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Patton, 1990; Yin, 
2003). The use of different data sources strengthens research findings as the evidence is 
triangulated; the findings have a robust foundation, and the arguments about contribution 
to existing knowledge are supported (Farquhar, 2012). Further, the case study method 
allows researchers to explore a phenomenon through a variety of lenses, allowing multiple 
dimensions of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood (Baxter & Jack, 2008). It 
also enables the use of diverse data sources such as documents, archival records, interviews, 
direct observation, participant observation, and physical artefacts (Gray, 2004; Yin, 1994). 
This method is particularly useful for this study as it provides a systematic way to collect 
data, analyse the data, present the findings and thus understand the phenomenon in greater 
depth. The use of several data sources ensures that critical data is captured to understand 
the intricacies of CEE in Africa and to answer the research questions in this study. 
The case study method is known to not only describe data in real-life environments but 
also to help explain the complexities of real-life situations. This aspect is instrumental in 
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this study, as the method helps capture the various variables and establish their linkages to 
the phenomenon being studied. Thus, utilising a qualitative case study seemed appropriate 
for collecting empirical data that would not only enhance the understanding of the Sino–
African engagement but also offer precise insights about its contribution and implications 
for HCD. Additionally, the case study method is suitable for answering the ‘why’ and 
‘how’ questions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009), which justifies its choice for this study as the 
research questions in this study are essentially ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions. These questions 
help achieve the research objectives, which are to understand the nature of CEE in Africa, 
investigate how the engagement contributes to HCD in Africa and how the African 
governments leverage this engagement for HCD.
A case study method can employ a single case or multiple cases (Yin, 2009). It is 
important for researchers to determine if a single case study is sufficient for their study or 
if a deeper understanding of the phenomenon requires data from multiple cases (Baxter & 
Jack, 2008). According to Yin (2009), there are four refined case study models, and the main 
distinction between these models is the number of units of analysis per case (Virtanen, 
2002). The models include (1) a single case with a single unit of analysis, (2) a single case with 
multiple units of analysis, (3) multiple cases with a single unit of analysis, and (4) multiple 
cases with multiple units of analysis. This study falls in the second category, because it is 
a single case study (case organisation – Huawei technologies in Nigeria) with various data 
points (primary and secondary) collected and analysed at multiple levels (institutional, 
organisational and individual). This allows for a rich analysis of the phenomenon and serves 
to better illuminate the case (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Figure 3  depicts the case study model 
utilised in this study. Section 4.3 presents a detailed outline of the process and rationale 
behind the case selection. 
Case study research is deemed especially useful in situations where the context and 
other complex conditions related to the phenomenon being investigated are critical; the 
researcher has little control over the events (Farquhar, 2012; Yin, 2009). This method is 
appropriate for this study, as to fully understand CEE in Africa and the opportunities it 
might present for HCD, the study needs to be carried out in its context. 
The focus of the case study in this thesis was to investigate the contributions of CEE in 
Africa for HCD in Africa and if and how African governments leverage the engagement 
for HCD. Huawei Technologies Company, Nigeria Limited was selected as the case 
organisation, and data were collected to examine the HCD contributions and implications 
of Huawei’s operations and activities in Nigeria. This was examined at multiple levels: 
institutional, organisational and individual. At the institutional level, the study examined 
the policy-related efforts of the government towards leveraging CEE for HCD. At the 
organisational level, the study analysed the HCD-related effects of Huawei’s operations 
and practices in Nigeria by investigating the employment, training and skills building, and 
knowledge and technology transfer effects of Huawei’s operations in Nigeria. Further, the 
organisation’s interactions with national policies on HCD were examined, with the aim of 
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understanding the role they have had on HCD-related practices, if any. At the individual 
level, the study analysed the impact of Huawei’s HCD contributions. The following section 
describes the data collected in this study and the data collection process.
4.3 Case selection
Selecting a case is an important step in case study design (Yin, 1994). The following 
paragraphs explain the process and rationale behind the case selection in this study. 
The Sino–African economic engagement remains significant as it covers FDI, trade and 
aid. The economic relations between China and Africa cut across different levels and involve 
both state actors such as the central government, local governments, state institutions, state-
owned banks and enterprises and non-state actors such as MNCs, small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, individual traders and migrants (Renard, 2011). While actions from both state 
and non-state actors carry implications for HCD in Africa, of particular interest to this 
Figure 3. Case study model utilised in sub-studies 3 and 4 
Units of analysis
Institutional Level
Policy-related efforts of the 
Nigerian government towards 
leveraging CEE for HCD
Organisational Level
• HCD related effects of 
Huawei’s operations and 
practices
• Huawei’s interactions with 
the Nigerian government 
policy on HC and its effects 
on HCD
Individual Level
• Impact of Huawei’s HCD 
contributions on an 
individual level 
Case organisation: 
Huawei, Nigeria
Chinese economic 
engagement in Africa
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study is the FDI from non-state actors, specifically Chinese MNEs, investing in different 
sectors of the African economy. 
The rationale for choosing non-state actors, particularly private MNEs, lies in the 
increasing role and importance of the private sector, particularly MNEs, in bridging the 
human capital gap in Africa (Harvey, Myers, & Novicevic, 2002). Their operations and 
activities in various African countries across different economic sectors is significant for 
HCD across the continent (World Bank, 2015; Brautigam et al., 2017). Further, non-state 
owned enterprises are seldom the focus of empirical studies on Chinese FDI in Africa 
even though they play an increasingly important role as a source of Chinese investment 
in Africa, they constitute the largest group of Chinese investors in Africa and they engage 
actively in local economic networks (He & Zhu, 2018). 
The potential for impact by Chinese private enterprises on HCD is significant as 
these enterprises can, through their operations, influence both direct and indirect local 
employment, skill transfers, and knowledge and technology transfer in their host countries 
(He & Zhu, 2018; King, 2013). Thus, this case focused on analysing the opportunities and 
implications of CEE in Africa on HCD from the perspective of a non-state owned Chinese 
multinational enterprise. Huawei Technologies Co. in Nigeria was selected as the case 
organisation to maximise the potential of a thorough understanding of the phenomenon 
(Palys, 2008). 
The selection of Huawei as a case organisation is significant because of the nature of 
its business, the extent of its operations and its broad presence across Africa. It is one of 
the largest private Chinese enterprises operating in Africa and the leading Chinese MNE 
in Africa’s telecom sector. Huawei’s operations span the world: it is currently the world’s 
largest telecom equipment manufacturer, after surpassing Ericsson in 2012. Its operations 
in Africa are spread across at least 40 countries (Fagan, 2018), and it has offices in 18 
African countries including South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia and Nigeria, where it has its 
West African headquarters (Gagliardone & Gaell, 2014). Its activities on the continent 
cut across the whole telecom ecosystem, from selling consumer products such as tablets 
and phones to offering solutions to telecom network operators and businesses, setting up 
telecom infrastructure and managing and upgrading telecom networks. Importantly, the 
Chinese MNCs in Africa’s telecoms sector, of which Huawei is the largest, are responsible 
for much of the infrastructure on which African information societies are built. 
Nigeria is one of China’s most important telecom markets. Chinese operations 
in Nigeria are extensive as the country is strategically significant for telecom success in 
African markets. This is because Nigeria is the largest telecom market in Africa and the 
largest economy, especially in the economic community of West African states. Nigeria is 
the seat of Huawei’s West African (W/A) operations, with its headquarters in Lagos, which 
also houses one of its eight global innovation centres, and its regional training centre in 
Abuja. Since establishing its corporate, consumer and business operations in the Nigerian 
market in 1999, Huawei has played a critical role in upgrading the country’s information 
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and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure. Huawei has worked with several 
telecom operators in numerous projects, which has led to an increase in broadband 
penetration and connectivity in Nigeria (Amawhe, 2016; Huawei, 2013; Telegeography, 
2010). 
Not only is Huawei important as a case organisation, the sector in which it operates 
also represents one of the main sectors and ‘newest frontiers’ of CEE in Africa, attracting a 
substantial proportion of Chinese investments (Gagliardone & Gaell, 2014). Further, the 
telecom sector is seldom studied in relation to the HCD implications of CEE, yet it has 
tremendous potential to produce significant gains in terms of HCD because it is knowledge 
intensive and prioritises training and capacity development. The sector is also crucial to most 
African countries, especially given the importance of telecom in increasing participation 
in the modern world economy and economic growth (Andrianaivo & Kpodar, 2011; 
Waverman, Meschi, & Fuss, 2005). In their study on the impact of telecom on economic 
growth, Waverman et al. (2005) find that mobile telephony has a significant positive effect 
on economic growth, and the impact is higher in developing countries than developed 
countries. Further, as many African countries pursue economic diversification, telecom is 
increasingly viewed as a sector with the potential to make substantial contributions to gross 
domestic product (GDP). This is particularly true for Nigeria, which is the largest telecom 
market in Africa and has seen a significant increase in the GDP contribution of the telecom 
sector from 1.45% in 2005 to 8.39% in the third quarter of 2018 (NCC, 2019).
Given the above scenario, the choice of Huawei in Nigeria as the case organisation for 
this study is appropriate for investigating the HCD opportunities and implications of 
CEE in Africa from a Chinese MNE perspective. More details on the case organisation – 
Huawei – are provided in Sub-studies 3 and 4. 
4.4 Data collection
Case study research allows the use of multiple sources of data (Patton, 1990; Yin, 
2003), including but not limited to interviews, documents, archival records, participant 
observation, field observation, physical artefacts and meeting minutes (Baxter & Jack, 
2008; Merriam, 1998; Yin, 1994). Researchers can collect data from multiple sources and 
converge them during analysis. Baxter and Jack (2008) liken each data source to a piece 
of a ‘puzzle’, with each piece enhancing the understanding of the phenomenon being 
studied. Convergence of data from different sources strengthens the findings as the data is 
triangulated. Farquhar (2012. p. 7) notes that triangulation is an important aspect of the 
case study method because ‘an investigation of the phenomenon from different perspectives 
provides robust foundations for the findings and supports arguments for its contribution 
to knowledge’. 
Triangulation involves multiple data-collecting procedures, multiple theoretical 
perspectives and multiple techniques of analysis (Berg, 2001; Denzin, 1978). This study 
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adopted a data triangulation strategy, utilising multiple sources of data to generate an 
in-depth understanding of the HCD implications of CEE in Africa and how African 
governments leverage the engagement for HCD (objectives of Sub-studies 3 and 4). The 
primary and secondary data sources utilised in this study include interviews (face-face, 
online), documents (company reports, press releases and reports, training reports, policy 
documents and guidelines) and incidental (casual) observations. See table 2 for a depiction 
of data triangulation in relation to research questions 2 and 3, which are addressed in sub-
study 3 and 4. 
The interview is one of the most important and widely used qualitative data collection 
methods (Qu & Dumay, 2011). Interviews are useful because they provide in-depth 
information about the informants’ experiences and their perceptions of a particular 
topic. Broadly, interview methods are of three types: structured, semi-structured and 
unstructured. Semi-structured interviews are the most commonly used and the most 
diverse of the three categories (Arksey & Knight, 1999). 
Semi-structured interviews, though more similar to unstructured interviews, combine 
the characteristics of the other two types. They usually follow an interview guide, which 
contains key questions on the topics to be covered in the interview, with room for flexibility 
and adaptability depending on the context (Arksey & Knight, 1999; Farquhar, 2012). The 
researcher has some scope to modify the order and wording of the questions, according to 
the informants. The researcher can also probe for responses, follow up on an idea or return 
to an answer that needs further clarification or elaboration (Merriam, 1998). Informants 
also can answer questions in the order that they consider important; that is, they can choose 
what to say about a topic or question and how much (Arksey & Knight, 1999).
Table 2. Data Sources: Research Question 2 and 3
Research questions (2 and 3) Semi-structured 
Interviews
Documentary 
review 
Incidental/Casual 
observation
In what ways, if any, does CEE 
contributes to HCD in Africa? i i i
Do African governments leverage CEE for 
HCD? If so how? i i i
This study utilised semi-structured interviews to generate primary data. The interviews 
addressed two main objectives: to investigate how Huawei’s operations contribute to HCD 
in Nigeria, and how the Nigerian government leverages CEE for HCD. The interviews 
targeted a range of informants including relevant government officials from Nigeria, 
officials from the case organisation Huawei, Nigeria, including current and ex-employees, 
participants of training programmes, and beneficiaries of Huawei scholarships. In total, 
29 semi-structured interviews were conducted between March and October 2016 across 
various sites in Nigeria as well as online via Skype (See Appendix 2). 
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Interview participants were selected through purposive sampling and the snowball 
technique. These techniques helped select informants who had an important perspective 
and extensive knowledge on the topic being studied (Elo et al., 2014). Purposive sampling 
is based on the notion that ‘research participants are not created equal’ (Palys, 2008, p. 
697); thus, researchers need to select a sample that ties well with the research objectives and 
context. While purposive sampling is associated with different sampling strategies such as 
paradigmatic case sampling, maximum variation sampling, typical case sampling, theory-
guided sampling, critical case sampling, etc. (Palys, 2008), the strategy used in this study 
was criterion sampling. Criterion sampling, as the name suggests, involves identifying cases 
or individuals who meet certain criteria (Palys, 2008). In this case, several criteria based on 
the individual’s experience and knowledge of the topic were defined to identify useful and 
crucial informants for this study.
The criteria used for selecting the informants were as follows:
• Individuals from the case organisation (Huawei) who were knowledgeable about 
the organisation’s history and operations in Africa and Nigeria, in particular. 
Further, individuals knowledgeable or directly involved in the policies and practices 
of recruitment, training, local supplier relations, CSR. This included managers, 
human resource managers, trainers, public relation officers, etc. 
• Individuals employed by the organisation currently or in the past (ex-employees of 
Huawei)
• Participants of Huawei’s training programmes
• Individuals who were tasked with implementing or were knowledgeable about 
national policies on FDIs, HCD, telecommunications and other issues relevant 
to this study. This included Nigerian government officials in relevant ministries, 
agencies or institutes such as the Ministry of Trade and Investment, Ministry of 
Information and Communication Technology, Ministry of Labour, Office of 
National Content, Nigerian Information Technology Development Agency, 
Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission, etc. 
• Individuals or institutions who were beneficiaries of Huawei’s CSR activities such as 
scholarships and training. 
Largely, this study adhered to the general principle of purposive sampling, which according 
to (Palys, 2008, p. 698) is to ‘think of the person or place or situation that has the largest 
potential for advancing your understanding and look there’. In addition to purposive 
sampling, this study also identified crucial informants using the snowball technique, which 
is also known as referral sampling. Snowball sampling is seen as an ‘informal’ means to 
reach a target population, especially when the aim of a study is explorative, qualitative or 
descriptive in nature (Berg, 2001). This technique is particularly useful in cases where a 
researcher needs to identify members of a concealed or difficult-to-reach population. It 
involves identifying a member of a population and asking them to name other members 
of the population (Atkinson & Flint, 2001; Berg, 2001; Vogt, 1999). In this study, the 
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snowball technique was used to identify ex-employees of Huawei (n = 3), beneficiaries of 
the Huawei–Unilag scholarship (n = 3) and some participants of the Huawei ‘1000 girls 
in ICT’ training programme (n = 2). Most of these informants would have been hard to 
reach without a referral as their names and, in some cases, contact details could not be 
obtained officially through a publicly available list. A combination of purposive sampling 
and snowball sampling was instrumental in identifying relevant informants for this study. 
The interview guides were developed keeping in mind the research questions and 
important themes from the conceptual framework. While the interview questions varied 
slightly depending on the category of the informant, they generally centred on exploring 
Huawei’s operations and practices in Nigeria from the perspective of local employment, 
training and skills building, and knowledge and technology transfer. Additionally, the 
questions explored the theme of CEE, policy measures, strategies and actions of the 
Nigerian government in relation to FDI and HCD, and particularly the issue of leveraging 
Chinese FDI for HCD in the telecom sector. 
The field work related to this research was carried out in March–April 2016. Key 
informants were contacted via email and in some cases via telephone to request and schedule 
interview appointments. The emails included introduction letters from the university, 
signed by the researcher’s thesis supervisor, to show that the research was supported by the 
university. While some interview appointments were secured ahead before the field work 
began, others were scheduled on ground in Nigeria during the field work, by visiting the 
various ministries and agencies to request for appointments. The majority of the interviews 
(17) were conducted face-to-face, and others (11) were conducted remotely via skype. One 
(1) informant choose to answer questions via email. All the interviews were conducted in 
English and lasted between 40 minutes to 2 hours, depending on the availability of the 
informant, the informants’ knowledge and experience of the topics and the issues covered 
in the interview.
The interviews were audiotaped and supported by field notes when some informants 
declined for the interviews to be recorded. After the interviews, the recordings were heard, 
transcribed and the notes were read through. This process enabled the researcher to glean 
some insights from what the informants said or did not say. In some cases, this step led to the 
inclusion of another informant considered important to the study who was not previously 
considered. For example, an interview an official from One Stop Investment Centre (OSIC) 
was deemed necessary on interviewing officers from the Nigerian Investment Promotion 
Corporation (NIPC) who emphasised the crucial role of OSIC in attracting FDI.
Apart from the interviews, another source of primary data was incidental observation. 
During the fieldwork, the researcher visited the Huawei West Africa headquarters in Lagos, 
Nigeria, and the Huawei training centre in Abuja, Nigeria, on separate occasions. During 
these visits, the research took notes of what was casually observed in both facilities, mainly 
with regard to employee composition, profile and working arrangements. This study also 
utilised secondary data sources, mainly in the form of company reports such as Huawei 
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Nigeria CSR Report – Growing with Nigeria (n.d.), Huawei’s company magazine Huawei 
People (Issue 255 January 8, 2015; Issue 263 January 31, 2016; Issue 265 March 31, 2016), 
Huawei 2013, 2014 Sustainability Report, and Huawei Africa Factsheet 2012. Reports released 
by the Huawei’s press/events centre were also used such as Telecom Seeds for the Future 
Training Program released in September 2015 and a training report (Huawei Training for 
Nigerian Government Officials) published in September 2016. Other documents consisted 
of Nigerian government policies such as the Guidelines for Nigerian Content Development 
in Information and Communications Technology, issued on December 3, 2013. 
The document review focused on uncovering data on Huawei’s training programmes, 
CSR initiatives and government policy initiatives and actions related to the local content 
in ICT policy. The documentary review served two main purposes apart from generating 
useful data. Firstly, the information gathered helped the researcher in the first step of 
generating the interview guides. Secondly, it helped the researcher triangulate the data 
generated from the interview, serving as a way to verify the data, corroborate data and 
ensure the research findings were credible.
Additionally, this study relied on secondary data in the form of existing literature on 
CEE in Africa in general and specifically those that addressed HCD issues in relation to 
CEE in Africa. This study also referenced existing literature that addressed the connection 
between FDIs and human capital formation in host countries. These existing studies were 
particularly useful as they shaped the research instruments used in this study. 
4.5 Empirical data analysis
Data analysis is often considered the most demanding aspects of a qualitative research 
process (Arksey & Knight, 1999). Empirical data generated in this study were analysed 
using qualitative content analysis. Julien (2008, p. 120) defines qualitative content analysis 
as a technique of ‘categorizing qualitative textual data into clusters of similar entities or 
conceptual categories to identify consistent patterns and relationships between variables 
or themes’. 
Qualitative content analysis used to analyse a wide range of contextual data, and the 
process aims to reduce and systematically derive meaning from data (Mayring, 2000; 
Schreier, 2014). It is different from other methods of qualitative data analysis as it enables 
the researcher to reduce the amount of data by focusing on ‘selected aspects of meaning’ 
connected to the research question (Schreier, 2014). The research questions determine what 
to analyse and what to create (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Schreier, 2014). Qualitative content 
analysis usually includes the following steps: ‘deciding on a research question, selecting 
material, building a coding frame, segmentation, trial coding, evaluating and modifying 
the coding frame, main analysis’ (Schreier, 2014). It is a flexible approach in that it can 
be data-driven or concept-driven; this ensures that the coding frame matches the data 
(Schreier, 2014). 
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Elo et al. (2014) identified the three main phases of qualitative content analysis: 
preparation, organisation and reporting. All the three phases are relevant whether the 
researcher utilises a deductive approach or an inductive approach to the analysis. The 
preparation stage entails collecting data, making sense of the data and selecting the unit 
of analysis. The organisation phase differs slightly according to the approach utilised, 
inductive or deductive. In an inductive approach, this phase involves coding, creating 
categories and abstraction, while in a deductive approach, this phase entails developing 
a ‘categorisation matrix’, where the data is sorted for content and matched according to 
the categories earlier identified (Elo et al., 2014). The third stage – reporting – involves 
describing the results by the ‘contents of the categories describing the phenomenon’, and 
this can be done inductively or deductively. 
This study used a concept-driven qualitative content analysis, similar to the process 
explained above, for Sub-studies 3 and 4 (Figure 4). In the preparation stage, relevant data 
were collected, including transcribed interview data, observation data and documentary 
information. Because all the interviews were conducted in English, the transcription of the 
data was a straightforward process, albeit time-consuming particularly given the numbers 
of interviews and the duration of each interview. Incidental observations were recorded via 
field notes, and relevant information gleaned from the documents were noted in memos. 
The preparation stage for Sub-studies 3 and 4 was identical as the same methodology and 
datasets were used in both sub-studies. 
After the preparation stage, categories were developed on the basis of key theoretical 
concepts in the study and in line with the study objectives, and data were manually coded 
according to the categories. While this process was employed in both Sub-studies 3 and 4, 
the conceptual categories developed in each sub-study differed because they were tailored 
to the objectives and research questions the sub-studies addressed. In Sub-study 3, the 
coding process involved developing categories based on the key theoretical concepts. The 
analysis focused on examining Huawei’s contributions to HCD through its training and 
skills-building activities. The sub-study also focused on the role of the government in 
leveraging CEE for HCD. In Sub-study 4, the analysis focused on the case organisation’s 
contributions to HCD via dimensions of local employment, training and skills building, 
and knowledge and technology transfer. This sub-study revealed the process and channels 
by which Huawei contributes to HCD, describing the HCD effects of CEE in Africa. 
Finally, in the reporting stage, the study findings were reported accordingly, in line with 
the research questions and the conceptual categories of Sub-studies 3 and 4 respectively. 
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4.6 Ethical considerations
When conducting research, it is important to consider the ethical issues that might arise 
as a result of the study and the choice of methods employed during the course of the study. 
Ethical issues are encountered in every phase of a research project, and researchers have 
an ethical obligation towards different stakeholders such as their research subjects, their 
colleagues, employers, their profession and the society at large (Berg, 2001; Qu & Dumay, 
Figure 4. Data analysis process
Conceptual fram
ework and research questions 
PREPARATION STAGE
Semi-structured 
interviews Documents
Observations 
(Incidental/casual)
ORGANISATION STAGE
Sub-study 3:
• Huawei’s contributions to HCD through its training and skills-building activities
• The role of the government in leveraging CEE for HCD 
Sub-study 4: 
• The process and channels by which Huawei contributes to HCD via the three 
dimensions of local employment; training & skills building; and knowledge and 
technology transfer.
• Working hypothesis to be tested in future research to guide the development of 
a theoretical framework for the study of CEE and implications for HCD in Africa
REPORTING STAGE
Transcripts Memos Field notes
Development of conceptual categories
Data reviewed and categorised into conceptual categories with 
the aim of answering the research questions
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2011). Ethical considerations usually concern issues such as harm to participants, consent, 
deception, privacy and data confidentiality (Punch, 1994), and Berg (2001) states that 
researchers must safeguard the rights, privacy and welfare of their research subjects. 
Suitable measures were used in this study to minimise harm to its research participants. 
Firstly, potential research participants were presented with a detailed introduction letter 
from the University of Tampere, which was signed by the thesis supervisor to legitimise the 
research. While researchers are sometimes requested to apply for research permits to carry 
out fieldwork in certain countries and contexts, in the case of this research, no research 
permits were required. However, the detailed introduction letter served as an initial means 
of introducing the researcher, the research project, its purpose and significance and the 
participant’s role (see Appendix 3). The introduction letter also informed participants briefly 
about the use of data and data confidentiality. Secondly, informed consent was obtained 
from the participants in this research project (see Appendix 4). Berg (2001) notes that 
physical, psychological and social injury are risks commonly associated with participation 
in scientific research, and it is important that research participants are informed of such 
potential risks before they decide to participate. 
Informed consent serves that purpose as it entails obtaining the ‘consent of individuals 
to participate as an exercise of their choice, free from any element of fraud, deceit, duress 
or similar unfair inducement or manipulation’ (Berg, 2001, p. 56). The informed consent 
form used in this study introduced the researcher and the research in more detail and 
highlighted the rights, risks and voluntary nature of the informants’ participation in the 
study. In addition, the consent letter contained a brief description of the data practices 
pertaining to the research project, contact details of the researcher and a section for the 
participant to assent to participating in the study. The anonymity of the informants 
anonymous was ensured by using a code for each interview respondent (see Appendix 
2). This was particularly important as the case organisation – Huawei – and the various 
ministries and agencies were named. 
A pseudonym was not used to refer to the case organisation – Huawei – for several 
reasons. Firstly, using the actual name made the study more realistic. Secondly, citing the 
secondary data utilised in this study, such as company reports, press releases, press reports 
etc., in the bibliography section would have revealed the identity of the case organisation, 
rendering the use of a pseudonym ineffective. Thirdly, because of the distinctive profile 
and established reputation of the case organisation in the telecommunications sector in 
Nigeria as well as across Africa, efforts to conceal the organisation’s name would have 
proved futile as the organisation’s profile and defining characteristics would have made it 
easily identifiable. Fourthly, the organisation did not request for anonymity in the course 
of this study. 
The ethical dimensions of this research and issues that may arise as a result of this study 
were well considered, and necessary actions were taken to minimise any potential harm to 
the research participants during the course of this study. 
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This study recognizes that Africa, its countries and people are not monolithic, Africa’s 54 
countries encompass a rich and varied culture, natural resources, political realities, social 
values and economic priorities. These differences will no doubt influence their level of 
engagement with China. As such, it could be considered problematic to generalize any 
assessment of Sino–Africa engagement and its impact on Africa. However, one must also 
note that African countries’ position and identity in the international political economy as 
well as reactions to the dynamics within the international political economy is fairly similar 
(Lumumba-Kasongo, 2011). Their political and economic histories under colonialism 
and imperialism have been largely similar, and today the main socio-economic issues and 
political issues they grapple with are much similar than dissimilar. Lumumba-Kasongo 
(2011, 239) surmises that ‘the structures of underdevelopment as reflected in the structures 
of the states and their economies and general behaviors of African leaders can be generalized ’. 
Thus, while this study takes Africa’s diversity into account, it also recognises that 
despite Africa’s diversity, its response and engagement with China has been largely similar, 
driven by similar needs and expectations. This includes the need to engage alternative 
development partners, and pursue without external limitations and pressure, alternative 
development models more attuned to their needs and priorities and the expectation that 
economic engagement with China may catalyse economic growth and development in their 
respective countries. Furthermore, China’s engagement with Africa has been large scale and 
pervasive, not limited to any specific sub-region or countries. Except for E-Swatini formerly 
Swaziland, China engages all African countries albeit to different degrees. The engagement 
has significant implications for the global world order, as well as China and Africa’s position 
in it (Campbell, 2007; Mason, 2015). Considering this, in order to truly make sense of the 
nature of China’s engagement in Africa and its implications, an integrated analysis of the 
engagement which captures the characteristics and manifestations of China’s engagement 
across the continent is not amiss. It is based on this logic that this thesis adopts an integrated 
view of China’s engagement with Africa in the conceptual part of this study – Sub-study 
1 and 2 – and draws implications for HCD in Africa based on empirical insights from the 
case introduced in sub-study 3 and 4, while noting the specific features of the context of the 
case in relation to other contexts in Africa.
This study also recognises that as the economic engagement between China and Africa 
deepens, studies need to move away from offering just a broad overview to delivering 
more focused insights into the engagement and its implications for Africa’s development 
(Brautigam, 2017; King, 2013). Case studies are particularly useful for gaining in-depth 
understanding of a phenomenon; they enable the researcher to move beyond the descriptive 
features of the phenomenon to a position where the how and why of the phenomenon can 
be explained. Hence, the case study approach was chosen as one of the approaches for this 
research. To acquire a nuanced understanding of the implications of CEE for HCD in 
Africa, it is important to build this understanding within a context, which will enable one 
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to examine the different aspects of the engagement and the different conditions that could 
enable the realisation of HCD gains from this engagement. These intentions confirm the 
suitability of the case study method for the empirical section of this study. 
This study design was not devoid of the typical constraints often encountered during a 
research endeavour. Thus, it is important to acknowledge the methodological limitations 
of this study. Firstly, the empirical scope of this study was limited to the case of Huawei in 
Nigeria, and thus challenges the generalisation of the findings. However, in line with Yin’s 
position on generalisation in case study research (Yin, 2013), the aim of this study was not 
to achieve generalisation in terms of statistics but analytically. The findings of this study 
go beyond the empirical domain of this study i.e. the case. Further clarification on how 
this research should be approached in reference to other contexts in Africa is provided in 
the general conclusions of this study (see chapter 6.1). Further, the findings confirm the 
working hypothesis developed in Sub-study 4 that the HCD impact of CEE in Africa will 
vary across industry sectors and countries due to the differences in sectoral and contextual 
conditions. Thus, this study provides further directions for research (see Sub-study 4 and 
the concluding chapter of this synthesis).
Secondly, although the data analysed in this study were sufficient to answer the research 
questions, they were not exhaustive. For example, primary data from organisations in a 
supplier–customer relationship with Huawei could have shed deeper insights into the 
knowledge transfer effects of Huawei’s operations, specifically in vertical spillovers. 
However, owing to lack of access to suppliers, insufficient client details and lack of response 
from the few suppliers contacted, the researcher was unable to gather data from these 
sources. Nonetheless, insights into the knowledge transfer effects via vertical spillovers were 
still derived from the interview data and secondary data. Further, future research, which 
aims to analyse the knowledge and technology transfer effects of Chinese investments in 
Africa, can focus on examining the linkages between Chinese firms and local firms by 
investigating suppliers and clients’ perspectives. 
4.8 Evaluating research quality: Validity and reliability
One of the classical approaches to evaluating the quality of research in positivist and post-
positivist paradigms is assessing ‘validity’ and ‘reliability’ (Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010). While 
alternative approaches, namely ‘trustworthiness’, have been proposed to assess research 
quality (Guba, 1981; Lincoln, 1995), validity and reliability were considered appropriate to 
confirm the quality of this research. 
Validity
The validity of a research design is assessed on the basis of three criteria: construct validity, 
internal validity and external validity (Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010). 
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Construct Validity
Construct validity is a test of ‘the extent at which the study investigates what it claims to 
investigate’ (Farquhar, 2012). The concept is more relevant to the data-collection phase, and 
triangulation has been suggested as one of the ways to ensure construct validity (Gibbert 
& Ruigrok, 2010; Schell, 1992). Construct validity is ensured by the use of multiple data 
collection strategies and sources (Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010). This study triangulated 
different data sources including interview data, incidental observation and documents 
such as policy documents, company reports, training reports, press reports etc. 
Peer review has been suggested as one of the ways to ensure construct validity (Gibbert 
& Ruigrok, 2010). The four sub-studies that make up this thesis underwent several rounds 
of rigorous peer review, which required revisions to be made to the manuscripts prior to the 
approval and publication of the sub-studies in reputable scientific journals. Additionally, 
the research findings were presented and discussed at various international academic 
conferences, allowing for feedback from experts and academics in this field of research. 
The review process, responses and approval from members of the academic community and 
specifically experts in the field of China–Africa relations, public administration and other 
relevant disciplines equally contributed to validating this research. 
Construct validity can also be ensured by clearly explaining the research process: from 
the development of research questions to the drawing of final research conclusions (Geertz, 
2003; Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010; Yin, 1994). To ensure construct validity in this work, 
the data collection and analysis procedures were described in the relevant sections of this 
chapter and are reiterated in the sub-studies. Further, the interview data utilised in this 
research was obtained from original interviews conducted by the researcher. 
Internal Validity
Internal validity specifically concerns the data analysis process (Gibbert & Ruigrok, 
2010; Schell, 1992). Simply, internal validity aims at ensuring that the research findings 
are derived from data (Farquhar, 2012; Silverman, 2005). Essentially, to ensure internal 
validity, a researcher should be able to convince themselves and their readers that the 
findings from their study are derived from a critical analysis of all their data and not just 
from a few suitable examples (Silverman, 2005). 
Several strategies have been proposed to ensure internal validity, such as ensuring that 
the research framework utilised in a study is derived from literature (Yin, 1994). In this 
research, internal validity was confirmed by the use of a clear research framework, explicitly 
derived from literature, which guided the sub-studies. Further, pattern matching was 
done with previous research; that is, the relationships between data generated in the sub-
studies (specifically Sub-studies 3 and 4) were established and discussed vis-à-vis previous 
research. This step is in line with the argument that researchers can use pattern matching 
as a technique to ensure internal validity (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989), a 
process Eisenhardt (1989, p. 544) describes as ‘enfolding the literature’.
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External Validity
External validity is highly crucial in the research design phase (Schell, 1992). On 
generalisability, which is also referred to as external validity, some scholars argue that 
statistical generalisations are not applicable to case study research because of its context-
dependent nature (Arksey & Knight, 1999; Baskerville & Lee, 2003; Yin, 1994). However, 
some experts believe otherwise, arguing that multiple case studies on a topic carry more 
external validity than a single case study (Johnston, Leach, & Liu, 1999; Leonard-Barton, 
1990). Interestingly, this view, too, has been rejected by some case study researchers 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006; Siggelkow, 2007; Yin, 2009). Yin (2013) posits that case studies are 
generalisable in an analytical manner rather than a statistical one. According to Yin (2013), 
statistical generalisations cannot be derived from multiple cases or a single case; however, 
analytical generalisations can be formed as they depend on using a study’s theoretical 
framework to establish a logic that can be applied to other situations. Simply put, analytical 
generalisations can be made from observations to theory (Yin, 2013). 
This study takes that position as the goal of the study was to achieve analytical 
generalisation. This study was primarily concerned with investigating the opportunities 
and implications of CEE for HCD in Africa. The study finds that CEE does present 
opportunities for HCD in Africa and that Chinese enterprises are significantly well placed 
to contribute to HCD in their host countries in Africa. However, these contributions will 
vary across countries and sectors of the African economy because of the different contextual 
and sectoral conditions in these host countries. Thus, the results of this study transcend the 
boundaries of the case (Huawei in Nigeria) investigated. Further, the rationale for selecting 
the case organisation clearly articulated the representativeness of the case organisation the 
telecom industry and its appropriateness to the phenomena being studied and the research 
question. Additionally, details of the context of study were shared to justify the sampling 
choices made in this study (Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010).
Reliability
According to Hammersley (1992, p. 67) reliability refers to ‘the degree of consistency with 
which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same 
observer in different occasions. Broadly, it’s seen as an assessment of whether the evidence 
is consistent and stable (Remenyi, et al. 1998). Some social science researchers are of the 
view that the need for reliability and validity only arises in quantitative research and 
not qualitative research (Silverman, 2010). They argue that if social reality is considered 
as always being in a state of flux, then ensuring research instruments measure accurately 
isn’t necessary. However, Kirk and Miller (1986) note that without paying attention to 
reliability in qualitative research, the results of field research will be ignored. 
Reliability is most crucial in the data collection phase of research (Schell, 1992). To 
ensure reliability in this study, interviews were tape-recorded except in a few instances 
where permission to record the interview was denied. In such instances, detailed notes 
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were taken instead. All the tape recordings were carefully transcribed, and some extracts of 
interview responses have been included in the sub-studies. This is in line with Silverman’s 
suggestions for increasing reliability of interview data (Silverman, 2005). Additionally 
‘careful documentation and clarification of research procedures’ has been identified as 
a strategy for ensuring reliability (Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010, p. 715). This strategy was 
implemented in this study via detailed reporting of the processes and procedures of the 
case study as well as divulging the name of the case organisation.
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5 Overview of the Sub-studies
This chapter summarises the aims and findings of Sub-studies 1–4 of this thesis (also 
referred to as articles in the following sections). Each section presents the purpose and 
research question addressed in that sub-study, followed by the data and analysis (in the 
case of empirical Sub-studies 3 and 4) and finally the conclusions and implications of that 
sub-study. Together, the sub-studies contribute to answering the main research questions 
of this thesis. 
5.1 Sub-study 1: Dependency theory: A conceptual lens 
to understand China’s presence in Africa?
Purpose and research question: In this sub-study (see Agbebi & Virtanen, 2017), China’s 
presence in Africa is examined through the lens of dependency theory. The increase in 
China’s investments, trade and aid portfolio in Africa has spurred an intense scrutiny of 
its presence on the continent. The chief concern is the implications of China’s presence 
for Africa’s development. This study is based on the premise that China’s continued 
engagements in Africa via trade, aid and investments will undoubtedly affect Africa’s 
development trajectory. 
Within this thesis, Sub-study 1 addresses RQ1: What are the nature and characteristics 
of CEE in Africa? This sub-study also addresses the question of whether China’s 
presence in Africa fosters a new dependency – diversifies dependency within the global 
south – or furthers Africa’s development? To answer the question, dependency theory 
is reviewed and applied to understand China’s presence in Africa. The article examines 
China’s contemporary presence in Africa, with a retrospective overview of Sino–African 
relations, an analysis of the current state of the engagement and a view of how the relations 
between China and Africa may evolve. This is done in order to understand the nature and 
characteristics of CEE in Africa and its implications for Africa’s development. In terms 
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of theory, the article deploys dependency theory to unpack the complexities of China’s 
engagement with Africa and to understand the implications of this relationship for Africa’s 
development trajectory. A review of relevant literature on dependency theory is carried out 
and its arguments applied to understand China’s presence in Africa.
Conclusions and implications: Following a review of dependency theory literature 
as well as a detailed analysis of Sino–African relations, the study concludes that contrary 
to notions that China’s presence in Africa signals a diversification of dependency in the 
global south, it actually indicates a growing interdependency stemming from economic 
partnership, cooperation and solidarity among the countries. The engagement serves 
both an opportunity and a challenge to Africa. The opportunity comes in the form a new 
alternative among development partners, and this observation has been supported by other 
studies (He, 2013; Moyo, 2009; Sautman & Hairong, 2007). However, the engagement 
also challenges governments of host African countries to leverage it for their development 
objectives. The study finds that within the China–Africa engagement, there is ‘room 
for negotiation’ as the engagement is not completely devoid of African agency. African 
countries can shape their engagement with China in a manner that advances their interests 
and aligns with their development needs and priorities. This and similar conclusions in 
existing studies (Corkin, 2013; Mohan & Lampert, 2013; Odoom, 2016; van Staden, Alden, 
& Wu, 2018) challenge the predominant narrative of China’s dominance and the lack of 
African agency in China–Africa engagement. 
Moreover, China’s presence in Africa challenges African leaders to question the status 
quo, reorient their values and adopt an inward focus on their developmental needs and 
priorities: they can question the status quo by which Africa’s engagement with Western 
industrialised countries has been largely hierarchical and conducted in a donor–recipient 
mode; they can reorient their values towards achieving their developmental goals and 
towards the development models that are well suited for Africa’s economic development; 
and they can adopt an inward focus on their developmental needs and priorities and allow 
these to guide their economic engagement with other nations (see Agbebi & Virtanen, 
2017). 
This sub-study contributes to the extant literature in that it furthers the understanding 
of contemporary Sino–African relations within the context of Africa’s development 
trajectory. 
5.2 Sub-study 2: Towards a framework for understanding 
the outcomes of economic engagement with Africa: 
A human capital development perspective
Purpose and research question: This sub-study (see Agbebi, Stenvall, & Virtanen, 2018) 
builds on Sub-study 1 in that it is based on a similar premise that economic engagements 
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among nations in general, and with Africa in particular, will generate certain outcomes 
that will affect the development trajectory of nations involved. This sub-study posits that 
these engagements need to be studied in order to understand their potential outcomes. As 
economic engagements among developing countries in the global south and transitional 
economies continue to gain momentum, a framework is needed to investigate the impacts 
of these engagements on the economies and the development of the countries involved. 
Accordingly, this sub-study presents a framework that can be used to study the outcomes 
of these new patterns of economic engagement across countries, including the ones forged 
between China and Africa. 
This framework is significant because there are currently no overarching guidelines to 
investigate the potential outcomes and implications of these new patterns of economic 
engagement. The study addresses two main aims. Firstly, it presents a conceptual framework 
that can guide management researchers in understanding how new features of economic 
engagement can benefit the nations involved and the business organisations in the host 
and home countries. Secondly, it illustrates how the framework can be deployed, using the 
example of Chinese engagement with Africa and its potential influence on HCD in Africa.
To achieve the aim of the article, existing relevant literature on dependency and human 
capital theories were reviewed to provide the foundation for a conceptual framework for 
understanding and investigating the new forms of economic engagement. In addition, 
relevant literature on China’s engagement in Africa was reviewed to further demonstrate 
the utility of the conceptual framework.
Conclusions and implications: So far as the world continues to experience significant 
economic and political shifts, as it has in the last few decades, new patterns of economic 
engagement will continue to emerge. To understand these new engagements and their 
potential outcomes, a comprehensive framework can be valuable. The framework proposed 
in this study aims to do that an constitutes the main contribution of this study. 
The framework is useful for investigating policy transfer and the diffusion of 
management and technological innovation that frequently result from these engagements. 
It focuses on three variables that should be analysed when conducting research on the 
potential outcomes of these engagements:
i. The nature and dynamics of economic engagement
ii. The contextual features of the nation-state 
iii. The degree of readiness of the nation state and its institutions to appropriate the 
benefits of the economic engagement 
The article argues that the presence and interactions of these variables will determine 
the potential outcomes of the engagement between nation-states. The application of this 
framework will enable management researchers study the potential outcomes of economic 
engagements between nations. As the China–Africa engagement continues to deepen, this 
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framework will guide researchers in understanding the engagement and its outcomes and 
implications for Africa’s development. 
5.3 Sub-study 3: China in Africa’s telecom sector: Opportunities for 
human capital development? A case of Huawei in Nigeria 
Purpose and research question: This sub-study (see Agbebi, 2018) is an extension of Sub-
studies 1 and 2, and it examines the opportunities in Sino–African engagement for HCD in 
Africa by focusing on Chinese investments in Africa’s telecom sector. Chinese investments 
in Africa have increasingly become diversified (Chen et al., 2015; Tang, 2010), spreading 
from traditional extractive industries into sectors such as manufacturing, financial services, 
construction, hospitality and telecommunications. 
The African telecommunications sector has seen increasing Chinese investments, as 
Chinese telecom giants such as Huawei and ZTE have been heavily involved in setting up 
and upgrading the core telecom infrastructure in many African countries, which have led 
to increased connectivity and broadband access in these regions. On the one hand, Chinese 
investments are on the rise; on the other hand, their potential to add value to African 
industries and contribute to HCD on the continent has been questioned. This study 
addresses such questions by investigating in what ways, if any, CEE contributes to HCD 
in Africa. It focuses specifically on training and skills building. Further, acknowledging 
the role of government policies in leveraging FDI for development, the study examines the 
role of the Nigerian government in leveraging Chinese investments in the telecom sector 
for HCD.
Data and analysis: This sub-study adopts a qualitative case study design (Yin, 2009), 
which is increasingly used in management research to investigate complex scenarios. The 
use of the case study approach in this study is significant as it enables the researcher to move 
beyond a general overview of China–Africa relations and delve deeper into individual 
country-level studies for a nuanced understanding of the relations and their outcomes and 
implications for Africa. 
The sub-study investigates empirically the case of Huawei in Nigeria’s telecom sector and 
examines the effects of its operations on skills and technology transfer. The data analysed 
consist of semi-structured interview responses from 29 participants – selected by purposive 
sampling and via the snowball technique – incidental observations and documentary 
analysis of policy documents, company reports, press releases and training reports. The 
interviewees were Huawei managers, trainers, current and ex-employees, participants of 
Huawei training programmes, Huawei scholarship recipients and government officials. 
The data generated were analysed using qualitative content analysis.
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Conclusions and implications: As long as China continues to invest in African 
economies, the question of its effect on the continent particularly, on Africa’s HCD, will 
remain pertinent. The findings from this study are as follows:
Chinese enterprises are indeed capable of contributing to HCD in Africa as proven in 
this case. The Chinese telecom firm Huawei has contributed to skills building in Nigeria 
through its in-house training activities for employees and the employees of its suppliers and 
clients. Further, Huawei’s partnerships with the Nigerian government on two capacity-
building programmes, aimed at promoting female participation in the ICT industry and 
for imparting ICT skills training to the youth to ensure employment, have seen its training 
activities extend to the Nigerian youth. In addition, the company’s training activities also 
include a ‘train the trainer’ programme aimed at Nigerian government officials. 
The Chinese MNC has also contributed to general education in Nigeria by offering 
university scholarships and grants in two HEIs in Nigeria. Findings show that these 
contributions are guided by Huawei’s strategic objectives and its desire to generate positive 
public awareness as well as gain political capital with the Nigerian government and other 
industry stakeholders. This finding reinforces the notion that although MNCs do not have 
altruistic motives with regard to their operations in host countries, there are economic 
arguments for them to contribute to HCD in their host countries.
Additionally, the findings support the argument for government intervention in 
steering FDI for development (Reiter & Steensma, 2010). The case study shows that the 
Nigerian government is keen to leverage Huawei’s presence for HCD in Nigeria, and they 
have demonstrated it by actively partnering with Huawei on HCD initiatives. Further, to 
encourage MNCs to contribute to HCD in the ICT sector, the Nigerian government has 
enacted a local content policy, which seeks to ensure that MNCs have detailed plans for 
job creation, recruitment of local engineers, HCD contribution and value creation for the 
whole ecosystem. This study highlights the important role that the private sector plays in 
bridging the HCD gap in sub-Saharan Africa, where the stock of human capital is lower 
than that in other regions of the world, and the institutional framework for HCD is 
relatively weak. 
While there is abundant research on HCD interventions at the firm and individual 
level, studies that employ a national-level perspective are few in number. This work addresses 
the gap by examining the context of HCD and the political and institutional realities and 
interactions within it (see Agbebi, 2018). 
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5.4 Sub-study 4: Exploring the human capital development 
dimensions of Chinese investments in Africa: Opportunities, 
implications and directions for further research
Purpose and research question: This sub-study (see Agbebi 2019) builds on Sub-study 
3 as it investigates and discusses the effects of CEE on three dimensions of HCD: local 
employment, training and skill building, and knowledge and technology transfer. These 
three dimensions are identified from literature and explored in the context of CEE in Africa. 
Using the case study of Huawei in Nigeria’s telecom sector, the paper examines, firstly, the 
employment effects of Huawei’s operations, its contributions to skills development, and is 
knowledge and technology transfer effects. The study also advances a working hypothesis 
that seeks to guide further research towards developing a theoretical framework for the 
study of CEE in Africa and its effects on HCD.
Data and analysis: The case analysed in this sub-study is identical to that in Sub-study 
3. Data generated in this study were analysed using qualitative content analysis. The focus 
of this sub-study is three HCD dimensions: local employment; training and skills building; 
and knowledge and technology transfer.
Conclusions and implications: Based on the premise that Chinese investments in 
Africa can impact HCD on the continent, this study explores the presence of the HCD 
dimensions. The findings are as follows:
Local employment: The employment effects of Huawei’s operation are significant as 
the company pursues a workforce localisation strategy. The company currently employs 
over 1000 employees in Nigeria, 70% of whom are locals. It has also engaged over 500 
local partners (suppliers, subcontractors etc.). These numbers confirm that Huawei has 
contributed to indirect employment creation, and this effect is most likely as significant as 
its direct employment creation. The findings show that several factors influence Huawei’s 
hiring practices such as its strategy, size and scale of operations, the local regulatory 
environment (expatriate quotas, local content policies), industry type and the presence of 
skilled labour.
Training and skills building: Huawei contributes to training and skills building in 
Nigeria via multiple routes such as in-house employee training activities, training for clients 
and partners, and training programmes in partnership with the Nigerian government. 
These findings echo other studies that show that regular employee training is a crucial 
component for MNCs operating in high-tech sectors because of the constant changes in 
technology, which is a characteristic of the industry. Huawei’s external training activities, 
particularly those carried out in partnership with the Nigerian government, are also linked 
to its CSR objectives. The MNC actively collaborates with the Nigerian government and 
other stakeholders in the telecom industry. 
Knowledge and technology transfer: To examine the extent of knowledge and 
technology transfer that occurred as a result of Huawei’s operations, this study focused 
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on horizontal and vertical spillovers. Horizontally, the findings showed that knowledge 
transfer occurred through labour mobility. Vertically, the technology transfer occurred 
via linkages between Huawei and its local suppliers. Supplier development programmes, 
technical training, and supplier/distributor training as part of Huawei’s interactions with 
local firms are all indicative of knowledge transfer. The introduction of new technology 
to its customers (network operators) has also had positive spillover effects on the larger 
telecom ecosystem in Nigeria. 
This study contributes to the literature on the impact of CEE on HCD in Africa. Unlike 
previous studies that have examined HCD issues within the context of other broader areas, 
this work offers an in-depth look at the HCD dimensions of CEE. Further, earlier studies 
lacked a theoretical basis to analyse and interpret the findings related to HCD. This study 
bridges this gap by examining the intricacies of a Chinese MNC’s operations from a HCD 
perspective and offering theory-driven rationalisations of the findings. It also advances a 
working hypothesis that the HCD impact of CEE will vary across countries and sectors of 
the African economy because of sectoral factors and contextual conditions, such as sectoral 
differences, institutional frameworks in host countries, firm profile and strategy, and 
labour quality in the host country. The study raises some questions that when addressed in 
further studies can help advance a theoretical framework that will guide further research 
on the HCD impact of CEE in Africa (see Agbebi, 2019). 
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6 Conclusions
This chapter presents the main conclusions of this study. The first section presents the 
conclusions that are based on the overall findings of the study, in line with the study’s main 
research questions. This chapter then discusses the theoretical contributions and practical 
implications of the findings. Lastly, suggestions for further research are presented. 
6.1 General conclusions
Economic engagement between China and African countries has implications – whether 
negative or positive – for the development of the continent (Ayodele & Sotola, 2014). 
The Sino–African engagement is particularly significant due to the growing power and 
influence of China in the world and the fact that China’s growing influence on the African 
continent has been viewed as a threat to the influence of Western powers and former 
colonial powers on the continent, albeit relatively (Lyman, 2005). Continued economic 
engagement between China and Africa has attracted much attention and scrutiny from 
the media, researchers, policymakers, foreign politicians and concerned individuals who 
question the real motives behind China’s engagement with Africa and its effects on Africa’s 
development trajectory (He & Zhu, 2018). These questions have resulted in growing 
research interest towards the phenomenon.
Despite a number of studies on Sino–African engagement across disciplines, several 
misconceptions surrounding the engagement continue to persist, mainly because of lack 
of knowledge and reliable data (Brautigam et al., 2017). Many scholars have therefore 
recommended a deeper investigation of the still evolving Sino–African engagement (Ado 
& Su, 2016; Brautigam et al., 2017). Thus, the motivation for this study was to shed light on 
the economic engagement and provide an in-depth analysis of one of the most contentious 
topics under the engagement: its implications for HCD. The overall research aim of this 
thesis was to examine the HCD opportunities and contributions of CEE in Africa. To 
achieve this objective, the nature and characteristics of CEE in Africa were investigated, 
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along with its potential outcomes. Further, the HCD opportunities present in the 
engagement were also examined. Specifically, this study sought to answer the following 
research questions: 
RQ1: What are the nature and characteristics of CEE in Africa?
This thesis relies on empirical data from the Huawei case study in Nigeria to answer RQ2 
and RQ3.
RQ2: In what ways, if any, does CEE contributes to HCD in Africa?
RQ3: Do African governments leverage CEE for HCD? If so how?
RQ1 What are the nature and characteristics of CEE in Africa?
Through a systematic analysis of Sino–African relations using  dependency theory, this 
study finds that the present-day Sino–African relations, manifesting in trade, capital 
investments and aid, are largely economic in nature. The engagement is driven largely by 
commercial and economic motives as Beijing seeks to secure crucial resources to sustain 
its rapid industrialisation and support its development objectives. Findings show that the 
current Sino–African engagement is devoid of ideological undertones that previously 
dominated the relations between the two parties, particularly during the Cold War era. 
The present engagement is focused on practical economic cooperation with concrete 
expectations and potential benefits for African countries and China. This finding is in line 
with existing research that considers China’s ongoing presence in Africa to be economically 
motivated (Konings, 2007; Li, 2007; Schiere, 2011). 
Although, China officially promotes an engagement without political conditions and 
partners with African countries irrespective of political systems and ideologies, a key clause 
is the recognition of its ‘One China’ principle. The ‘One China’ principle is the diplomatic 
acknowledgement that there is only one sovereign Chinese state, which is the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), and not the Republic of China, Taiwan (ROC). Consequently, 
China maintains vast trade, investments and aid links with 53 African countries, except 
Swaziland, which is the sole African country that maintains diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan (Madowo, 2019).
This study finds that the defining characteristics of the engagement emphasise a 
partnership between China and African countries geared towards achieving their common 
and respective development and economic objectives. Additionally, the engagement fosters 
a cooperation that sees China and individual African countries support one another 
politically and morally on the world stage. While there is an apparent power asymmetry 
between China and African countries owing to China’s economic position, power and 
influence in the world, China’s interaction with African countries can be considered different 
particularly in its framing by both China and Africa. This is in line with observations that 
China draws on its experiences as a developing country and espouses the principle of non-
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interference in domestic affairs in its relations with Africa (Alden, 2018; Li, 2007; Power 
& Mohan, 2010). In the face of Western countries’ hierarchical approach to Africa and 
criticisms thereof, China’s non-interference has only served to drive African countries to 
seek closer ties to China. Although there appears to be no shortage of commentary labelling 
China as Africa’s new exploiter (Navarro, 2007), African governments largely view China 
as a development partner as opposed to a hegemonic power. The engagement is welcomed 
as most see China’s economic success as one to aspire towards, and governments recognise 
that continued economic engagement has the potential to catalyse economic rejuvenation 
in their respective countries. 
The Sino–African economic engagement can be characterised as south-south cooperation. 
China’s official narrative is very much in line with the principles of south-south cooperation 
centred on collaboration for development. The Asian giant views its engagement with 
African countries as cooperation and partnership geared towards addressing common 
development challenges for mutual benefit. China’s African policy stresses this position 
(He, 2007; Li, 2007). 
On a practical level, the engagement is an example of south-south cooperation, where 
China is in a position to offer access to better technologies and solutions, owing to the 
relative similarities in socio-economic conditions and development issues between China 
and Africa. In addition to projects and engagements under the FOCAC platform, China 
has engaged in several projects with African countries in cooperation with the UNDP 
for knowledge transfer and technical cooperation (UNDP, 2016). The UNDP (2016) 
observes that through south-south cooperation with China, infrastructure and business 
environments have been strengthened in some African countries, and the influx of Chinese 
FDI into Africa has generated jobs in some economies. 
China, drawing on its own successful experience with special economic zones (SEZs), 
has helped develop SEZs and industrial parks in some African countries (notably Ethiopia 
and Nigeria), thus supporting spatial industrial policy in Africa as well as sharing and 
demonstrating the effectiveness of some parts of its development model (Brautigam 
& Tang, 2011; Newman & Page, 2017). China’s willingness to finance infrastructural 
projects is crucial to development on the continent. It also serve to strengthen China’s 
image as a viable source of development finance to Africa and as a development partner. 
This is particularly important as China stepped in as a viable development partner at a 
time when development finance and assistance from Western international financial 
institutions (IFIs) and bilateral donors in the 1980s and 1990s was on the decline (Ayodele 
& Sotola, 2014). Rosseel, DeCorte, Bloomaert and Verniers (2009) opine that this period 
also heightened the need for mutual collaboration amongst countries in the global south 
instead of continuous dependence on industrialised countries of the global north.
Another defining characteristic of the China–Africa engagement is economic 
pragmatism. African leaders increasingly see China as a more viable development partner 
for Africa because of the economic pragmatism in the relations (Hanauer & Morris, 2014). 
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China’s economic engagement with African countries is primarily based on an evaluation 
of their perceived economic potential, with more investments going to the most promising 
high-growth economies (Brautigam et al., 2017). This is why Taylor (1998) rightly forecasted 
an increase in Sino–African economic engagement. 
China’s approach to the engagement is economically pragmatic and free of 
conditionalities related to liberal economic reforms and democratic governance, which are 
often attached to development assistance from IFIs such as the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and bilateral donors (Sautman & Hairong, 2009). China’s ‘principle 
of non-interference’ in other countries’ domestic affairs is viewed favourably by African 
leaders (Taylor, 1998), who consider the conditionalities imposed by the IFIs as prescriptive, 
not conducive to their country’s development priorities and a barrier to their autonomous 
development plans. 
In fact, China’s non-interference principle may increase its popularity among African 
masses as it eliminates political obstacles in the speedy delivery of infrastructure (Sautman 
& Hairong, 2009). The principle, though heavily criticised for undermining democratic 
governance and supporting repressive governments and human rights violations (Chidause, 
2007; Naim, 2007; Schoeman, 2007), has offered countries such as Zimbabwe and Sudan 
an alternative source of development finance. These countries have hitherto been penalised 
for their non-democratic and repressive practices and as a result have been subjected to 
economic sanctions by some Western governments. It is important to note that concerns 
about whether China can protect its economic interests in volatile countries without 
interfering in domestic affairs have been proven valid in light of the growing complexities 
surrounding China’s involvement in Dafur (see Large 2008) and its support of Zanu PF 
in Zimbabwe (see Rotberg, 2009), which seem to cast a doubt on its adherence to its non-
intervention policy. 
On examining contemporary China–Africa engagement, this study finds that the 
engagement gives African countries an alternative in their choice of development partners, 
providing room to manoeuvre and refine their development objectives. Rosseel et al. (2009) 
remarked that one of the challenges in north-south engagement is the differences in the 
understanding of development; thus objectives, priorities and proposed actions also often 
differ. China’s approach to development offers an alternative in that it differs fundamentally 
from the Western approach, which is often centred on uniform solutions to developmental 
needs and benchmark models for development that favour a laissez-faire economic approach 
(Besada, Wang, & Whalley, 2011). This departure is crucial for developing countries in 
Africa, where the Washington consensus model and its set of economic policy reforms have 
not succeeded in addressing economic growth and development challenges (Ramo, 2004; 
Rodrik, 2006; Stiglitz, 2002). This finding is in line with research that considers China–
Africa engagement as an alternative for African economies (He, 2007; 2013; Moyo, 2009; 
Sautman & Hairong, 2007). Though some studies warn that despite China presenting 
Africa an alternative path to development, reliance on China to alleviate Africa’s economic 
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plight might reify Africa’s dependent position in the world economy (Mason, 2017; Taylor, 
2014). 
Economic engagement between China and African countries despite the asymmetry 
of power is not devoid of African agency. Despite China’s growing economic influence on 
the continent, the engagement lacks the overtones of political and economic hegemony, 
which has typically dominated north-south relations (Moyo, 2016). The engagement gives 
leeway for Africa to exert agency, allowing African state and non-state actors to steer it 
for the benefits of development in Africa and in line with their developmental priorities. 
This could be partly attributed to the FOCAC platform. FOCAC, a triennial forum 
where Chinese and African leaders meet to review progress and set new targets, can be 
said to foster shared ownership, decision making and accountability in the China–Africa 
engagement. The FOCAC platform ensures the presence of African agency within the 
engagement (van Staden et al., 2018; Were, 2018).
Van Staden et al. (2018) note that China’s engagement with Africa is driven and 
shaped by the local environment and pressures from state and non-state actors in Africa. 
Actors from African countries, notably Angola, Nigeria and Ghana, have been able to 
exert considerable influence and autonomy in the engagement with China, leveraging 
it for their own economic and political gains (Mohan & Lampert, 2013; Odoom, 2016). 
According to Gagliardone (2018), African agency plays a central role in determining the 
outcomes of China’s projects in Africa. The popular notion of China’s dominance in Sino–
African engagement has been challenged by studies that have found that both sides have 
considerable influence in steering the engagement to achieve their objectives (Corkin, 2013; 
Mohan & Lampert, 2013; Odoom, 2016). 
When viewed from the dependency theory lens, the engagement signifies a growing 
interdependency tied to the domestic economic needs and long-term strategic interests 
of both Africa and China. The economic engagement has the potential to be mutually 
beneficial as long as the engagement is steered and leveraged to benefit both parties and 
their respective economic objectives. For China, this implies gaining access to much needed 
resources and new markets to meet its strategic development objectives, and for African 
countries, it implies receiving concrete economic gains in terms of access to revenue, 
infrastructural development and job creation among others. 
China–Africa relations are not solely based on development assistance but on reciprocal 
trade and investments, which has resulted in economic gains and opportunities for both 
parties, further reinforcing their role as economic partners. Thus, the engagement has 
enabled Africa play an active role not only as a commodity exporter but also as a contributor 
to the global economy. It has given rise to a growing interdependency between China and 
African countries. This finding is in line with studies that have commented on the mutual 
dependence in China–Africa relations (Danquah Institute, 2019; Power & Mohan, 2008). 
Li Anshan (2006), the renowned China–Africa scholar describes the interdependence as 
follows: ‘Although Africa might need China, China definitely needs Africa more for her 
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development process’ (as cited in Power & Mohan, 2008). Some studies hold a different 
view, opining that although China’s engagement with Africa reduces Africa’s dependency 
on the west, it merely diversifies dependency (Mason 2017, Taylor 2014) which could 
potentially result in a state of managed ‘multi-dependency’ for African countries (Mason 
2017:93). 
Thus, to answer RQ1 of this study, the findings suggest that Sino–African engagement is 
largely economic in nature and driven by commercial and economic motives of both China 
and Africa. The engagement constitutes a partnership between China and African countries 
and is a practical example of south-south collaboration. It is economically pragmatic and offers 
Africa an alternative in its choice of development partners (see Agbebi & Virtanen, 2017). 
Present within the engagement is African agency in various forms and levels, which allows 
governments of African countries to negotiate, shape and steer the engagement towards 
their respective objectives. Finally, the engagement signifies a growing interdependency 
between China and Africa driven by strategic interests and objectives of China and 
African countries. The engagement presents both opportunities and challenges for Africa 
– opportunities to realise economic gains and a challenge to steer the engagement in a 
direction that is beneficial to Africa’s development while mitigating the negative effects 
that could arise, particularly in relation to debt sustainability, trade imbalance and 
environmental degradation. 
In addition to addressing RQ1, this study employs dependency theory and human capital 
theory to develop a framework for understanding the outcomes of economic engagements 
between nations. The last few decades have witnessed significant economic and political 
transformation globally that has influenced the state of economic interactions between 
countries. The formation of BRICS, an increase in south-south trade and investments, the 
formation and growing influence of regional economic blocs etc., have strong implications 
for development. However, there is no overarching framework in management research 
to investigate these engagements, how they interact with the national context of the host 
country and their impacts. This is important as these new forms of engagement could 
shape the development discourse in Africa. This framework proposed in this study can be 
instrumental in understanding the outcomes of economic engagements between nations. 
The framework is discussed in detail in Section 2.3 and in Sub-study 2 of this thesis (see 
Agbebi, Stenvall, & Virtanen, 2018). Sub-study 2 also explains how the framework can 
be applied to analyse CEE with Africa. By developing the framework, the study aims 
to further the understanding of CEE and how its potential outcomes for Africa can be 
investigated from an HCD perspective. 
The framework identifies three variables as crucial to understanding the outcomes 
of economic engagement: the nature and dynamics of the economic engagement, the 
contextual features of the nation state and the degree of readiness of the nation state and 
its institutions to appropriate the benefits of an economic engagement. This study posits 
that the presence and interactions of these variables will determine the potential outcomes, 
97
both negative and positive, of economic engagements between nation-states. With regard 
to Sino–African engagement and its possible outcomes for HCD, this study argues that 
while HCD opportunities are inherent to CEE with Africa, these opportunities can 
only be accrued if African governments develop and implement appropriate policies to 
leverage CEE for HCD in their respective countries. The study further highlights that the 
outcomes will vary in different African countries owing to the presence and interactions of 
the aforementioned variables. 
RQ2 In what ways, if any, does CEE contributes to HCD in Africa?
Building on the premise that economic engagement between China and individual African 
countries creates opportunities for HCD in Africa, this study addresses RQ2 by analysing 
data from a case study of Huawei’s operations in Nigeria’s telecom sector. Findings 
reflect that Chinese enterprises operating in Africa are well placed to contribute to local 
employment generation, training and skills building, and technology and knowledge 
transfer via their operations and investments in the host country. 
Huawei contributes to local employment by employing host country nationals in its 
operations in Nigeria. This study finds that Huawei contributes to both direct and indirect 
local employment. Huawei pursues a workforce localisation strategy in Nigeria, with locals 
(i.e. host country nationals) accounting for 70% of its 1000+ employees. The company 
has also engaged over 500 local partners (suppliers, subcontractors, etc.), thus generating 
indirect employment in Nigeria. This finding echoes reports that the scale and diversity 
of Chinese investments in Africa have created ample potential for job creation in the host 
countries (Calabrese, 2016; He & Zhu, 2018; Lin, 2016). The study finds that the following 
factors influence Huawei’s hiring practices in Nigeria: the firm’s strategy, its size, the scale of 
its operations, the local regulatory environment (expatriate quotas, local content policies), 
the industry it operates in and the availability of skilled labour.
In terms of training and skills transfer, this study examines Huawei’s training activities 
and its effects on HCD. Huawei regularly trains its employees and extends the training 
to its partners, employees of suppliers, clients, Nigerian youths and government officials. 
Training modalities such as employee training in various forms, training for clients and 
partners, training programmes in partnership with the government have been utilised, all 
of which contribute to skills buildings on different levels. 
Huawei also contributes to general education in Nigeria by lending support via 
grants, scholarships, and equipment. Further, training and skills-building programmes 
for Nigerian youths are implemented through a partnership between the Nigerian 
government and Huawei. This mode of training not only represents an example of how a 
Chinese firm directly contributes to human capital formation in the host country but also 
shows how governments can directly leverage FDI for HCD. Effects of Huawei’s training 
on employability and on skills and technology transfer have been largely positive, with 
98
trainees gaining internships and employment with Huawei and ex-employees leveraging 
the acquired knowledge and skills to further their careers in other organisations. 
Findings show that the motives underlying the training activities are not altruistic; 
rather they are shaped by the nature of Huawei’s operations, its organisational strategy, the 
availability of skills in the host country and several contextual factors. This study enables a 
broader view of how Chinese enterprises, and MNCs in general, can contribute to human 
capital formation, their motives for doing so and how the host government can leverage 
these investments for HCD. 
In terms of skills and technology transfer, this study find that skills and technology 
transfer have occurred through labour turnover and vertical linkages. Close links between 
Huawei and local suppliers, an active supplier development programme and training for 
local suppliers and clients set the stage for technology and knowledge diffusion to occur, 
which in turn enhances the capabilities and productivity of local firms. 
On the basis of the findings from the case study, one could argue that Chinese enterprises 
are well placed to contribute to HCD in Africa; however, this contributions are dependent 
on several sectoral and contextual factors. Thus, the study advances the following working 
hypothesis to guide future studies: the degree to which CEE contributes to HCD will vary 
across countries and sectors of the African economy. 
It is important to stress that the purpose of the study is not to generalize based on the 
case of Huawei in Nigeria but to draw on findings from the case to support the conceptual 
argument that CEE creates opportunities for HCD in Africa. It is necessary to clarify how 
this research should be approached in reference to other contexts in Africa. 
In the case of Huawei in Nigeria, the study concludes that CEE in Africa can and does 
contribute to HCD in Africa and also stresses that ‘the HCD impact of CEE will vary 
across countries and sectors of the African economy’ due to differences in sectoral and 
contextual conditions, such as sector characteristics, institutional frameworks in host 
countries, firm profile and strategy, and labour quality in the host country. The particular 
factors that can be drawn out from this case includes: Firm profile and strategy (Huawei’s 
large scale operations in Nigeria and its active localization strategy); industry sector (telecom 
sector is a high tech sector, requires skilled workers and regular employee training to keep 
up with advances in technology) labour quality (availability of skilled local workers in the 
telecom sector in Nigeria); policy and regulatory environment (regulation pertaining to work 
permits and expatriate quotas, local content requirement guidelines). These factors were 
found to have influenced Huawei’s labour related practices resulting in local employment 
creation, high workforce localization rate, training and skills development of locals, as well 
as knowledge transfer and contribution to tertiary education in Nigeria (see sub-study 4 – 
Agbebi, 2019 and Chapter 5 and 6 of this summary). 
This study stresses that these conditions will vary across all African countries and in 
every Chinese enterprise thus reinforcing the working hypothesis advanced in sub-study 
4 to guide for future studies ‘the HCD impact of CEE will vary across countries and 
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sectors of the African economy’ due to differences in sectoral and contextual conditions. 
The finding of this case and the working hypothesis advanced, sheds a deeper insight into 
the erstwhile contradictory reports on the labour related effects of Chinese investments 
in Africa. To illustrate, the widespread criticism that Chinese companies are unwilling 
to hire local workers which emanated from news reports (Flynn, 2013; Lorenz & Thielke, 
2007) need to be understood within a context. This is because the employment effects of 
Chinese investments may differ according to the skills composition in the host country, 
the regulatory environment, the duration or time sensitivity of a project, the size of the 
enterprise, its strategy and the sector it operates in. 
It is important to draw attention to some arguments made in chapter 3.3 of this 
summary, which presents examples from existing studies of the how HCD effects of CEE 
is influenced by the different contexts in the host country and organisation. This, alongside 
the evidence from this case, highlights the importance of the context and the merit of 
the working hypothesis advanced in this study. This thesis highlighted how host country 
policies that require MNCs to implement training and skills transfer programmes can 
influence the employment creation and knowledge transfer effects of Chinese enterprises as 
seen in the case of Chinese investments in Rwanda’s manufacturing sector (see Eom, 2018). 
This study emphasised how the duration of operations of Chinese projects and enterprises 
also determine their level of workforce localisation as seen in the case of Ethiopia (see Tang, 
2016). This study highlighted that the presence and quality of labour in the host African 
country also determines the extent of workforce localisation in Chinese companies in 
Africa. This is so in the case of Angola, where the lack of skilled labour was identified as 
a major impediment to workforce localisation in Chinese enterprises in the country (see 
Corkin, 2012). This study highlighted how the motivations of African governments and 
presence/lack of clear policies also influence the employment creation effects of Chinese 
investments and their long-term contribution to HCD in their host country as in the case 
of Angola and DRC (see Tang, 2010). 
Findings from this study support the assertion that there is room for human capital gains 
for Africa within the China–Africa economic engagement (He & Zhu, 2018; Sautmann & 
Hairong, 2015; Tang, 2016) and that the context in the host country and organisation can 
play a crucial role in understanding the HCD implications of the engagement (King, 2013). 
It is in this light that the findings of this study be understood in reference to other contexts 
in Africa 
RQ3: Do African governments leverage CEE for HCD? If so how?
As part of the case study, this study examined how the Nigerian government leverages CEE 
for HCD. Findings showed that the government recognises that FDI in this sector, and in 
this case Chinese FDI, could significantly contribute to HCD and has taken measures to 
encourage MNCs to upgrade their operations. The Nigerian government specifically has 
done so by way of the local content policy in ICT, which encourages MNCs in the sector to 
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meaningfully engage in local employment, train local workers and create value for the local 
ecosystem by engaging local firms in their supply chain. While the policy is still in its early 
stages and therefore its impact cannot be adequately evaluated, it clearly represents a step by 
the government towards leveraging FDI for HCD in the ICT sector. Findings reveal that the 
government has been proactive in its approach to leverage Huawei’s investments for HCD 
by collaborating with Huawei on several skills-building and enhancement programmes 
in Nigeria. These findings align with studies that have observed increasing actions from 
African governments in leveraging Chinese investments to support the domestic economic 
goals of job creation, as in the case of Rwanda (Eom, 2018), and industrialisation as in the 
case of Ethiopia (Lin, 2016; Tang, 2016).
This study concludes that there are indeed opportunities for HCD within CEE, though 
these opportunities vary according to country and sectors of the African economy. Further, 
Chinese enterprises are well placed to contribute to HCD through their operations in 
the host countries in Africa, and the host government has an important role to play in 
maximising these opportunities. Several policies targeting FDI attraction and upgrade 
can be effective in leveraging these engagements for HCD. While it is not a given that 
the activities of Chinese enterprises will contribute to HCD, findings from this research 
suggest that it is in their economic interest to do so. This is because their contributions to 
HCD, especially those linked to their CSR initiatives in their host country, help build a 
positive public image within and outside their host country and with their stakeholders. 
Vogel (2005) posits that firms will behave responsibly not solely for altruistic purposes but 
because being a responsible firm is a source of competitive advantage, and this is particularly 
so for firms that are highly visible and vulnerable to reputational damage. Moreover, HCD 
contributions are a way to earn political capital with their host government and industry 
stakeholders, which in turn could prove beneficial to the company’s operations in the host 
country, particularly in African countries (Corkin, 2011).
6.2 Theoretical contributions 
This study has several implications for the academia, specifically for those interested in the 
discourse of China–Africa relations and economic engagement. 
China–Africa discourse and studies
The recurring themes in academic and policy research on China–Africa relations have 
centred on the impact of the engagement on economic development in Africa, mostly 
in the area of infrastructure and natural resources. In addition, scholars have examined 
the impact of Chinese economic interest on African security and conflicts in the region, 
migration patterns of Chinese into Africa and Africans into China, media representations 
of China–Africa relations and the impact of the engagement on environment and public 
health (Alden & Large, 2019). Labour practices of Chinese enterprises in Africa and the 
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impact of the engagement on HCD are among the most contentious issues in the relations 
(King, 2013). However, academic research on the topic, though gaining momentum, has 
been limited. This study addresses this gap by examining the HCD dimensions of China–
Africa economic engagement and investigating its implications for HCD in Africa as a 
whole. 
This study responds to calls for research that provide more than a general overview of 
China–Africa relations, such as empirical investigations based on country-specific case 
studies, for a deeper understanding of the engagement (Brautigam, 2017). Among the 
key contributions of this thesis is that it provides empirical evidence on the implications 
of the China–Africa economic engagement for HCD in Africa by examining the case of 
Huawei in Nigeria. The study finds that Chinese enterprises in Africa are well placed and 
do contribute to HCD in the form of employment creation, training and skills building, 
and knowledge and technology transfer. Further, host government policies can leverage 
these investments for HCD. While CEE with Africa ushers opportunities for HCD, these 
opportunities are likely to vary across sectors and countries because of the differences in 
sectoral and contextual conditions. 
Factors such as the type of industry sector, the regulatory environment pertaining to 
expatriate quotas, work permits, local content requirements, availability of skilled labour 
in the host country, the firm’s strategy, its size and its scale of operations impact the 
labour-related practices of Chinese enterprises in Africa and the HCD implications of the 
engagement. Thus, investigations, analyses and interpretations of the findings on the HCD 
implications of China–Africa economic engagement should include an analysis of these 
sectoral and contextual conditions. 
By relying on existing research and theoretical viewpoints on the links between FDI 
and HCD enhancement, this study provides a deeper analysis and nuanced understanding 
of the HCD implications of China–Africa economic engagement. It addresses enduring 
narratives surrounding the labour practices and operations of Chinese enterprises in 
Africa, some of which include the use of convict labour, reluctance to hire local workers and 
poor working conditions. Some of these claims are a result of reports and studies lacking 
theoretical, methodological and analytical rigour (Ado & Su, 2016; Brautigam et al., 2017; 
Oya & McKinley, 2016). This study as such highlights and addresses the drawbacks in 
extant literature stemming from the lack of theoretical underpinnings and poor analysis 
of findings that have contributed to fragmented and conflicting accounts of China–Africa 
engagement (Ado & Su, 2016) and its impact on HCD (King, 2013). This study proffers a 
working hypothesis that the HCD impact of CEE in Africa will vary across industry sectors 
and countries because of the differences in sectoral and contextual conditions (see Agbebi, 
2019). Studies adopting this viewpoint will promote a deeper understanding of the HCD 
implications of CEE in Africa. 
This study responds to calls for an increase in theoretically grounded studies on China’s 
engagement in Africa (Alden & Large, 2019; A’Zami, 2015) and its implications for Africa’s 
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development. While the number of studies on the engagement are on the rise, they have 
been largely ‘under-theorised and fragmented’ and mostly events-driven (Alden & Large, 
2019). By relying on the frameworks of dependency theory and human capital theory to 
examine China–Africa economic engagement and its HCD implications in Africa, this 
study addresses a crucial gap. In so doing, it facilitates a deeper understanding of the 
engagement and its implications from a theoretically sound viewpoint. 
Dependency theory, though instrumental in analysing systems-level relationships, 
has traditionally been deployed to analyse and explain north-south relations and the 
consequences for development in the global south (Kruger, 2009). This study, however, 
extends the application of the theory to analyse Sino–African engagement (an example 
of a south–south engagement) and its implications for development in Africa. Thus, this 
work draws attention to dependency theory as an important analytical lens to examine not 
only North-South relations but cross-national economic relations within the global south. 
It may help answer questions such as ‘can exploitative relations also emerge within south-
south economic relations, resulting in a diversification of dependency?’. 
Study on new forms of economic engagement
This study puts forth a framework that can advance the understanding of the outcomes 
of new forms of economic engagements such as the China–Africa economic engagement. 
This overarching framework, presented in Section 2.3 and in Sub-study 2, can guide 
management researchers in investigating new patterns of economic engagement, how they 
interact with the national contexts of a country, its institutions and organisations and the 
potential outcomes of such engagements. The framework when utilised, could further 
shed insights into these new forms of economic engagement and their wider impact on 
development.
This framework could also be useful in guiding studies on economic engagement 
within the context of the global south relations i.e. south-south economic engagements. 
Such engagements could significantly affect the development trajectory of the countries 
and thus warrant more research attention (Gray & Gills, 2016). The use of the framework 
to investigate CEE in Africa can help examine arguments such as whether the relative 
similarities in the socio-economic conditions between China and Africa offer better 
prospects for socio-economic development in Africa. Research using this framework 
might disprove or confirm arguments that international economic engagements within 
the auspices of globalisation are inherently exploitative (Kruger, 2009) regardless of the 
nature of the economic partners involved in such engagement. Further, the use of the 
framework can be useful in investigating the readiness of African nations and institutions 
for leveraging economic engagements for their development objectives and the approaches 
that they should employ. 
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The case for host government interventions and 
the role of the private sector in HCD
Findings from this study corroborate the arguments for government intervention in 
steering FDI for development (Reiter & Steensma, 2010; te Velde, 2002). The findings 
show that through policies, such as the local content policy, and strategies involving active 
collaboration with MNCs, governments can encourage MNCs to contribute to HCD in 
their host countries and in this case leverage China–Africa engagement for HCD. Typically, 
studies on the development of human capital have focused on internal organisational 
processes and interventions to enhance individual and organisational effectiveness 
(Garavan, 2007; Hamlin & Stewart, 2011). This study partly shifts the attention to a 
macro level by focusing on how the private sector could contribute to HCD at a national 
scale. Thus, this work contributes to the ongoing discussion on how the private sector can 
complement weak governmental institutional frameworks for HCD (Business Action for 
Africa, 2010; Harvey et al., 2002; Jackson, 2012; Mamman, Kamoche, Zakaria, & Agbebi, 
2018; Nsouli, 2000) by supporting education and capacity-building efforts, particularly in 
developing countries. Private sector involvement could potentially bridge the HCD gap 
between African countries and the rest of the developed world.
In conclusion, this study serves to de-sensationalise unpolished narratives about 
China’s role in Africa by providing verifiable empirical analysis of the engagement. It also 
helps advance scholarly inquiry on HCD dynamics and the implications of China–Africa 
economic engagement by interpreting the findings and suggesting areas of further research 
that can enhance one’s understanding of the engagement and its implications for HCD in 
Africa.
6.3 Practical implications
With regard to understanding China–Africa engagement, this study finds that the 
economic ties are laden with expectations from both parties. China on its part seeks to 
promote its own economic interests on the continent by securing much needed resources 
to supports its industrialisation and secure markets to support its ‘Go Out strategy’ (Alessi 
& Xu, 2015; Haroz, 2011). On the other hand, the African nations expect to make concrete 
economic gains in terms of influx of much needed capital into crucial sectors of their 
economy, infrastructural development, jobs creation and knowledge transfer (Adem, 2016). 
China’s economic success and its principles of engagement with Africa lend it a unique level 
of credibility, allowing it to be viewed as a development partner for Africa (Adem, 2016). 
The findings from the sub-studies indicate that there is room for these expectations to 
be met on both sides. In other words, this engagement could contribute towards fostering 
economic growth and development in Africa, if properly leveraged by African governments. 
It is important to acknowledge the challenges within this engagement, such as striving for 
a balance in China–Africa trade, promoting responsible investment practices, especially 
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in vulnerable sectors, and addressing the financial burdens that could arise from Chinese 
loans to Africa.
In order to maximise opportunities and overcome challenges, African leaders need to 
assert more agency and ownership within the engagement (Corkin, 2013; Chen et al., 2016; 
Mohan, 2016; Mohan & Lampert, 2013). This would enable them to steer the engagement 
in ways that catalyse growth and development in crucial sectors of the economy and foster 
socio-economic development on the continent as a whole. Evidence from this study and 
existing research on China–Africa relations (Eom, 2018; see Fei, 2018) has shown that 
in instances where certain African governments have taken a proactive stance towards 
Chinese investments, they have been able to direct Chinese investments to crucial sectors 
of their economy to address issues like job creation, skills development and knowledge 
transfer. Ethiopia is an example of a case where the government has managed to leverage 
Chinese investments to accelerate high-productivity manufacturing and a shift towards an 
export-based economy from a primarily agriculture-based economy (World Bank, 2012). 
This move has led to an influx of Chinese investments to Ethiopia’s light manufacturing 
sectors such as garment manufacturing and footwear industry. These investments have 
resulted in the creation of jobs for locals, aided skills and technology transfer and fostered 
an exports-based economy in Ethiopia (Lin, 2016). 
In addition to promoting industrialisation on the continent, this engagement has the 
potential to address the human capital gap in Africa. Human capital is one of the most 
important drivers of development, particularly on the African continent. This is because 
the high population growth rate in Africa will play an important role in shaping the size 
and distribution of the world’s population (UN, 2017) and the global workforce over the 
next few decades, yet the countries on the continent have a relatively weak institutional 
capacity for HCD. Apart from infrastructural deficit, which is considered a barrier to 
economic development (Arezki & Sy, 2016), low stock of human capital is a key deterrent 
to economic growth and development on the continent (Hall & Jones, 1999; Lynham & 
Cunningham, 2006). 
Interventions by international institutions and private sector participation have been 
instrumental in addressing this deficit (Business action for Africa, 2010; Harvey et al., 
2002). Similarly, FDI plays a crucial role in human capital formation – the influx of capital 
can boost host country revenue, which can then be used to fund training and educational 
programmes. Further, human capital can be directly enhanced through MNCs operations 
(Majeed & Ahmad, 2008; Slaughter, 2002). While African governments have been successful 
to varying degrees in attracting Chinese investments and in some cases leveraging these 
investments for development (Eom, 2018; Fei, 2018), the scope for improvement cannot be 
denied. Governments need to focus simultaneously on attracting these investments and 
employing measures that encourage Chinese MNCs to offer more value-added processes 
and deepen linkages with local firms to ensure knowledge and technology diffusion. 
105
This can be done by enacting and implementing policies like the local content policy, 
designed to encourage local value creation in MNC operations in the host country. Local 
content policies can promote workforce development (in terms of employment and 
training of local workforce) and supplier development (backward and forward linkages 
with the local suppliers in the industry) (Ramdoo, 2016; Stone, Messent, & Flaig, 2015; 
Weiss, 2016). There has been a growing interest in local content policies around the world, 
particularly in countries with an active extractive industry (Weiss, 2016). Though the debate 
on the efficacy of such policies continues (Weiss, 2016), countries such as Norway, Chile 
and Brazil have been relatively successful at implementing the policy in their extractive 
industries, which benefit from their natural resources (Ramdoo, 2015). The adoption of 
such policies is, however, not limited to the extractive industry. For example, this study 
shows how Nigeria has adopted the local content policy in the ICT sector. 
The local content policy in Nigeria’s ICT sector, similar to the one employed in its oil 
and gas sector, is focused on the creation of value additions. Specifically, the policy aims 
to ‘achieve the development of local skills, technology transfer, use of local manpower and 
local manufacturing’ (NITDA, 2013, p. 6). The local content guideline requires MNCs 
to provide a local content development plan for job creation, HCD and value creation in 
the local ecosystem. The implementation of the policy can help leverage FDI for local job 
creation and establish and strengthen linkages between MNCs and the local industry. 
This in turn can promote skills enhancement and knowledge and technology diffusion 
in the local industry. Thus, African countries can leverage Chinese investments in crucial 
sectors of their economy for HCD through the use of local content requirements. The host 
country governments should work in collaboration with the local industries and MNCs to 
achieve their policy objectives.
Policies such as the local content policy can encourage local participation in the ICT 
value chain by requiring MNCs to use locally sourced material where available and local 
suppliers and sub-contractors to carry out services that might otherwise be outsourced 
to foreign firms. The local content policy in the Nigerian oil and gas sector has proven 
effective in creating linkages in the value chain and increasing local labour and industry 
participation in the sector (Adedeji, Sidique, Abd Rahman, & Law, 2016; Adewuyi & 
Oyejide, 2012). In this study, findings show that Huawei is actively engaged with local 
suppliers and subcontractors in its operations in Nigeria, although it is unclear how much 
of an effect the local content policy in ICT has had on Huawei’s operations, as the policy is 
still in its early implementation stages.
In order for local content policies to have a significant effect on the recruitment of local 
workers into highly skilled positions, it is important that the skills supply matches the 
skills demand of the MNCs. Thus, this study recommends that African hosts governments 
should focus on training and education to upgrade the skills available locally and close 
existing skills gaps. Apart from investments in education systems, governments could 
encourage partnerships between MNCs and local educational institutes. Previous research 
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has shown that MNCs can and do contribute to educational development in their host 
countries (Blomström & Kokko, 2002; te Velde, 2002). This study has found that Huawei is 
involved in a couple of partnerships with educational institutes, providing scholarships and 
equipment to tertiary institutions in Nigeria. This level of partnership could be deepened 
to include partnerships on degree programmes, certifications, innovation labs, internships 
and co-creation labs, where the students can work directly with the MNCs. In the long 
run, such measures will ensure that the local educational institutes produce graduates 
whose skill levels match the labour market demands. 
This study also highlighted that close partnerships between governments and MNCs on 
employment and training programmes could be instrumental in creating local employment 
and upgrading local skills. The case study bears testimony to the fact that MNCs are willing 
to collaborate with the host country on training programmes as they stand to benefit just as 
much as the local populace. In other words, such involvement allows the MNC to position 
itself as a responsible corporation in the host country. This is in line with previous research 
that shows that MNCs often engage in CSR activities to promote a positive image of their 
organisation (Vogel, 2005). This is also true in the case of Chinese companies who engage 
in developmental programmes in host African countries to earn useful political capital 
(Corkin, 2011). Such collaborations could be deepened for example by encouraging more 
public-private partnerships on training and skills building that are mutually beneficial. 
Organisations can benefit from making their contributions sustainable, and the host 
government can help create a long-term positive impact on HCD.
This study reiterates that the institutional framework for HCD in most African countries 
is weak and thus interventions from the private sector play a crucial role in bridging skills 
gaps in important industrial sectors. It is imperative that the African governments employ 
effective policies and strategies like those discussed above to leverage CEE for HCD in 
their respective countries.
6.4 Suggestions for further research
China’s presence in Africa has no doubt garnered considerable interest over the past 
decade. The relations between the Asian giant and the African continent have been the 
focus of researchers across several disciplines, including economics, management, politics, 
international relations and international development. Despite the growing literature on 
Sino–African relations, knowledge about CEE and its implications for HCD in Africa 
was scarce (Ado & Su, 2016; Brautigam et al., 2017; King, 2013). The purpose of this thesis 
was to address this gap. This summary and the four sub-studies addressed have achieved 
this objective varying degrees. As the results of this study demonstrate, Sino–Africa 
relations represent a case of growing interdependency among the nations involved, and this 
engagement can contribute to HCD in Africa. 
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Future research on China–Africa relations should be pursued from a viewpoint of 
interdependency between systems. Such an analysis will enable researchers to uncover the 
different elements that constitutes the relationship, interaction amongst these elements and 
their collective impact on Africa’s socio-economic development. While this study focused 
primarily on the implications of the engagement for HCD, future research could focus on 
other socio-economic aspects that could be influenced by this engagement.
One of the contributions of this study is a conceptual framework to guide research on 
the new features of economic engagement between countries. A sub-study showed how the 
framework could be used to investigate the HCD potential inherent to CEE in Africa. In 
future, studies can use the framework to investigate the extent of knowledge and technology 
diffusion between China and Africa within the auspices of this engagement. Further, 
scholars can investigate the engagement from a south-south cooperation perspective, 
with a focus on policy learning and transfer between developing countries in the global 
south, in this case, China and African countries. Such research can help verify claims that 
developing countries under south-south cooperation can access appropriate technologies 
and solutions for tackling development issues because of the similarities in their socio-
economic conditions. Thus, in the case of China–Africa engagement, the question of 
whether or not China is a more viable development partner for Africa can be explored 
further using the developed framework. 
Another area of investigation that could yield theoretical inputs from a good governance 
perspective pertains to policy formulation and implementation readiness for appropriating 
the potential benefits of economic engagement. This investigation can help determine 
the capacity of African governments to leverage CEE for development in their respective 
countries. This study posits that China’s economic engagement with Africa offers Africa a 
choice in development partners and enhances development opportunities on the continent. 
It would be interesting to see how various African governments leverage these opportunities 
and exploit their current engagements with China for their developmental needs. 
From an HCD perspective, research can explore the HCD dimension of Chinese 
SEZs. SEZs have come to symbolise Sino–African economic cooperation in Africa 
(Brautigam, 2011). The Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) currently supports 
the development of SEZs in selected African countries, namely Zambia, Egypt, Nigeria, 
Mauritius, Algeria and Ethiopia (Brautigam & Tang, 2011). Similarly, Chinese enterprises 
have also set up industrial zones independent of MOFCOM in countries such as Ethiopia 
and Nigeria (Brautigam & Tang, 2011). These zones could potentially spur industrialisation 
and contribute to HCD through local job creation, training and skills transfer, and 
knowledge and technology diffusion. Future studies could investigate the effects of these 
SEZs. Such studies would contribute to the growing literature on Sino–African economic 
engagement and its implications for socio-economic development in Africa and specifically 
for fostering industrialisation in Africa. Findings from such studies could also add to 
the literature on the links between FDI and human capital formation in host countries. 
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While there is ample research on the topic from the perspective of MNCs from developed 
countries operating in other developed and developing countries, data on developing-
country MNCs operating in developing countries remain scant. 
Another avenue of research that could generate interesting insights about the HCD 
contributions of CEE in Africa is China’s capacity development programmes with Africa. 
Action plans from the recently concluded 2018 FOCAC summit saw China commit 
to providing tailor-made training programmes for 1000 high calibre Africans, 50,000 
scholarships and 50,000 training opportunities in form of seminars and workshops 
(FOCAC, 2018). Future research could examine China’s short-term training programmes 
for African officials. Little or no research has been carried out on the effects of these short-
term trainings on capacity-building of African public officials and its political undertones 
or implications. 
Another aspect of China’s HCD cooperation that has not been adequately explored is 
Chinese scholarship programmes for Africa. China has funded university scholarships for 
African students for decades; however, not much is known about the intricacies of these 
scholarships. It would be interesting to investigate the exact number of African students on 
Chinese government scholarships and their selection criteria. Studies could aim to answer 
questions such as the following: what are the effects of the scholarships? Do recipients 
return to their home country after their studies or remain in China? What effects do 
the scholarships have on future employment prospects of the scholarship recipient? Do 
scholarship recipients work for Chinese companies operating in their home country once 
they return? Findings from such studies can shed light on wider issues of socialisation of 
African youth via Chinese higher education, brain drain in African nations, Chinese soft 
power elements in Africa, etc. Studies investigating the modalities and effects of these 
training programmes and scholarships on HCD can enrich one’s understanding of the 
different modes through which CEE could contribute to HCD in Africa. 
In general, such studies may offer a deeper understanding of Sino–African economic 
engagement and its implications for HCD, and more importantly, they can contribute to 
unravelling what economic cooperation with China really means for Africa’s development 
trajectory. They may also help dispel preconceived notions and enduring myths surrounding 
CEE in Africa, replacing them with an informed understanding of the engagement 
generated from evidence and robust research. 
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Appendix 2: List of interview participants and schedule
Code $IÀOLDWLRQ5ROHRI,QWHU-
viewee 
Number of 
Interviewees
Location Interview 
Format 
Date of Data Col-
lection 
Government
R1, R2 Federal Ministry of Communications Technology 2 Abuja
Face to face 
(Individual) 30 March; 7 April 2016
R3 National Communications Commission 1 Abuja Face to face 8 April 2016
R4 Federal Ministry of Trade and Investment 1 Abuja Face to face 6 April 2016
R5, R6 Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity 2 Abuja
Face to face 
(Paired) 4 April 2016
R7 One Stop Investment Centre (OSIC) 1 Abuja Face to face 29 March 2016
R8, R9, R10 Nigerian Investment Promotion Corporation 3 Abuja
Face to face 
(Individual) 29 March 2016
R11, R12
National Information 
Technology Development 
Agency
2 Abuja Face to face (Individual) 6 April 2016
R13, R14 2I¿FHRI1DWLRQDOFRQWHQWin ICT 2 Abuja
Face to face 
(Individual) 30–31 March 2016
T1, T2, T3, T4 Trainee – 1000 Girls in ICT Training programme 4
Remote 
Contact 
Skype inter-
view 17 June– 22 July 2016
R15 University of Lagos Student $IIDLUV2I¿FLDO 1 Lagos Face to face 22 March 2016
S1, S2 %HQH¿FLDULHVRI+XDZHL±UNILAG Scholarship 2
Remote 
Contact Skype 16 June 2016
Huawei
R16, R17, R18 Ex-employees 3 Remote contact Skype 
2 August 2016–
19 May 2017
Current employees
R19, R20 Engineer 2 Lagos Face to face; Skype 
15 March 2016;
4 October 2016
R21 Manager 1 Lagos Face to face 15 March 2016
R22 Training Centre Manager 1 Abuja Emailcommunication 10 May 2016 
R23 Trainer 1 Abuja Face to face (Individual) 7 April 2016
Total number 
of interviewees 29
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Appendix 3: Sample of Introduction letter
Dear Sir/Madam
Introduction and Cooperation for data collection
This is to inform you that Motolani Agbebi is a doctoral candidate at the School of 
Management, University of Tampere, Finland. Ms. Agbebi is working on her doctoral 
dissertation entitled Chinese economic engagement in Africa: Potential opportunities for 
human capital development and implications. The study particularly focuses on examining 
the contributions of Chinese enterprises to human capital development in Nigeria 
and the Nigerian government’s efforts in leveraging this engagement for human capital 
development. This research is very important in the discourse of China-Africa relations 
and in particular in highlighting how this engagement might contribute to development 
in Africa. 
Thus, Ms. Agbebi will collect data from your organisation that are relevant to this study. 
She aims to conduct interviews with key persons actively involved in the management and 
operations of your organisation. I can assure you that any data collected will be used solely 
for research purposes, your responses will be made anonymous. Only Ms. Agbebi will have 
access to the data and information collected during this study. The successful completion 
of her research would be an important input to further the understanding of Sino-African 
relations and its implications for human capital development in Africa. 
Therefore, I kindly solicit your cooperation and request that you grant her access to 
any relevant information useful for her research. If you have any questions, please do not 
hesitate to contact me via email or telephone.
Yours faithfully
Professor Jari Stenvall
School of Management
University of Tampere, Finland. 
Email: jari.stenvall@staff.uta.fi
Telephone: +35840828435
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Appendix 4: Consent form
CONSENT FORM
I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study being 
conducted by Motolani Agbebi of the School of Management at University of Tampere, 
Finland. I have had the opportunity to ask any questions related to this study, to receive 
satisfactory answers to my questions and any additional information needed. 
I am aware that excerpts from the interview may be included in the dissertation and or 
publication to come from this research, with the understanding that the quotations will be 
made anonymous.
I was informed that I may withdraw my consent at any time by advising the researcher.
With the full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree, of my own free will to participate in this 
study
        Yes No
I grant the researcher permission to tape-record this interview Yes No 
I grant the researcher permission to use my responses in the study Yes No
Name of participant 
Signature of Participant
Date 
Name of researcher 
Signature of Researcher
Date
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Dependency Theory – A Conceptual Lens to Understand China’s
Presence in Africa?
Motolani Agbebi a and Petri Virtanenb
aSchool of Management, University of Tampere, Tampere, Finland; bDepartment of Social
Policy, School of Health Sciences, University of Tampere, Tampere, Finland
Abstract This conceptual article explores the evolution of dependency theory
and deploys the theory to understand China’s contemporary presence in Africa
as a case study to provide new insights into the usability of this theory and its
fundamental concepts. To this end, this article provides commentary to
dependency theory and develops further its theoretical foundations from the
viewpoint of this case example. In an attempt to understand and explain the
phenomenon of contemporary Sino-African engagement, we explore dependency
theory in order to unpack the complexity inherent in China’s contemporary
presence in Africa and ask whether this ‘system-level’ relationship is likely to
end in a similar fashion as espoused by dependency theorists in their analysis of
North–South relationship. This article concludes that straightforward deployment
of dependency theory does not sufﬁce in the light of contemporary Sino-African
engagement. We opine that China–Africa relationship suggests a case of
growing interdependency. We conclude that beyond the economic partnership,
cooperation and solidarity, China’s presence in Africa presents Africa a
challenge to question the status quo, re-orient their values and to adopt an
inward focus on their developmental needs and priorities.
Keywords: dependency theory; China Africa; development; economic engagement
Introduction
Dependency theory emerged in the late 1950s in response to concerns of the gap
between rich and poor countries and that economic growth in the advanced industrial-
ised countries did not lead to growth in the poorer countries (Ferraro, 2008). Studies
carried out by Rau´l Prebisch, the then Director of the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Latin America (UNECLA) and his colleagues suggested that economic
activity in the advanced countries does not beneﬁt the poorer countries but often
resulted in serious economic challenges in poorer countries (Ferraro, 2008). Depen-
dency theory thus became an important tool to analyse development and underdevelop-
ment in the international political economy (Namkoong, 1999).
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As succinctly put by Brown (1985, p. 62),
There is no single coherent body of thought that can accurately be described as ‘depen-
dency’ theory. Instead various theorists stress the key notion that some countries (or econ-
omies) are conditioned in their development by their dependence on other countries
(economies).
Assessing Brown’s viewpoint 30 years later it is reasonable to still think that,
despite the rich intellectual ideas, debates and writings from dependency theorists of
different leanings, there is still no single uniﬁed theory of dependency.
Despite the intellectual disagreements among dependency theorists there remains
some basic agreements among them, namely the view that the world is divided into
two parts, the centre-industrialised countries and the periphery/the underdeveloped
countries, and that this structure also exists within a state; while they do not all
employ the use of the term centre/periphery, their approach to the structure of the inter-
national system remains the same (Namkoong, 1999). They argue that trade between
the centre and periphery is characterised by unequal exchange, which has resulted in
underdevelopment of the periphery. They agree that underdevelopment in third
world countries can be linked to the expansion of the world capitalist system. In
order to shed more light on the diversity of ideas that constitute dependency theory,
a breakdown of dependency theory seems appropriate. This will be done by separating
the theory into two strands: the Marxist and non-Marxist frameworks.
This article’s contribution is based on the need to rethink dependency theory from a
very speciﬁc point of view – that being China’s presence in Africa. Karl R. Popper
(2005, p. 38) wrote in The logic of scientiﬁc discovery that ‘theories are nets cast to
catch what we call “the world”, to rationalize, to explain and to master it [. . .]’. In an
attempt to understand and explain the phenomenon of contemporary Sino-African
engagement, we try to follow Popper’s footsteps. In this article, we explore dependency
theory in order to unpack the complexity inherent in China’s presence in Africa. To this
end, we ask: Is this relationship likely to end in a similar fashion as espoused by depen-
dency theorists in their analysis of North–South relationship or is it one of self-reliance,
the ‘unity of thought and purpose’ shared by the third world in charting their develop-
ment course as referred to by Haq (1976) in the opening chapter of his book The
Poverty Curtain?
The principal question this article addresses is whether China’s presence in Africa
fosters a new dependency in other words diversiﬁes dependency within the global south
or furthers Africa’s socio-economic development. In order to do this, a systematic lit-
erature review of dependency theory is carried out and applied to understand China’s
presence in Africa. This article offers a different perspective to the use of dependency
theory in understanding China’s presence in Africa. This is important because China’s
presence in Africa in aspects of trade, aid and investments will continue to rise and thus
remains of interest to leaders, policy-makers and scholars as it will undoubtedly have
effects on Africa’s development trajectory. Some studies have largely analysed
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China’s presence as reiterating dependency (Taylor, 2014) and as the ‘new face of
imperialism’ (Lee, 2006); however, within the dependency literature, we see a role
for China as being not the new ‘centre’ but a catalyst for a rethink on Africa’s
development.
Our article is organised as follows. Firstly, we focus on dependency theory per se –
what are the origins of the theory and how it has developed? Secondly, we explore the
main criticisms presented against dependency theory. And thirdly, we analyse the
theory in the light of China’s current presence in Africa. We conclude this article by
summarising our reasoning as well as putting forward an agenda for future research.
Schools of thought on dependency theory
Dependency theory has been under debate since the 1960s. The main aim of the scho-
lars has seemed to be to explain the cause and result of the dependent status of the
global south in the international political and economic systems. Scholars such as
Mahbub ul Haq and Rau´l Prebisch have approached the question of dependency
from a non-Marxist perspective while the likes of Andre´ Gunder Frank, Theotino
dos Santos and Immanuel Wallerstein’s views on dependency reﬂect a Marxist orien-
tation. For example, Mahbub ul Haq (1976, p. 3) expresses his concerns regarding the
dependent status of the south in the opening chapter of his book The Poverty Curtain.
He writes, ‘A poverty curtain has descended right across the face of our world, dividing
it materially and philosophically into two different worlds, two separate planets, two
unequal humanities, one embarrassingly rich and the other desperately poor.’
In the same vein as other dependency scholars, Haq (1976) identiﬁes the roots of the
inequality between developed and developing countries to be their historical past.
According to him, the era of colonialism exacerbated the disparities between the rich
and the poor countries by placing the rich countries of the North in the centre of the
world and the poor countries of the South at the periphery, supplying raw materials
to the North. He argues that these exploitative links evident in the economic depen-
dence and intellectual slavery remains despite decolonisation. Within the context of
this article, this theory can be used to speculate that rampant exploitation would less
likely occur between equal partners than unequal partners. In other words, the exploita-
tion reported in North–South economic engagement has its foundation in historical
inequality. Haq (1976) in his writings focused on providing a solution for altering
the existing relationship that serves to beneﬁt both the industrial countries and the
global south. He argues that if the present unjust order continues, then a rebellion in
the third world that can lead to damages to the western world’s interests is inevitable.
Haq (1976) further identiﬁes that poverty is a global problem in the sense that it is not
only related to poor nations but also to poor people within these nations; thus it is a
problem that has to be dealt with. To do this he suggests a two-pronged offensive as
the only way to eliminate inequality, where the national governments in developed
and developing countries share this responsibility, developing countries on their part
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must ensure an equality of opportunity for developing countries to fully engage in and
beneﬁt from the international system. Also, developing countries on their part should
carry out internal reforms to provide the same for their poor so as to remove domestic
structural biases. In short, Haq sees a shared interest in North–South cooperation as the
basis for mutual cooperation, a point where he differs from the other dependency the-
orist with Marxist views.
Haq’s view is similar to that of Prebisch, whose views were outlined in various
policy papers during his time as the secretary general of UNECLA. Prebisch argued
that the South’s dependent status is caused by the historical development of centre–per-
iphery relations. His views differ from Haq in that while Haq emphasised on the impact
of colonialism, he was more concerned with the impact of western industrialisation on
the position of the poor states.
Prebisch (1968) argued that the rapid industrialisation of the North as well as export
competitiveness created a divide between the global North and South, resulting in
declining terms of trade for the South and eventually dependency of the South on
the North. As a solution to the problem of dependency, Prebisch proposes third
world countries accelerate industrialisation by adopting import substitution (O’Brien,
1975). Import substitution as prescribed by Prebisch (1968) would only be effective
if the South have developed the capacity not only to substitute imports but also to
add value to natural resources, which can then be exported in the form of processed
goods. Similarly, the rapid industrialisation of the North, which created unfavourable
terms of trade for the South, was made possible through the abundance of certain
capacities particularly their control of technology (Shrum, 2001). Similar to Haq, Pre-
bisch identiﬁes a shared political and economic interest between the North and the
South and argues that it is not just morally imperative for this inequality to be redressed
but that it is in the North’s self-interest to do so. He maintains that the centre is not
immune to the increasingly obvious economic and social tensions in the periphery
and thus should make deliberate efforts to stimulate development in the right direction
in these countries.
Haq and Prebisch share similar views that set them apart from the Marxist school of
dependency theorists. Bokhari (1989) states three major points of view that set them
apart from the Marxist school. Firstly, their argument that the existing international
economic system can be reformed to accommodate countries of the global South
thus creates no need for southern countries to create a new system or leave the
present system in order to overcome dependency. Secondly, Haq and Prebisch due
to the perceived shared interest between the North and South, argued that the North
ought to introduce system reforms to safeguard its own interests. Thirdly, their views
and solutions were inﬂuenced by their backgrounds and professional experience as
top ofﬁcials at the World Bank and the United Nations agency, respectively. They
unlike the Marxist school of thought recognised that the international economic
system has beneﬁts to offer to facilitate the global South’s development needs and
that the developed world should facilitate these needs as it is of interest to them if
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they do. The Marxist perspective views the system as based on the excesses of capit-
alism, which is controlled by the North (Ferraro, 2008). Unlike the non-Marxist theor-
ists they argue that the system cannot be restructured to accommodate the South as the
beneﬁts from the prevailing system are largely accrued by the North. They consider the
notion of the existence of a shared North–South interest as unrealistic given the
inability of the South to modify the system (Hoogvelt, 1984).
One of the most prominent writers with this viewpoint is Andre´ Gunder Frank, a
sociologist whose thesis ‘Development of Underdevelopment’ gained wide attention
in this discourse during the 1960s. In line with the non-Marxist scholars of dependency
theory, Frank also argued that underdevelopment is a product of historical, economic
and political relationship between the North and the South. He writes: ‘Historical
research demonstrates that contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the histori-
cal product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite
underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries’ (Frank, 1966, p. 28).
He further claims that this relation is an integral part of the world capitalist system.
According to him, the capitalist system has put in place a rigid international division of
labour, which is responsible for the underdevelopment of many areas of the world. This
division, he claimed, determined the economic, political, social and cultural values in
the dependent states in line with the interest of the dominant states. This division he
maintains, will remain as it serves the purpose of absorbing surplus capital from the
dependent states to the beneﬁt of the dominant states. He argues that a similar division
also exists within the underdeveloped states. Frank argues that the most impressive
results of development in underdeveloped countries were recorded at periods when
their ties to developed countries were the weakest citing countries like Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico and Chile during the Napoleonic wars and the two world wars as
examples. Frank in his writings also made a distinction between a state of being ‘unde-
veloped’ and being ‘underdeveloped’. He argued that developed states were in the state
of undevelopment in the past and were free of the structuralist constraints faced by the
underdeveloped states, thus stating that the route to development as adopted by the
developed countries is not viable for underdeveloped states. He proposes that loosening
of ties of the South to the North gives the South a greater probability of achieving devel-
opment. According to Frank, independence and not interdependence is the way to get
out of dependence.
A Marxist analysis of dependency theory can also be found in the works of Imma-
nuel Wallerstein. Wallerstein argued that a ‘modern world system’ called the Capitalist
World Economy emerged from the European feudal system in the sixteenth century. He
is classiﬁed as a ‘world system theorist’ due to his analysis. He argues that this system
had resulted in divisions of the world into three, the ‘core, periphery and semi-periph-
ery’, regions creating a new international division of labour where the economically
and politically strong states at the core achieved their status at the expense of the
states at the periphery. He attributes this new division of labour to the rise of capitalism,
which he argues still exists in the world today and is the source of exploitation of the
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periphery states. Wallerstein argues that dependency can be overcome only via revolu-
tionary socialism within a uniﬁed world system.
Another prominent Marxist analysis of dependency theory is found in the works of
Theotonio dos Santos. His views are quite similar to that of Frank in that he sees depen-
dency as a ‘conditioning situation’ that causes peripheral countries to be backward and
exploited and this status is caused by the international division of labour perpetuated in
the capitalist system which allows development to occur in some countries while
restricting it in others. Dos Santos (1970) distinguishes between three forms of depen-
dency, which the now underdeveloped nations have gone through, namely, colonial
dependency, ﬁnancial-industry dependency and a new type of dependency. Dos
Santos labelled this new form of dependency as technological-industrial dependency;
he asserts that this has further deepened the structure of dependency in the third
world. In a view similar to Frank, Dos Santos (1970, p. 235) considers the reformist
ideas of Prebisch and Haq as ineffective to destroy ‘these terrible chains imposed by
dependent development’ and proposes a social revolution as the solution to
dependency.
The Marxist view of dependency has some historical validity. However develop-
ments in Asia suggest that North–South economic engagement can lead to positive
outcomes in terms of economic and social development, as evidenced in newly indus-
trialised countries of South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia.
Critiques of dependency theory
As no theoretical approach to the study of social science is without critiques, depen-
dency theory also attracted some criticisms of its own.
Proponents of free-market economics criticise dependency theory for failing to
account for the endogenous factors involved in a country’s development and attributing
blame entirely on external factors (Namkoong, 1999). Tony Smith (1979), one of such
liberalists contends that the main misconception of dependency theory is its insistence
that the key causes of underdevelopment of third world countries are not internal factors
but external, that is, the structure of the international system. He asserts that ‘depen-
dency theory represents a historically concrete attempt of Marxism to absorb southern
nationalism into a kind of ideological united front’ (Smith, 1979, p. 83). This claim is
by no means uncommon, giving the Marxist persuasions within Dependency theory.
While any interaction between nations has the inherent risk of exploitation, at least
in the beginning, the international economic system was not set up for the purpose
of exploitation. To do that is to negate the concept of a ‘system’. Actors in a system
must have a symbiotic relationship; otherwise the system will collapse and destroy
the actors. Having said that, actors must work hard to determine and correct excesses
of the system by building the capability to detect and correct the excesses.
Indeed, when confronting situations where rapid development has occurred such as
in Thailand, South Korea and Taiwan, the theory encounters some difﬁculties as it
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generally accounts for an impoverished South on a global basis, a development that
would not have been possible to achieve anywhere if the argument was valid
(Moles, 1999).
Sanjaya Lall (1975) also criticises the theory, arguing that the concept of depen-
dency is deﬁned ‘in a circular manner’, that is, less developed countries are poor
because they are dependent. He asserts to the impossibility of deﬁning the concept
of dependency and thus cannot be proved to be ‘causally related to continuance of
underdevelopment’ (Lall 1975, p. 808).
Traditional Marxists have also criticised dependency theory for ‘seeking to become
a Neo-Marxism without Marxism’ (Cueva, 1976). The theory is criticised for replacing
class conﬂict with national and regional contradictions (Namkoong, 1999), as suc-
cinctly put by Thomas Angotti; ‘While the ultra-“left” line fails to consider the contra-
dictions between nations as part of the international class struggle, the rightist line
reduces the class struggle to nothing more than a struggle between nations (or
“social formations”) (Angotti, 1981, p. 129).
Also, Marxists criticised the view held by non-Marxist dependency theorists that
international trade (unequal exchange) is the key cause in the rise of dependency and
underdevelopment; they argue that while it may help to extend underdevelopment it
does not create it, that capitalism creates underdevelopment (Weaver and Berger, 1973).
In spite of criticisms of dependency theory, it is impossible to deny that dependency
theory gave a new perspective on the realities of international political economy and put
the underdevelopment status of the global South on the radar. Ideas emanating from
dependency scholars have been the source of motivation for a focus on development
needs of the global South. Their arguments stressed that the underdeveloped South
will remain in their underprivileged state unless drastic measures are taken to
provide an equality of participation in a system which was designed to beneﬁt the
North. It is this idea that fuelled the creation of the Group of 77, United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and demands for a New International
Economic Order (Bohkari, 1989). Also, the non-Marxist ideas have been instrumental
in deﬁning ways that the countries of the global South can develop while remaining
within the current international system. They have stressed the existence of common
interest between the North and the South in terms of mutually beneﬁcial industrial pro-
duction, expansion of trade, supply of raw materials and technological transfer. They
have identiﬁed that there is a need to attend to those common issues, areas where the
North cannot maintain absolute independence, an important point that holds true in
present-day economy.
Dependency theory has been most inﬂuential in discrediting some western ideas
about development in the third world particularly policies and ideas that failed to
appreciate the speciﬁc developmental needs of the third world. This has shaped discus-
sions in development studies today, raising an awareness of the need to examine the
patterns of economic development speciﬁc to third world countries and strategies
that recognise the speciﬁc needs of these countries (Bohkari, 1989). This discussion
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can be linked to the popularity of South–South cooperation (SSC), which criticises
those misplaced western ideas regarding development in the global South and the con-
ditionalities placed on countries of the South by the West, conditionalities that do not
necessarily meet the development needs of these countries (Amanor, 2013). The idea
that developing nations of the South might ﬁnd more appropriate and sustainable sol-
utions to development by collaborating with other developing countries of the South
underlies SSC (Fordelone, 2009; Rosseel et al., 2009).
An increasingly cited example of SSC is Chinese engagement in Africa. Following
China’s unprecedented growth is its increasing presence in Africa evident in its engage-
ment in the continent on levels on trade, investment and aid. As China–Africa relations
continue to evolve, there continues to be a debate on just what China’s presence in
Africa means for Africa’s development. Is China a development partner or Africa’s
new coloniser?
The next section addresses China’s presence in Africa and we shall attempt to
understand this phenomenon using dependency theory.
Case – China’s contemporary presence in Africa
Background
The growing relations between China and Africa have been accompanied with intense
scrutiny. There has been a lot of interest from academia, the media, development
agencies and western governments, negative and positives views have been expressed,
conjectures and accusations have also been made of China’s ongoing presence in Africa
being an attempt to ‘neo-colonise’ Africa. The former British foreign secretary, Jack
Straw, stated that ‘most of what China has been doing in Africa today, is what we
did in Africa 150 years ago’ (as cited in Stevenson, 2006). Making similar insinuations
about China’s presence in Africa, then US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, in an
interview stated ‘We don’t want to see a new colonialism in Africa.’ Similarly, aca-
demics have raised concerns over China’s motives and presence in Africa (Taylor,
2006). Given the sentiments surrounding China’s presence in Africa, we shall
attempt to critically view this phenomenon using dependency theory. Firstly, a back-
ground of China–Africa relations both historical and at present will be discussed in
the subsequent paragraphs, followed by an analysis of the phenomenon from the depen-
dency theory point of view.
China in Africa: retrospective view
Chinese engagement with Africa is not a new phenomenon. Discourse on contemporary
China–Africa relations often invokes history as a common reference point (Large,
2008); thus we shall begin with an overview of the historical links between China
and Africa. Chinese contacts with Africa are believed to date as far back as 140–87
BC during the Han dynasty (Gao, 1984). Contacts between China and the African
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continent predating 1949 were as a result of transnational trade ﬂow with other mer-
chants such as the Arabs and Persians (Alden and Alves, 2008).
The establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 saw China as having
no negative record of dealings on the African continent but in fact it shared a common
past with Africa as it too suffered hardship under western imperialism; a point that
Beijing is often apt to point out (Alden and Alves, 2008; Cooke, 2009). China saw
the newly independent African states as natural allies and its ‘Five Principles of Peace-
ful Coexistence’ appeared appealing to these new states (Alden and Alves, 2008). Thus,
China renewed interests and established ofﬁcial contacts with these states following the
Bandung Conference of 1955 (Renard, 2011). According to Alden and Alves (2008),
the Bandung conference which was aimed at promoting Afro-Asian economic and cul-
tural cooperation and opposing colonialism was a unique platform for China to present
itself to African and Asian states as a model of self-reliance, as well as a supporter of
Asian–African unity and the independence movements around Asia and Africa.
China’s relations with Africa during the period of the cold war, which also marked
the post-colonial period for Africa, was one that was based on ideology (Zhang,
2013). Mao’s ‘Three Worlds Theory’ positioned China as a third world nation along
with other Asian, African and Latin American countries that chose not to align with
either the United States or Russia (Alden and Alves, 2008). Africa was seen by
Beijing as the ground for ideological competition with the United States, the Soviet
Union and other European inﬂuences, as well as a place to export its brand of socialist
revolution to (Alden and Alves, 2008; Renard, 2011). In this period, China signed an
economic and technical cooperation agreement with Guinea in 1960, granted Ghana an
interest-free loan of US$20 Million, established diplomatic relations with Mali upon its
independence and trade relations the following year (Renard, 2011). China also gave
diplomatic and military support in Southern Africa particularly to liberation movements
ideologically aligned with Maoist China and not the Soviet Union (Alden and Alves,
2008).
In North Africa, relations were also established with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.
Sino-African relations were maintained in the early 1960s; however, by 1966 China’s
relations with some African states had turned sour, as China was increasingly viewed
with suspicion that it was seen trying to export revolution into some of the countries,
resulting in Chinese diplomats being expelled from some African countries and diplo-
matic ties severed by other countries (Alden and Alves, 2008). Also the cultural revo-
lution in China contributed to the decline in Sino-African relations in that era. However,
relations did improve in the late 1970s with Beijing normalising diplomatic relations
with all African countries irrespective of their ideological differences and increasing
its overseas development assistance. African countries welcomed ﬁnancial aid and
technical assistance from China; they were seen as offering more advantages than
those of traditional western donors (Ayodele and Sotola, 2014). As adeptly put by
Alden and Alves (2008, p. 20),
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The West’s employment of conditionalities, merely the latest in the decades of humiliat-
ing experiences at the hands of former colonial powers and the United States, echoes the
humiliations of the ‘unequal treaties’ foisted on China by the West in the nineteenth
century. Indeed, China’s ability to recognise this is part of the genius of its foreign
policy endeavours toward Africa.
Notably, China’s development aid to Africa during this period was concentrated
in fewer countries and on highly visible projects such as the Tazara railway – a
railway line linking Tanzania to Zambia – a project which several western powers
declined to fund (Renard, 2011). China’s commitment to providing development assist-
ance and technical support to African countries was seen as quite remarkable as China
itself at the time was quite poor compared to some African countries (Renard, 2011).
This renewed relationship contributed to China gaining admission into the UN with
votes from 26 African countries. The introduction of economic reforms in China by
Deng Xiaoping during the post-Mao era led to a shift in Sino-African relations,
while the ofﬁcial principles of engagement remained the same; relations were no
longer based on ideological interest but on commercial interest (Larkin, 1971;
Schiere, 2011).
China in Africa: today
The new era of Sino-African relations ushered in relations devoid of ideological inter-
ests of the past but with a focus on practical results, mutual beneﬁts and common devel-
opment driven by China’s developmental objectives and its increasing energy demand
(Schiere, 2011).
China’s need to secure energy resources to sustain its economic development and its
international push for new markets and resources has in part necessitated the commer-
cial focus to its ongoing presence in Africa (Konings, 2007). Chinese economic activity
on the continent involves both state and non-state actors; the Chinese Ministries of
Foreign Affairs and Commerce have been critical in establishing and maintaining bilat-
eral relationships with African governments; several state-owned banks of China have
supported China’s presence in Africa. China Export-Import Bank established in 1994
promotes Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) and exports especially in the infra-
structure sector (Wang, 2007). China Development Bank, also founded in 1994,
launched the China–Africa Development Fund in 2006 at the Beijing Summit of the
Forum on China – Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) to support Chinese FDI in Africa
(SCIO, 2013); SINOSURE (China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation) has pro-
vided insurance against risks involved in Chinese exports and foreign investment since
2001 (Renard, 2011). The non-state actors representing China’s presence in Africa
include multinationals, small- and medium-sized enterprises, traders who are generally
seeking economic opportunities (Osei and Mabiru, 2010; Renard, 2011) and their
activities cut across different sectors of the African economy.
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China has become Africa’s largest trading partner (Chen et al., 2015); bilateral trade
between China and Africa rose steadily between 2000 and 2014. According to Eom
et al. (2016), the volumes of China–Africa trade grew at a rate of over 40 per cent
between 2004 and 2009, and has since 2009 slowed to an average of 10per cent per
year. In 2015, China’s trade with Africa reached approximately US$172 billion in
2015 (CARI, 2016a), with its top ﬁve African trade partners being South Africa,
Angola, Nigeria, Egypt and Algeria. Crude oil dominates China’s imports from
Africa, the continent being China’s second largest source of crude oil after the
middle-east in 2013; its top suppliers include Angola, Sudan, the Republic of
Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria (Alessi and Xu, 2015). Other commodities
such as iron ore and copper also feature in China’s imports from Africa (Eom et al.,
2016).
Chinese investment in Africa while trailing behind China–Africa trade volumes
remains modest (Eom et al., 2016). Data compiled by the China–Africa Research
Initiative at Johns Hopkins University show Chinese FDI stock in Africa came to a
total of US$32.35 billion in 2014, showing an increase from the 2013 volume which
was US$26 billion (CARI, 2016b). While Chinese investments in Africa is growing,
China remains a small player compared to other western countries (Chen et al.,
2015). A report from UNCTAD shows that the ﬂow of Chinese FDI into Africa
during 2013–2014 amounts to about 4.4 per cent of the total FDI to Africa. China
invests in 49 African countries (Chen et al., 2015). Its top ﬁve destinations in 2014
were South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (CARI, 2016b). These investments also cut across a wide range of sectors.
According to China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), Chinese investments as
of 2011 were largely in the sectors of mining (31 per cent), banking and ﬁnance (20
per cent), construction (16 per cent) and manufacturing (15 per cent) (SCIO, 2013).
Chinese investments in sectors such as manufacturing and construction are notable,
according to Brautigam (2016) as at the end of 2014, MOFCOM approved a number
of manufacturing projects in countries like Nigeria (128), Ethiopia (80), South Africa
(77), Tanzania (48) and Ghana (44). Likewise, China has signed infrastructure-ﬁnan-
cing agreements with over 35 African countries, the largest recipients being Nigeria,
Angola, Sudan and Ethiopia (Renard, 2011). Investments in these sectors (manufactur-
ing and construction) are particularly signiﬁcant and have important implications for
Africa, as apart from helping to combat Africa’s deﬁcient infrastructure, investments
in these sectors could potentially generate human capital development gains through
employment and opportunities for skills and technology transfer for local populace
and ﬁrms. In terms of actors, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate stra-
tegic extractive sectors of oil, ores and infrastructures and are usually subsidised
with grants from Chinese state-owned banks. Chinese medium- to large-sized enter-
prises are mainly found in the manufacture of goods, business services, wholesale
trade and telecommunications sectors while the small-sized enterprises are found in
the retail and light industry sectors (Renard, 2011).
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China’s development assistance to Africa is increasing. China is fast becoming an
important aid partner in the continent. Be that as it may, China’s aid is still very low in
comparison to the traditional western aid donors (Brautigam, 2011). China has had an
African aid programme since the mid-1950s, with its ofﬁcial development assistance to
Africa provided through grants, concessional (ﬁxed-rate, low-interest) loans and zero
interest loans (Brautigam, 2011; Zafar, 2007). At the third summit of FOCAC,
China promised to double its size of aid to Africa. China’s aid to Africa appears to
be focused on industrial and agricultural productivity; funds are mostly directed
towards funding infrastructural development, agriculture, industry, public facilities
and provided on a non-interference policy basis which means there are no preconditions
on the receiving countries to implement certain democratisation policies or advanced
human rights policies and so on (SCIO, 2013), while that of other traditional aid part-
ners such as the USA is often conditional and directed towards programmes that
support public health, democratisation efforts, counterterrorism cooperation, improve-
ment of regulatory institutions and governance (Zafar, 2007). According to data com-
piled by CARI (2016c), the Chinese government offered loans worth US$86.3 billion
to African governments and SOEs between 2000 and 2014, with Angola being the
largest recipient followed by Ethiopia (US$12.3 billion), Sudan (US$5.6 billion),
Kenya (US$5.2 billion) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (US$4.9 billion).
A sizable portion of these loans ﬁnanced much-needed infrastructural projects in
Africa such as the Addis Ababa – Adama expressway of Ethiopia and the Kribi
deep-water port of Cameroon, and re-building war-torn infrastructure in Angola.
From 2010 to 2012, China granted 18,743 government scholarships to students from
several African countries including South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia,
Cameroon and so on. Other projects include the building of schools, agricultural tech-
nology demonstration centres (Liberia, Rwanda, Tanzania, etc.) hospitals and anti-
malarial centres across several locations in Africa (Angola, Zimbabwe, etc.) (SCIO,
2013).
The strong demand for oil and other mineral resources outside of Africa, particu-
larly demand from China, positively impacted the growth rate of certain African econ-
omies, creating conditions for better terms of trade and a higher volume in exports
(Besada et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2015). Similarly, Chinese investments contributed
to the continent’s growth rate (Ayodele and Sotola, 2014). According to Chen et al.,
(2015), Chinese engagement in Africa has in part impacted Africa’s growth rate posi-
tively; the average African economy realised a surge in per capita growth rate from 0.6
per cent per annum in the 1990s to 2 per cent in the 2000s.
As China undergoes a slowdown in economic growth as it rebalances its economy,
it is expected that the volume of China–Africa trade and investments will also decline
(Calabrese, 2016). In 2015, China–Africa trade witnessed a slowdown in value from
US$222 billion in the previous year to US$172 billion. The recent drop in commodity
prices has also affected the value of Africa’s exports all around with commodity
exporters being hardest hit. However, Lin (2016) posits that opportunities still
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abound for Africa in sectors such as manufacturing particularly as China restructures
its economy away from manufacturing. Africa could potentially capture some of the
manufacturing jobs that will be relocated as labour and production costs rises in
China. According to Calabrese (2016), projects like ‘One Belt, One Road initiative’
could potentially boost African economies particularly those of Kenya, Djibouti and
Egypt as the inclusion of their ports in the silk maritime route will lead to more invest-
ments in infrastructure and an increase in regional trade. Commitments made at the
sixth FOCAC summit suggest continued economic partnerships between China and
African countries.
As the relationship between China and Africa deepens, so does the scholarly interest
on the relationship across different ﬁelds of study. The subsequent paragraph discusses
China’s presence in Africa through the lens of dependency theory.
Discussion: the case of China in Africa vis-a´-vis dependency theory
Should China’s presence in Africa then be viewed as detrimental to Africa’s develop-
ment, an attempt at neocolonialism or a ‘diversiﬁcation of dependency’?
We argue that a critical point, which dependency theorists pointed out as being the
root of inequality between the North and the South, was their historical past, speciﬁ-
cally colonialism and imperial linkages that persisted after decolonisation. Examining
Sino-African relations under this assumption points out very important points of depar-
ture between China’s relations with Africa and North–South relations. Firstly, China
does not have an imperial heritage in Africa as colonialism under the West; rather it
shares a common past with Africa as it too underwent hardship under western imperi-
alism, a fact which, as mentioned before, China is apt to point out in its diplomacy with
Africa (Alden and Alves, 2008; Cooke, 2009). Secondly, China’s relation with Africa
saw China stand in solidarity with African countries in its national independence move-
ments, forging a new and thriving relationship with the continent (Renard, 2011). His-
torical relations between China and Africa echo Beijing’s anti-imperialist and anti-
colonialist stance. Its support for newly independent states in Africa is often invoked
to corroborate and assure Africa and the rest of the world that China is not out to
control its economic and political systems (Mohan and Power, 2008). Within the
engagement between China and Africa is China’s continued stress on South–South
cooperation based on perceived ‘similarities’ between China and African countries.
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai during his tour of Africa in 1964 referred to China’s
support for Africa’s struggles against imperialism as the ‘poor helping the poor’,
while China’s interactions in Africa during the cold war era was often linked to its ideo-
logical battle with the United States and the USSR. However, China’s ongoing engage-
ment in Africa is devoid of this ideological undertone; while largely commercial, it
stresses a willingness to partner with Africa towards achieving their common develop-
ment and to foster a cooperation that results in helping and supporting each other on the
world stage.
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China–Africa engagement can be seen as a practical example of SSC. China is
often seen as a more viable development partner for Africa based on the similarities
of socio-economic condition and development issues in China and Africa, offering
an access to appropriate technologies and solutions (UNOSSC, 2015). China has
carried out several SSC projects in Africa in cooperation with United Nations Industrial
Development Organization and United Nations Development Programme, namely the
‘lighting up Rural Africa’ project, a project aimed at providing electricity in rural com-
munities in Africa. Under the project, 14 small hydropower projects have been carried
out in Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania, as well as the Shiwang’andu hydro power plant in
Zambia. Other projects include agricultural projects, and technical exchanges and
cooperation (UNOSSC, 2015).
Considering the scale and nature of trade, investments and aid, China’s presence in
Africa plays an important role in increasing developmental opportunities in Africa
(Ayodele and Sotola, 2014). While China has intensiﬁed competition in the manufac-
turing sectors in some African countries and its rising demand for oil and other raw
materials raises the risks of further subjecting the continent to a role of supplier of
raw materials and making some countries such as Angola, Nigeria, Gabon and so on
more vulnerable to volatile commodity price ﬂuctuation (Ademola et al., 2009).
African countries still stand to beneﬁt from commodity revenues, and could potentially
use their commodities sectors to spur industrialisation (Mohan, 2016). Findings from
research carried out by Morris et al., (2012) in their ‘Making the Most of Commodities
Program’ suggest that by creating meaningful backward and forward linkages in their
resource sectors, countries could actually foster wider industrial development as has
been shown in the case of Nigeria (oil sector), Angola (oil sector), Botswana (dia-
monds) and Gabon (timber) where local content policies have been used to promote
job creation, skills and technology transfer and value-added production (Morris
et al., 2012). Furthermore, China’s exports into Africa actually cater to low-income
populace in these countries and lead to reduction in prices of consumer goods in
Africa, something African low-income masses need (Ajakaiye et al., 2009; Renard,
2011).
There have been a lot of criticisms on the volume of trade imbalances in Sino-
African trade and this has often been compared to the great imbalances under
North–South engagement and echoes the concerns of dependency theorists. China
maintains a trade surplus with Africa. However, there have been attempts from the
Chinese government to address this, by gradually increasing its imports from Africa,
also by granting ‘zero customs duty’ status to imports from some African countries
(Danchie, 2010). According to a UNOSSC (United Nations Ofﬁce for South-South
Cooperation) (2015) report on China’s SSC, China removed customs duty to products
coming from least developed African countries, products that make up to 93 per cent of
the countries’ exports to China. In addition to that, China through its establishments of
special economic zones (SEZs) in selected African countries supports export diversiﬁ-
cation. China could potentially be a catalyst for the promotion of industrial activity in
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some selected African countries where Chinese-funded SEZs have been established.
Not only will this have an impact on the exports of African countries to China, but it
also has the potential to further attract investments in much-needed sectors, promote
manufacturing and diversify the economy from being majorly extractive (Brautigam
and Tang, 2011). According to Sandrey and Edinger (2011), these zones could poten-
tially contribute to the backward and forward linkages in the host economies, and also
create massive employment opportunities and generate greater foreign exchange
reserves through more diversiﬁed sources of income. While not all the zones have
begun operations, some have and have been moderately successful. An example is
the Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone, one of the Chinese SEZs in Nigeria. The
zone has had considerable impact on the economy of the local area in Ogun state,
Nigeria, contributing to employment generation (currently employs about 4500 local
workers), considerable skills and technology transfer, and increased economic activity
in the local area (Caruso et al., 2016).
Dependency theorists highlighted the highly exploitative relations in North–South
relations and how the third world has been condemned to the role of supplier of raw
materials blocking the chances for industrialisation. Given this, the range of relations
within Sino-African relations suggests that Africa is not relegated to being just a sup-
plier of primary commodities. While China possesses the main industrial productive
capacity in this engagement, there are opportunities for Africa to also engage in pro-
ductive activities within the engagement. As mentioned previously, as of the end of
2014, MOFCOM had approved a signiﬁcant total number of 377 manufacturing pro-
jects in these ﬁve countries: Nigeria (128), Ethiopia (80), South Africa (77), Tanzania
(48) and Ghana (44) (Brautigam, 2016). These projects would contribute to the indus-
trial capacity of these countries. Other examples of Chinese investments contributing to
industrialisation in Africa include the case of the Huajian group, who set up a shoe man-
ufacturing factory in Ethiopia in 2011 and has plans of setting up an industrial park. As
at the end of 2013, the Huajian shoe factory had created 4000 jobs for locals and had
begun manufacturing shoes in Ethiopia for export to the global market (Lin, 2016).
Another example is the Yuemei Group in Nigeria, which successfully set up a textile
industry park in Nigeria in 2008 (Pigato and Tang, 2015). Furthermore, in Rwanda,
Chinese investors set up a garment manufacturing factory, C&H garments in 2015,
and have so far employed about 500 workers, trained them and are currently exporting
from Rwanda to foreign markets (Lin, 2016). The aforementioned manufacturing
investments would further increase Africa’s capacity to produce and trade value-
added products and could provide opportunities for balancing China–Africa trade.
Not only are such Chinese investments creating employment and training opportunities
for locals but could also facilitate industrialisation in host countries in Africa. African
governments can leverage Chinese investments for socio-economic development in
their respective countries by using concrete industrial and localisation policies and
strategy followed through with effective implementation. A few African governments
have had a measure of success in exerting agency to direct Chinese investments to
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crucial sectors of their economy, as seen in the case of Ethiopia with the shoe factory
and in the case of Rwanda with the garment factory. Ofﬁcially, within FOCAC, there is
a focus on cooperation to foster industrialisation in Africa. The Chinese President Xi in
his speech at the FOCAC 2015 summit announced a new ‘China-Africa Industrializ-
ation Program’, a program targeted at enhancing Africa’s industrial capacity that sig-
niﬁes China’s support for Africa’s industrialisation and includes a pledge of US$10
billion to set up a new China–Africa industrial cooperation fund. As part of the com-
mitments laid out in FOCAC 2015, China plans to set up industrial parks, regional
vocational education centres and capacity-building schools. These commitments also
include plans to train 200,000 technical personnel and provide training opportunities
for 40,000 African personnel in China (Eom et al., 2016). While it will take a while
for these commitments to be implemented, these plans suggest China’s continued com-
mitment to partner with African countries in fostering development.
Chinese investments in Africa open up opportunities for employment and training,
contributing to skill building, technology transfer and human capital development.
However, there have been criticisms of Chinese investments in Africa, particularly
on the potential of these investments to create jobs, to add value to industries in
Africa (Ancharaz, 2013) and the labour practices of Chinese companies (Baah and
Jauch, 2009; Flynn, 2013). These criticisms have often not been based on concrete
data (Oya and McKinley, 2016). Research carried out by Sautman and Yan (2015)
on over 400 Chinese enterprises and projects in 40 plus African countries found that
over 85 per cent of their workforce are local African workers. While there is some vari-
ation in countries, cases of lower than average localisation rate was mainly in Angola
and Algeria due to years of civil war which has led to de-skilling of the populace and
migration of skilled workers to Europe, respectively. Chen et al., (2016), in their study
of Chinese manufacturing ﬁrms in Nigeria and their potential for skills and technology
transfer, found that ﬁrms sampled employ 80 per cent of their workforce locally, and
engage in workforce training. Their ﬁndings also showed cases of positive technology
transfer and linkages to local suppliers in the ﬁrms surveyed. Their research concludes
that not only can Chinese FDI in manufacturing generate local employment but can
contribute to industrialisation by providing opportunities for skills and technology
transfer, promoting linkages with domestic ﬁrms which could integrate local ﬁrms in
global manufacturing supply chains and increasing opportunities for developing
countries to upgrade their domestic production.
We argue that focusing rather narrowly on the misconceptions surrounding China’s
economic activities in Africa often leads to a short-sighted analysis of the relations
between Beijing and the continent. China has chosen to engage Africa in a distinctive
manner evident in the FOCAC. Using the platform of FOCAC, China seeks to differ-
entiate itself from the ‘prescriptive, intrusive and hierarchical (donor and recipient)’
approach of western actors by emphasising that its engagement with Africa is one of
mutual beneﬁt, win–win engagement that promotes common development (Alden
and Large, 2011) espousing a spirit of partnership (Zhang, 2013). Dependency theorists
444 Motolani Agbebi and Petri Virtanen
challenged both western and soviet models of development and ceased to recognise
these models as ideal for development in the third world. They reject the notion that
all nations can attain development by following prescribed stages and prerequisites
to growth that have been prescribed by the industrialised world. China is seen to
promote what is referred to as the ‘Beijing Consensus’ in Africa (Besada et al.,
2011), a ‘model’ that seeks to replace the widely criticised and largely disappointing
Washington Consensus, a prescriptive, Washington-knows-best approach to economic
growth and development (Ramo, 2004). This western approach espoused by western
agencies often accompanied its ﬁnancial assistance with conditionalities, which have
not always suited the developmental needs of the recipient country and have in fact
been detrimental to some developing economies (Rodrik, 2006; Stiglitz, 2002).
African leaders and masses often see the western approach accompanied by their con-
ditions, which are often centred on economic liberalisation, democratisation, human
rights, as condescending and hypocritical (Cooke, 2009), thus making China’s
‘respect for sovereignty’ and policy of non-interference, which has often been ques-
tioned, one that appeals to many African leaders and masses (Cooke, 2009).
Thus, China’s approach is one that has offered and offers Africa an alternative in its
choice of development partners and model (He, 2013). China’s rise in the world
economy is thus seen as an example for Africa. China is seen as opening up new pro-
spects for Africa’s development (Ayodele and Sotola, 2014). Africans often view
China’s engagement in their countries as being pragmatic with quick implementation
and deliverables and in line with their priorities for the continent (Cooke, 2009).
More so, within China’s engagement in Africa, there is ‘room for negotiation’
(Mohan and Lampert, 2012) which is further supported under the FOCAC platform,
something that was mostly lacking in North–South relations due to great power imbal-
ance between the nations involved (Girvan, 2007), a point echoed in the dependency
literature. China’s presence in Africa is not one that is totally lacking in African
agency. According to Mohan and Lampert (2012, p. 109) ‘African actors have been
able to shape these relationships in ways that advance their own interests and aspira-
tions and or produce forms of wider social beneﬁt’; this signiﬁes that China’s presence
in Africa gives the leeway and is being steered (Mohan and Lampert, 2012) to be ben-
eﬁcial to Africa’s development.
Conclusions
China’s presence in Africa is an opportunity for Africa to practice self-reliance that
translates not into the utopian ideal of Autarky but controlled engagement beneﬁcial
to the socio-economic developmental needs of Africa. We argue that what China’s
presence means for Africa beyond economic partnership, cooperation and solidarity
is a challenge to question the status quo, re-orient their values and adopt an inward
focus on their developmental needs and priorities, letting that dictate their economic
engagements with other countries after all China can be said to have towed the same
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road towards development. While the ideology, ofﬁcial discourse and framework
guiding China–Africa relations hold the promise of a win–win relationship and
indeed China has a lot to contribute towards Africa’s development, we stress that, like
any engagement between two or more actors, there are risks and opportunities. As
China–Africa relations continue to evolve, it is clear that in order for Africa to maximise
the opportunities and minimise the risks in its relationship with China, African leaders
need to assert more agency and ownership and approach the relationship with clearly
articulated interests, policies and strategies that promote the welfare of their citizens
and facilitate development in crucial sectors of their economy. It is also in China’s interest
to remain a responsible partner particularly in relation to regulating Chinese enterprises in
Africa, promoting a more balanced China–Africa trade and addressing ﬁnancial burdens
that could arise due to China’s loans to African countries. From the dependency point of
view, we opine that the China–Africa relationship suggests a case of growing interdepen-
dency. A new direction for future research should be from a viewpoint of increasing inter-
dependency between systems and its implications for development.
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China in Africa’s telecom sector: opportunities for human
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ABSTRACT
The inﬂow of Chinese investments into Africa’s telecom sector
presents opportunities for skill building and technology transfer,
and African governments through their policy measures and
actions can maximize these opportunities. This article examines
how Chinese investments in Africa have contributed to human
capital development (HCD) and what role the government has
played in leveraging these investments. Analysing data from a
case study of Huawei in Nigeria, the study ﬁnds that Chinese
enterprises operating in Africa are well placed to contribute sig-
niﬁcantly to skill building and technology transfer. However, their
eﬀorts need to be supported by government policies, which are
important for HCD. This article contributes to the emergent litera-
ture on Chinese economic engagement in Africa and its implica-
tions for HCD in Africa. Moreover, it provides an insight into the
role of government policy in HCD in Africa.
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Introduction
China has made signiﬁcant in-roads into the African economy. Chinese investments in
Africa are no longer conﬁned to the traditional extractive industries; they have expanded
to industries such as construction and manufacturing and service sectors such as tele-
communications, banking, wholesale-retail business, and hospitality (Tang 2010; Chen,
Dollar, and Tang 2015). Chinese multinational companies – Huawei and ZTE – are
among the major players in Africa’s telecommunications industry, and they have been
heavily involved in setting up and improving the core infrastructure on which Africa’s
communication industry relies (Cisse 2012; Gagliardone and Gaell 2014; Oreglia 2012).
In the recent years, Nigeria has emerged as a strategically important base for Chinese
telecom ﬁrms partly because it is the largest telecom market in Africa. Huawei registered
Huawei Technologies Co, Nigeria Limited and established its West African headquarters
(HQ) in Lagos in 1999. Over the past 16 years, the Chinese company has established a
solid presence in Nigeria and is currently the leading network equipment provider, in
terms of market share, in the Nigerian telecom industry. Its operational facilities in
Nigeria include a regional training centre in Abuja; a software R&D centre, a network
hosting centre, and a regional network operating centre in the Lagos HQ; and a business
process outsourcing centre in Kano, Northern Nigeria (Huawei 2014a).
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Huawei’s ability to develop appropriate and aﬀordable technologies for this part of
the world has contributed to its success in Africa’s telecommunication industry (Cisse
2012). Since entering the Nigerian market, Huawei has played a critical role in upgrad-
ing the country’s ICT infrastructure, contributing to an increase in broadband penetra-
tion and connectivity in Nigeria. However, beyond ﬁnancing the telecom infrastructure
in African countries, its contributions to human capital development (HCD), through
skill and technology transfer, remain crucial in order to leverage Chinese telecom
companies’ engagement in African countries.
While, on the one hand, Chinese economic engagement (CEE) in Africa is on the rise,
on the other hand, the potential of Chinese investments to add value to African industries
and contribute to the development of human capital has been questioned (Tull 2006;
Ancharaz 2013). Table 1 presents the claims and criticisms of Chinese enterprises’ labour
practices in Africa and research-based rebuttals to the claims. For example, Chinese labour
practices have been heavily criticized (Baah and Jauch 2009; Flynn 2013). Claims have
been made that Chinese companies employ convict labourers on projects in Africa
(Chellaney 2010), are unwilling to hire local workers (Flynn 2013; Lorenz and Thielke
2007), oﬀer low wages to African workers with limited opportunity for training and career
development (Kamwanga and Koyi 2009; Gandolfo 2015), and subject African workers to
poor working conditions (Human Rights Watch 2011). See Table 1.
Although such comments continue to permeate the narratives of CEE in Africa, Oya
andMcKinley (2016) note that they are often not based on concrete data. The researchers
call for more research on employment-related opportunities and challenges of Chinese
ﬁrms operating in Africa. While information is limited on the eﬀects of CEE in Africa, it
seems reasonable to argue that, despite the challenges, CEE in Africa provides valuable
opportunities for HCD, especially in a vital service sector such as telecommunications.
The main aim of this study is to ascertain whether CEE in Africa provides oppor-
tunities to develop African human capital. Using a case study approach, the article
investigates whether the investments and operations of Huawei, a Chinese telecom
company, in Nigeria have contributed to HCD, speciﬁcally, skill and technology
transfer. The article explores the training activities of Huawei in Nigeria and their
eﬀects on HCD. By doing so, it seeks to contribute to the emerging body of literature on
CEE in Africa and its implications for HCD. On a broader level, it also explores how
multinational corporations (MNCs) contribute to HCD, by focusing on a particular
industry and MNC. This viewpoint is important because though Chinese MNCs share a
home country, they cannot be considered as a homogenous group, and their practices
in host countries are inﬂuenced by several factors speciﬁc to the MNC, the sector in
which they operate in and the host country itself.
Furthermore, most studies on human resource development (HRD) focus on the
internal organization processes and consider a range of HRD interventions to enhance
individual and organizational eﬀectiveness. Thus, while there is ample research on ﬁrm
level/organizational level HCD, there is need for more research to be carried out on the
national level. This study ﬁlls the gap as it examines the context of HCD and the
political and institutional realities and interactions within it.
The article is organized into three sections. The ﬁrst section reviews literature on the
role of MNCs in human capital formation with a focus on training and the role of
government policy in leveraging foreign direct investment (FDI) for HCD. The second
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section explains the methodology and data collection process. The third section pre-
sents the ﬁndings of this study, which is followed by a discussion of its implications for
HCD in Nigeria, particularly the telecom sector.
The role of mncs in human capital formation
Developing a country’s human resources is a vital part to development (Sydhagen and
Cunningham 2007; Pillay 2006), without it most development interventions will be inef-
fective (Kessels and Poell 2004) Thus, countries around the world are increasingly investing
Table 1. Claims and criticisms of Chinese enterprises’ labour practices in Africa and research-based
rebuttals of claims.
Claims and criticisms of Chinese enterprises’ labour
practices in Africa Research-based rebuttals of claims
● Chinese companies employ convict labourers to work
on projects in the developing world including Africa
(Chellaney 2010)
● This claim has been condemned by prominent Sino-
Africa researchers as nothing more than anti-Chinese
propaganda and more importantly not evidence
based. (See Centre for Chinese Studies 2006, Blog post
by Sautman and Yan titled ‘Stirring up trouble: Claims
that China sends convicts to labour in Africa are
unfounded’ on China Africa Research Initiative blog –
China in Africa: The Real Story, 21 August 2010.)
● Chinese companies are unwilling to hire local workers
(Flynn 2013, Lorenz and Thielke 2007)
● Tang (2010), study on the impact of Chinese
enterprises on local employment in Angola and
Congo, shows high and increasing levels of workforce
localization in Chinese enterprises and projects across
a range of industry sectors in both countries.
● Sautmann and Yan (2015), based on data from over
400 Chinese enterprises and projects in Africa, ﬁnd
workforce localization rate to be over 85% in surveyed
enterprise and projects. They condemn this claim as
not based on systematic data.
● Oﬀer low wages to African workers with limited
opportunity for training and career development
(Kamwanga and Koyi 2009, Gandolfo 2015).
● The scale and diversity of Chinese enterprises operating
in Africa makes this claim problematic. Chinese ﬁrms
operating in Africa cannot be treated as a homogenous
group. Given sectoral, contextual, and institutional
diﬀerences, employment conditions are bound to vary
in Chinese ﬁrms across diﬀerent industry sectors in
diﬀerent African countries (King 2013).
● Subject African workers to poor working conditions
(Human Rights Watch 2011).
● Zambian copper mines are generally rife with labour-
related problems and this is by no means exclusive to
Chinese mines in Zambia as poor working conditions
have been noted in non-Chinese mines in Zambia. The
problem of poor working conditions appears to be
rooted in the absence of a strong and eﬀective
regulatory body in Zambia’s copper mining industry.
(See blog post by Brautigam, D. titled ‘The Huma
Rights Watch report on Chinese-owned mines in
Zambia’ on China Africa Research Initiative blog –
China in Africa: The Real Story, 11 November 2011).
● There exists huge cultural diﬀerences in terms of work/
business ethics, expectations towards labour between
Chinese society and individual African Societies. These
diﬀerences in work culture and labour expectations
often leads to labour-related disputes and issues. (See
blog post by Brautigam, D. titled ‘Nigerian workers
protest conditions at Chinese construction projects’ on
China Africa Research Initiative blog – China in Africa:
The Real Story, 1 February 2013).
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in the development of human capital in order to stimulate economic development. The
rapid economic growth of resource-poor East Asian countries of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore,
and Hong Kong, which is largely attributed to the sustained levels of investment in human
capital, compared to the unstable economic growth and underdevelopment experienced by
the resource rich countries in Sub-Saharan Africa clearly proves this point. UNDP’s latest
human development reports point out that Sub-Saharan Africa experiences the slowest
progress on the human development index (UNDP 2016). Concrete human capital policies
and strategies coupled with ample investments in education and capacity building is
necessary for Africa’s development (Hall and Jones 1999, Lynham and Cunningham
2006). According to the Global human capital report (World Economic Forum 2017, 15),
Nigeria currently ranked 114 in the global human capital index ‘. . .has a relatively large pool
of tertiary educated workers, especially among its older generations, and comparatively
strong staﬀ training. However, it simultaneously records low primary and secondary
education attainment across all age groups and one of the lowest current primary school
enrolment rates globally, pointing to excessively uneven human capital outcomes and the
untapped opportunities of pursuing a more inclusive human capital development
approach’. This is largely due to a weak institutional framework for HCD and negligible
investments in education and training. Several bodies have sought to ﬁll the void created by
institutional inadequacies (Nsouli 2000; Jackson 2012; Mamman et al. 2018). For example,
education and training interventions from international institutions such as the African
development bank, World Bank, the United Nations have increasingly complemented the
weak eﬀorts of governments in building their human capital. Similarly, the private sector is
considered to play a crucial part in the education and capacity building eﬀorts in several
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa through their business and partnership with governments
(Business Action for Africa 2010). MNCs are seen as a focal catalyst for HCD in Africa,
Harvey, Myers, and Novicevic (2002) posit that MNCs could potentially balance the HCD
gap between African and developed countries.
FDI inﬂuences human capital formation and development, particularly through the
interaction of host countries’ policies, education, and training system with the MNCs
and their education and training activities (Slaughter 2002; Te Velde 2002; Ritchie
2002; Blomström and Kokko 2002). Macedo as cited in Slaughter (2002, 7) asserts that
MNCs ‘can and do generate substantial human capital spillovers in developing
countries and appropriate policies can maximize these’. FDI is not only a source of
capital for growth in developing countries but through MNCs, it is also an active
provider of employment, education and training, skill enhancement, and technology
transfer (Majeed and Ahmad 2008). Slaughter (2002) notes that MNCs can facilitate
HCD through ﬁrm-level activities that allow for interaction with the host country
labour market such as local employment, on-the-job training, supporting the host
country’s educational and training institutions, etc. In addition, a rise in economic
activity from MNCs leads to a rise in the host country’s tax revenue, and increased
revenue can in turn foster macro-economic stability, promoting higher educational
and training investment by the government (Slaughter 2002). Furthermore, higher
FDI inﬂows can prevent brain drain (Slaughter 2002). As the loss of highly educated
locals to employment opportunities abroad remains an enduring concern in develop-
ing countries, the inﬂow of FDI resulting in MNCs setting up subsidiaries brings
those employment opportunities back to the host countries.
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Enhancing human capital through training and skill building
Training is also a prominent route through which MNCs facilitate HCD. O’Donnell
and Blumentritt (1999) consider training as a mechanism for the transfer of tech-
nology and managerial knowledge to the local workforce. Although most recipients
of MNC’s training are their employees, sometimes they also include employees of
their customers, subcontractors, and suppliers (Blomstrom and Kokko 2002).
Trainings can be imparted via formal interactions, on-the-job classroom sessions,
seminars, formal schooling, international training courses and education, etc. The
spillover eﬀects of training are particularly signiﬁcant for developing countries than
developed countries as the public education system, and consequently the knowledge
base, tends to be relatively weaker in the former than in the latter (Blomstrom and
Kokko 2002). Evidence conﬁrms that MNCs carry out more training activities than
local private ﬁrms (Te Velde 2002). While most MNCs provide some level of
training to their local employees, the type and amount varies depending on the
mode of entry, the industry, the size and timeline of investment, type of operations,
motivation for the investment and local conditions (Blomstrom and Kokko 2002).
For example, training in service sectors is more focused on strengthening the skills
and expertise of the employees (Blunch and Castro 2005). MNCs that use complex
technologies tend to oﬀer more employee training as their operations need skilled
and trained workers (Te Velde 2002).
In the context of Chinese MNCs in Africa, those engaged in low technology sectors
do not oﬀer elaborate training or capacity development opportunities. However, MNCs
operating in telecommunications and high technology sectors train their employees on
the nature of the company’s products and technology. For example, King (2013) noted
that Chinese telecom ﬁrm ZTE upon gaining its ﬁrst telecom infrastructure contract in
Ethiopia embarked on re-training 1000 Ethiopian engineers from the Ethiopian telecom
corporation. This was done to ensure complete understanding and knowledge of ZTE
technology. Moreover, Chinese ﬁrms in Africa have also engaged in voluntary con-
tributions to promote general education in their host countries. For instance, China
Petroleum Engineering and Construction Corporation funded a laboratory equipped
with modern welding equipment to Egerton University (King 2013). Holley Cotec, a
large Chinese pharmaceutical company provided scholarships to support the study of
medicine, geography, and the Confucius institute at the University of Nairobi. While
the beneﬁts of FDI to HCD abound, appropriate government policies in the host
country are crucial to maximizing the beneﬁts and mitigating the negative eﬀects.
Thus, while Chinese investments in Africa provide opportunities for HCD, African
governments through policy measures and actions should play an active role in steering
these investments towards the intended outcomes.
Host country policies and human capital formation
While FDI plays a key role in human capital formation in host countries, HCD is not an
automatic consequence of the presence of foreign MNCs (Blomstrom and Kokko 2002;
Te Velde 2002; Slaughter 2002). According to Te Velde (2002), theory supports inter-
vention from policymakers to direct FDI towards development. Governments need to
536 M. AGBEBI
not only attract FDI but also ensure that they maximize the beneﬁts of FDI to achieve
their developmental objectives, and they often rely on a combination of FDI and
macroeconomic policies to achieve this (Te Velde 2002).
FDI promotion policies in the form of investment promotion agencies, particularly
those oﬀering a one-stop service to investors, have been particularly successful in attracting
FDI (Wells and Wint 2000). The use of ﬁscal and ﬁnancial incentives linked to technology
status (i.e. pioneer status) (Hanson 2001; Te Velde 2002); implementing trade policies that
are meant to facilitate trade by lowering tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers (Morisset 2000);
developing and upgrading infrastructures (Wheeler and Mody 1992); establishing export
processing zones are measures through which governments have successfully attracted
certain types of MNCs (Madani 1999). Further, in order to encourage MNCs to upgrade
their operations, host governments can adopt policies that ‘target certain types of TNCs
(Transnational corporations); build eﬀective institutions, impose tax levies linked to train-
ing; engage the private sector in education and training planning; and design eﬀective
technology policy where R&D centres interact with TNCs, etc’. (Te Velde 2002).
While FDI, through the activities of MNCs, can promote HCD in host countries, this is
not a certainty. This is because the primary interest of MNCs is to generate proﬁt and not
to engage in the development of the host country. To promote HCD and development in
general, host country governments should deploy policies andmeasures that align inward
FDI with developmental objectives. Te Velde (2002) argues that to maximize the con-
tributions of MNCs to human capital formation, the government should formulate
strategic education policies that will improve the chances of attracting more MNCs
into the country. Further, the government should also oﬀer MNCs incentives for carrying
out training and skill-upgrading activities. Domestic education policies meant to raise the
educational attainment and technical knowledge of locals are crucial because the presence
of quality skilled labour in the host country usually serves a good basis for attracting asset-
seeking MNCs (Blomstrom and Kokko 2002; Noorbakhsh, Palioni., and Yousseﬀ 2001).
In the context of CEE in Africa, the role of host country policies cannot be over-
emphasized. While some African countries such as Angola and Nigeria have been
successful at attracting FDI largely due to their abundant natural resources and the
size of their markets, other countries that lack such geographic advantages have to rely
on a mix of eﬀective policies and strategies to attract FDI. Further, there is need for
concrete policies in order to mitigate the negative eﬀects associated with FDI such as
the crowding out eﬀect, negative wage spillovers, etc. and maximize the beneﬁts to the
local economy. African governments need to direct FDI to crucial sectors of their
economies and leverage these investments to strengthen their stock of human capital.
Chen et al. (2016) assert that Chinese FDI in Africa can generate local employment and
opportunities for skill and technology transfer; however, policy measures are crucial to
ensuring that these beneﬁts are realized. A few African countries have engaged in active
investment-promotion activities and have been successful in attracting Chinese MNCs
into their manufacturing sectors; thus, creating opportunities for job creation, training,
and skill transfer. For example, the Ethiopian government led by its then prime minister
Meles Zenawi actively promoted investments into its manufacturing sector, inviting
several investors from China. One of which is the Chinese shoe manufacturer, Huajian,
which set-up operations in Ethiopia in 2011. The company has since then employed
over 4,000 locals, training, and equipping them with necessary skills (Lin 2016).
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Similarly, in Rwanda, investment-promotion eﬀorts resulted in Chinese investors set-
ting up a garment-manufacturing factory in 2015. Today, C and H garments has about
500 local employees (Lin 2016). Local content policies such as those employed in
Nigeria and Angola’s oil sectors (Mohan 2016); the import substitution policy in
Nigeria’s automobile sector (Chen et al. 2016); and export processing zones and special
economic zones in Nigeria (Brautigam and Tang 2011) can generate concrete gains for
HCD and spur growth in these economies. Further, research shows that Chinese ﬁrms
operating in Africa are more heavily inﬂuenced by host country policies, regulations,
and institutions than by the guidelines of the Chinese government (Weng and Buckley
2016). This highlights the crucial role African governments and institutions can play in
leveraging Chinese investments for HCD.
The following section introduces the methodology employed in this study. The article
describes how Huawei contributed to HCD through its training programmes in Nigeria
and further explores the role of government policies in leveraging Chinese investments.
Methodology
Interviews and on-site observations were carried out by the researcher fromMarch to April
2016 at Huawei’s oﬃces in Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria. Data were collected through 29 semi-
structured interviews. Some participants were selected using purposive sampling and some
through the snowball technique. Purposive sampling was employed because it ensures that
individuals selected have an important perspective on the phenomenon being studied
(Mason 2002; Robinson 2014). Table 2 presents the details of the interviewed participants.
The interviews exploredHuawei’s contributions toHCD inNigeria, particularly to skill and
technology transfer via training. Questions also covered the policy measures and actions of
the Nigerian government in leveraging FDI for HCD in the telecom sector.
Broad topic categories were formed based on the concepts and literature on MNCs
and human capital formation as well as the objectives of this research. The ﬁndings
were organized on topic categories/themes emerging from the interviews and derived
from the literature reviewed earlier. Subsequently, transcripts from the interviews were
manually coded according to the above categories and thoroughly examined to gain
useful insights into the issues investigated. Excerpts from the interviews have been
selected to elucidate key themes emerging from the ﬁndings. Various other documents
such as company reports, press releases, training reports, and policy documents col-
lected in Nigeria were examined and used in this study. The document review focused
on Huawei’s training programmes, corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, and
government policy information (e.g. local content in ICT policy document).
Findings and analysis
Huawei’s training activities in nigeria
As mentioned earlier, Chinese ﬁrms have been widely criticized for their unfavourable
approach towards local labour. In fact, Kamwanga and Koyi (2009) noted that ‘even in cases
where local source of labour has been utilized it has been observed that this tends to be on a
limited scale with little capacity development and hardly any opportunities for technology
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transfer’. However, responses from this study present a starkly diﬀerent picture: Huawei has
actively contributed to skill building in Nigeria via employee training activities, training for
clients and partners, and training programmes implemented in partnership with the
Nigerian government. Interview data suggest that Huawei’s training centre in Abuja has
seen roughly over 50,000 trainees since its inception. Built at a cost of US$ 20 million, the
training centre serves Huawei employees in Nigeria and in the West African region
(Huawei 2014a). Past and current employees of Huawei (R16, 17, 18, 19, 20) conﬁrm
that trainings are regularly conducted in various forms, including formal classroom
sessions, on-the-job coaching, learning by observation and virtual sessions conducted by
experts at Huawei’s HQ in Shenzhen, China.
Table 2. Breakdown of interview respondents.
Code
Aﬃliation/Role of
interviewee
Number of
interviewees Location
Data collection
method
Date of data
collection
Government
R1, 2 Federal Ministry of
Communications
technology (FMCT)
2 Abuja Face-to-face
individual
interview
March 30
2016; 7
April 2016
R3 National Communications
Commission
1 Abuja Face-to-face
interview
8 April 2016
R4 Federal Ministry of Trade
and Investment (FMTI)
1 Abuja Face-to-face
interview
6 April 2016
R5, 6 Federal Ministry of Labour
and Productivity (FMLP)
2 Abuja Face-to-face pair
interview
4 April 2016
R7 One Stop Investment centre
(OSIC)
1 Abuja Face-to-face
interview
March
29,2016
R8, 9, 10 Nigerian Investment
Promotion Corporation
(NIPC)
3 Abuja Face-to-face
individual
interview
March
29,2016
R11, 12 National Information
Technology Development
Agency (NITDA)
2 Abuja Face-to-face
individual
interview
6 April 2016
R13, 14 Oﬃce of National content in
ICT (ONC)
2 Abuja Face-to-face
individual
interview
March 30 –
31, 2016
T1, T2, T3, T4 Trainee – 1000 Girls in ICT
Training programme
4 Remote Contact Skype interview 17 June–22
July 2016
R15 University of Lagos Student
Aﬀairs Oﬃcial
1 Lagos Face-to-face
interview
22 March
2016
S1, S2 Beneﬁciaries Huawei-
UNILAG Scholarship
2 Remote Contact Skype interview 16 June 2016
Huawei
R16, R17, R18 Ex-Employees 3 Remote contact Skype interview 2 August
2016 – 19
May 2017
Current employees
R19, R20 Engineer 2 Lagos Face-to-face
interview; Skype
interview
15 March
2016; 4
October
2016
R21 Manager 1 Lagos Face-to-face
interview
15 March
2016
R22 Training Centre Manager 1 Abuja Email
communication
10 May 2016
R23 Trainer 1 Abuja Face-to-face
individual
interview
7 April 2016
Total number of
interviewees
29
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As Huawei operates in a high technology sector that requires highly skilled
technical staﬀ, training is a high priority for the company to ensure that employees
are informed about new products, innovations, and processes. Interviewees reveal
that new graduate intakes at Huawei, Nigeria, undergo intensive training and
induction within the ﬁrst weeks of their employment as their knowledge base may
be considerably diﬀerent from that of engineering graduates in China. Experienced
hires are also provided ﬁrm-speciﬁc training to acquaint them with Huawei’s equip-
ment, machinery, and processes, which diﬀer from those of other telecom equipment
manufacturers such as Ericsson and Nokia. These ﬁndings are in line with existing
literature, which suggests that MNCs operating in complex technology sectors tend
to oﬀer more employee training as their operations are dependent on highly skilled
workers (Te Velde 2002)
Blomström and Kokko (2002) explained that MNC training beneﬁciaries often
include more than just their employees. This is evident in the case of Huawei. Both
the training centre manager (R22) and the trainer (R23) assert that Huawei’s training
facility in Abuja is a crucial training ground for employees of partner ﬁrms, telecoms
operators, clients, suppliers, Nigerian youths, and government employees. The trainings
range from ICT deployment, telecom equipment operation, management skills to
general ICT solutions. Documentary data show that in addition to establishing guide-
lines, procurement requirements and audits to ensure its suppliers are up to industry
standards and adhere to the electronic industry code of conduct, Huawei also holds
training conferences on quality for its partners and suppliers. For instance, the Nigeria
Supplier Quality Conference held at their headquarters in Lagos in 2014 was attended
by the core management teams of 106 supplier ﬁrms (Huawei 2014b). Part of Huawei’s
supplier development programmes, this conference saw ideas being shared on value
integrations, quality and service delivery enhancement to ensure a ‘win-win’ partner-
ship for the suppliers and Huawei (Huawei 2014b). Huawei’s move to train suppliers’
employees and customers is in line with research that shows that MNCs engage in
active supplier development programmes to improve their overall capabilities in the
value chain (Botelho and Pﬁster 2011).
Huawei has also implemented two major training programmes in partnership with
the Nigerian government: the 1000 Girls in ICT Training Programme and the
ICTFORCHANGE-Nigeria 2000 Youth ICT Training (see Table 3). Both programmes
focus on equipping Nigerian youths with crucial ICT and management skills that could
increase their chances of employment. The 1000 Girls in ICT Training Programme
commenced in 2013, with Huawei contributing US$ 1.3 million and the Nigerian
government contributing US$ 1 million. The programme was concluded in 2016.
Some of the participants undertook a two-month internship at Huawei, and some
were oﬀered employment at the company oﬃce in Nigeria. Recently, Huawei has
launched another training programme in collaboration with the Nigerian government:
ICTFORCHANGE-Nigeria 2000 Youth ICT Training. This programme is the outcome of
a memorandum of understanding signed between Huawei and the Nigerian govern-
ment in December 2015, to train 2,000 youths in Nigeria on ICT. The training
participants are to be selected by the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Communications
Technology (FMCT) and the Ministry of Labour via an online application process.
Huawei’s training initiatives have also extended to include Nigerian government
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oﬃcials. A training course was organized in China for Nigerian government oﬃcials in
September 2016 (see Table 3). Huawei actively promotes skill building and enhance-
ment via its training activities in Nigeria and is open to collaborating with the govern-
ment in order to contribute to social development.
Like most MNCs that contribute to educational development in their host countries,
Huawei too supports general education in Nigeria by awarding scholarships to out-
standing students in engineering and science-related streams at the University of Lagos.
Huawei also provides grants and equipment to the African University of Science and
Technology, Abuja (an aﬃliate of the Nelson Mandela Institute) (Huawei 2014c).
Table 4 presents an overview of Huawei’s contribution to general education in
Nigeria. Apart from the ﬁnancial relief that a scholarship aﬀords its beneﬁciaries, it
also motivates better performance among the students. A recipient of the Huawei-
UNILAG scholarship (S1) explains this in the following words: ‘Apart from the ﬁnancial
reward, psychologically it motivated me’.
Table 3. Overview of Huawei training programmes in Nigeria.
Training
Programme Short description # Participants Financed by Location Duration
1000 girls in
ICT
Training was on imparting
participants with technical ICT
skills and soft skills in order to
improve their employability in
the ICT sector. The programme
was carried out in stages. Initial
stage: ICT training – 2 days, 1000
trainees; Stage 2: HCDA (Huawei
certiﬁed Datacom associate)
training – 5 days, 200 trainees;
Stage 3: Internship – 2 months,
50 trainees; Final Stage: Further
training in China – 1 week, 20
trainees.
1000 girls Huawei,
Nigerian
government
Lagos, Abuja,
Shenzhen,
China
2013–2016
ICT for
Change
Training is targeted at developing
the skills of 2000 graduates from
engineering and ICT related
subjects in order to enhance
their employability. Huawei will
provide free training on
specialist ICT and telecoms areas
targeted for use in diﬀerent
sectors such as banking, power,
oil and gas, manufacturing,
information technology,
telecoms, and e-government.
2000 youths Huawei,
Nigerian
government
Lagos, Abuja 2016 –
ongoing
Government
oﬃcials’
training
A ‘train the trainer’ programme to
equip the participants with skills
necessary to carry out training
activities in their home country
and diﬀerent ministries. The
training focused on the use of IT
in the world and in governance,
socio-economic value of the
mobile industry, digital
economy, telecommunication
strategy, ICT trends and policies,
and cyber security approach and
strategy.
8 government
oﬃcials
Huawei China 15 days
(September
2016)
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Motives underlying huawei’s training initiatives
The degree of training that MNCs provide to their employees varies based on factors
such as the mode of entry, type of operations, local conditions, etc. (Blomstrom and
Kokko 2002). Huawei’s training activities in Nigeria have been shaped by the nature of
its operations, organizational strategy, the industrial sector it operates in, local labour
conditions, and national institutional structures. For example, Nigerian government
regulations such as the local content in ICT policy requires foreign MNCs such as
Huawei to provide training to their local employees. Huawei’s localization strategy also
prioritizes the employment and training of local workforce. Although Huawei’s training
activities (e.g. 1000 Girls in ICT Training Programme, ICTFORCHANGE – Nigeria 2000
Youth ICT Training) have been seen CSR initiatives and a move by the company to link
its products and services to the developmental needs of the host country, one must add
that these trainings also strengthen Huawei’s political capital and its brand value as a
socially responsible organization. This perception is useful for Huawei when dealing
with the local authorities. Corkin (2011) empirically conﬁrmed that large Chinese
companies engage in developmental programmes in host African countries to earn
useful political capital. This notion gains more credence in light of Huawei’s preference
for collaborating with the Nigerian government for implementing its CSR initiatives.
Doing so ensures that such contributions are not only visible to the local populace but
also to the administration. There is an economic argument for companies to carry out
CSR activities, especially if they are highly visible and more vulnerable to reputational
damage (Vogel 2005), as is the case with Chinese enterprises operating in Africa.
Additionally, Huawei’s actions in Nigeria align with the directives of the Chinese
government for its large multinationals operating in Africa: to contribute to develop-
ment of the host countries and promote the narrative of win-win partnerships and
development – a phrase that Beijing uses to characterize its engagement with Africa,
and Huawei uses frequently in its CSR reports. An important question that has been
Table 4. Overview of Huawei’s contribution to general education in Nigeria.
Form Institution Short description Duration
Scholarships
Memorandum of
Understanding on
joint innovation
University of Lagos (UNILAG) Huawei initiated the Huawei-UNILAG
scholarship in 2011. So far, 20
students have beneﬁtted.
Huawei continues to collaborate with
UNILAG on a number of projects
including a ‘Joint Open Innovation
Laboratory’ and an ‘Innovation and
Experience Centre’ set-up at the
university in 2016.
2011 and
2012
academic
sessions
2016
Scholarships and
Laboratory
equipment
donation
African University of Science and
technology, Abuja (Aﬃliate of
Nelson Mandela Institute)
Huawei signed a MOU in 2014 with the
Nelson Mandela Institute (NMI) to
provide ICT scholarships to the tune
of $30,000 to the African University
of Science and Technology, Abuja.
ICT products and equipment worth
$50,000 were donated to the
university to aid in building the
university’s telecoms research
laboratory (Huawei 2014b).
2014
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raised is the skill transfer eﬀect of these training activities and their impact on the
employability of the beneﬁciaries (Tsui 2016). These questions are addressed in the
subsequent paragraphs.
Eﬀects of training activities on skill and knowledge transfer
Huawei has made signiﬁcant investments in its training and skill-building activities
in Nigeria. Both current and ex-employees (R16, 17, 18, 19, 20) cite the training
opportunities oﬀered by the company as one of the reasons for joining the Chinese
MNC. They add that the training and experience received at Huawei have enabled
them move to higher positions with higher pay and beneﬁts in other telecom
companies. A former employee of Huawei (R16), who worked for six years as a
wireless 2G, 3G engineer at their head oﬃce in Lagos and left to join another mobile
telecom infrastructure company explains, ‘My experience with Huawei has been so
beneﬁcial knowledge wise, working with Huawei gave me a holistic knowledge of
telecom. . .an edge at my current job’. R17 and R18 also made similar observations.
R17 currently works as a consultant engineer and a subject matter expert on
Huawei/ZTE radio equipment at a competing MNC within the telecom sector.
R18 currently works at a foreign MNC in Nigeria. Both consider the experience
and skills gained at Huawei as vital for securing their current jobs and performing
their current duties. These responses support previous ﬁndings (Mohan and
Lampert 2013; Lampert and Mohan 2016) that the presence of Chinese telecommu-
nication companies has enabled Nigerian employees to further their careers in other
organizations.
The trainings oﬀered by Huawei in partnership with the Nigerian government
helped unemployed or otherwise un-engaged youths occupy their time gainfully.
Findings from the 1000 Girls in ICT Training Programme revealed that the programme
overlapped with a ﬁve-month-long strike called by Academic Staﬀ Union of
Universities in July 2013. Thus, the programme oﬀered the participants, especially
those studying in State universities in Nigeria, an opportunity to be engaged when
the national universities were closed. One trainee (T1) says, ‘The university was on strike
[. . .] I just saw free 2-day training programme, after applying I didn’t really know what it
was going to be about, but I knew it was a free training and a chance for me to just leave
the house and learn something’. According to the trainees (T1, 2, 3, 4), the training
aﬀorded them an opportunity to acquire new skills as they had no prior computer
engineering/ICT training experience. T3 says, ‘The training was impactful, the soft skills
training is something one will use everywhere and the technical skills helped me to learn
about the telecoms sector’. Commenting on the 2-month internship experience at
Huawei, T3 who was assigned to work on a power project involving Huawei and
other companies says, ‘The experience was worth it. I got to work with other big
companies (multinational companies) on this project [. . .] I learnt a lot working with
them’. Huawei’s second youth training programme ICTFORCHANGE is designed to
ensure that participants have the relevant industry-speciﬁc skills and certiﬁcations to
gain employment in various sectors of the economy. While the goal is promising, its
execution and long-term eﬀects on the skills and employability of the participants
remain to be seen.
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Eﬀects of training activities on employability of trainees
Outside of its training activities for employees, partners, suppliers, and customers,
Huawei’s training initiatives have had limited impact on the employability of its
trainees. For example, from the 1000 Girls in ICT Training Programme, only ﬁve
currently work at Huawei on a contract basis. One of the participants (T1) who
interned at Huawei says the following of her overall experience: ‘I commend what the
federal government and Huawei is doing, and they are doing it well, however I have my
reservations. The aim of the training was to get 1000 girls into ICT [. . .] I don’t think they
achieved it in any way’. She adds, ‘Even the 50 people that did the internship, after the
internship, we were just asked to leave, no follow up, nothing at all, they didn’t achieve
their aim. Huawei retained very few, less than 10 out of 1000 trainees’. T2, 3, and 4
echoed her sentiments about the disappointing overall outcome of the programme. A
trainee (T2) currently working on an outsourced/contract basis with Huawei reﬂects on
her experience:
‘In terms of learning, the experience in China was great [. . .] the only thing that was a
disappointment is about the employment. We were thinking since we went through training,
the internship, travelled to China to undergo further training maybe we had the chance of
being retained as direct permanent staﬀ of Huawei’.
T2 still worked in the department that she joined as an intern; however, the decision
to let her continue in the same department was made her supervisor to save time and
money on recruiting a new staﬀ member as opposed to a pre-planned outcome of the
training programme. Reﬂecting on the eﬀects of the training on her present and future
employability T3 says, ‘Well, I’m not sure as I am still unemployed but I think it will be,
as I included everything (acquired skills, experience and certiﬁcation), on my CV’. The
programme lacks a concrete post-training outcome, which should have been planned by
Huawei and the Nigerian FMCT. Further, the training programme was not evaluated in
terms of its ability to equip the participants with crucial skills and provide them
employment opportunities in the sector. This is a major drawback because the partici-
pants of the programme were from diﬀerent academic disciplines; therefore, many
possibly required intensive training to compensate for their lack of specialization in
telecom and related ICT ﬁelds. The impact of such training programmes can be
maximized with better coordination between Huawei and the Nigerian government.
Nevertheless, the training did provide participants with skills and insights into the
telecom industry that they might otherwise not have gained.
Addressing questions on the intended impact of their training programmes, a
Huawei manager (R21) says the following about the ICTFORCHANGE-Nigeria 2000
Youth ICT Training: ‘We do not want to just make some noise. We really want to give
them training and skills to enable them to ﬁnd a good job in the ICT industry. Of course,
Huawei also would provide some employment opportunities for them and also give
recommendations for those people’. Though the real motives behind the various projects
of the Chinese government and Chinese companies in Africa have been questioned,
interview data suggests that Huawei intends for their training programmes and activ-
ities in Nigeria to have real beneﬁts for the local populace.
While Huawei has contributed to the skill development and knowledge transfer via
its training activities in Nigeria, ﬁndings suggest that the Nigerian government has also
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taken proactive steps to leverage the foreign investments in the telecom sector for HCD.
The subsequent paragraphs speciﬁcally focus on the local content policy of the Nigerian
government owing to its signiﬁcance for the telecom sector.
The role of government policy
The role of host government policies in human capital formation has been emphasized in
various studies. In a bid to channel FDI towards HCD and strengthen the local capacity in
the ICT sector, the Nigerian government introduced the local content policy. The National
Information Technology Development Agency, an agency under the FMCT, set-up the
Oﬃce for National Content (ONC) to ensure implementation of the ICT guidelines. One of
the guidelines in the policy addresses HCD in the ICT sector. It speciﬁcally calls on foreign
multinationals to provide a local content plan to the ONC, detailing their vision for ‘job
creation, recruitment of local engineers, human capital development and value creation for
the local ecosystem’ (ONC, 2013:19). The policy is similar to the local content policy
introduced and implemented in Nigeria’s oil sector, which has been eﬀective not only in
enhancing local participation but also in creating and deepening linkages between multi-
national companies and local companies in the sector (Mohan 2016). The reasons for
introducing such a policy in the ICT sector mirror those in the oil sector – to drive local
participation and enhance human capital. A manager at the ONC (R14) responsible for
overseeing the implementation of the policy says the following:
‘It was clear that there was a capacity challenge in local content participation in ICT [. . .]
This is not simply because Nigeria wishes to capture value but because ICT cuts across and
permeates every other aspect of development so there is no alternative but to grow indigenous
capacity. So it’s not so much as for import substitution or to reduce the stake of foreigners in
the Nigerian market but necessarily to create the skills that are needed for Nigeria’s
development locally. So that’s the background of why local content’.
Although concerns as to whether the policy may act as a barrier to foreign investors
have been raised, they are currently manageable. R14 explains how while the policy is
being viewed as hostile to the operations of MNCs, they are aimed at creating solutions
to work together:
‘[. . .] we are aware that foreign multinationals come with critical skills, global templates, and a
rich repertoire of knowledge and executed projects to drive skills development locally. What the
programme does is create nodes and avenues for collaboration so that certain aspects as it
concerns public procurement will have to be done or sourced in partnership with Nigerian
companies strategically to transfer knowledge or to train or equip[. . .]’.
While theONC is still in the initial stages of implementing and ensuring compliance to the
local content guidelines, they have started receiving development plans from various multi-
national companies operating in the sector. A manager at Huawei explicitly stated during the
interview that they do not view the policy as disruptive or a threat to their operations in
Nigeria as they have pursued aworkforce localization strategy and are workingwith operators
to develop software with more local content in their R&D centre in Lagos.
It may be premature to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the policy as it is still in the early
implementation phase; however, the policy appears to be a step in the right direction as it
has the potential to enhance local capacity and drive innovation and local participation in
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the sector. The FMCT and ONC’s ability to work together with foreign MNCs and other
stakeholders in the sector would in part determine the success of the policy.
Conclusions
Against the backdrop of enduring negative perceptions about the labour practices of
Chinese enterprises in Africa, this study analysed the skill-building contributions of
Chinese investments in Africa’s telecom sector, using the case study of Huawei in
Nigeria. Despite the growing literature on Sino-Africa relations, few studies explore how
the engagement has enhanced or constrained HCD in Africa, particularly in Nigeria. This
article bridges this gap. It builds on previous research that justiﬁes government involvement
in ensuring that FDI is steered towards development in the host country.
Several key ﬁndings emerge from this study. Firstly, the Chinese telecom ﬁrm Huawei
has contributed to skill building through its numerous training programmes and activities
in Nigeria. These mainly comprise training activities targeted towards its local employees
and the employees of its suppliers, clients, and customers. Secondly, Huawei, in partnership
with the Nigerian government, has contributed to the skill development of the Nigerian
youth through two public training programmes intended to equip participants with ICT
skills, engage them in the telecom sector, and provide them job opportunities in the sector.
Thirdly, Huawei has contributed to general education in Nigeria by oﬀering scholarships
and grants and donating equipment to tertiary institutions. The results from this study
support the notion that MNCs via training and skill-building activities play a signiﬁcant
role in HCD in their host countries. Additionally, these ﬁndings support the argument
while Chinese engagement in Africa oﬀers opportunities for HCD, government policy, and
strategy play a key role in reaching these opportunities to the respective African countries
(e.g. Odoom 2015; Sautmann and Yan 2015; Chen et al. 2016; Agbebi et al. 2017).
Findings indicate that Huawei’s contributions to HCD are guided by strategic
objectives as well as the desire to generate positive awareness among the public and
other stakeholders, gain political capital with the Nigerian government and industry
stakeholders, and further promote the narrative of win-win development. Its contribu-
tions are also shaped by government regulations and policy within the telecom industry
albeit not to a signiﬁcant extent. These ﬁndings supports the notion that though MNCs
do not have an altruistic motive, there are strong economic arguments for MNCs
contributing to the development of their host countries.
Though Huawei has collaborated with the Nigerian government on a number of
training programmes, deepening these partnerships may help the organization ensure
that its contributions are sustainable and have a tangible long-term impact on HCD in
Nigeria’s telecom sector. This case highlights how some MNCs are willing to collaborate
closely with the host government to implement training and other CSR activities. This
partnership is worth investigating further as it could potentially shed more light on the
interactions between MNCs and the host governments and their eﬀects on HCD.
Additionally, these ﬁndings reveal that the Nigerian government is keen to leverage the
engagement of multinational companies to develop the economy, particularly to enhance
local capacity and technology transfer. The government recognizes that the ICT sector is a
viable alternative to natural resources such as crude oil in terms of revenue and employment
generation. As a result, it has introduced policy actions and initiatives, such as the local
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content policy, to leverage foreign engagement in the sector. While it is still too early to
estimate the eﬀectiveness of the local content policy in ICT, it is a step in the right direction. It
is imperative that the Nigerian government continues to collaborate with foreign MNCs in
the ICT sector to direct the beneﬁts of their investments towards the development of the
sector. Future studies on the eﬀects of the local content policy can contribute to the literature
on how host country policies aﬀect human capital formation. In addition, future research
could utilize the K4D (Knowledge for Development) framework to study how African
governments leverage knowledge for economic growth and development.
Furthermore, as ICT infrastructure improves and foreign ﬁrm participation
increases, so will the demand for highly skilled labour. While attracting foreign invest-
ments is not a challenge, for Nigeria to truly become a knowledge economy and be at
the forefront of technology production in Africa, the government should intensify skill-
development eﬀorts in the sector. By encouraging partnerships between foreign ﬁrms
such as Huawei and ICT-focused tertiary institutions and universities, the government
can help increase the number of qualiﬁed graduates that are absorbed into the sector’s
workforce. Further, the government can leverage the expertise of foreign MNCs for
HCD in Nigeria by encouraging more public-private partnerships in training initiatives.
Furthermore, on one hand, host country policies are said to inﬂuence the activities of
MNCs, on the other hand, MNC operations could also have an eﬀect on local labour
policies (Wood et al. 2014). By collaborating with governments, MNCs can help address
systemic constraints to human development impact in the workplace. While this study
stopped short on researching this issue, future research could do so, by investigating the
broader eﬀects of Chinese MNCs on labour policies in Africa, for instance the ILO
decent work indicators (See ILO 2013) can be used to assess if Chinese MNCs play a
role in upgrading labour policies in Africa or otherwise.
As highlighted earlier in the paper, the institutional framework for HCD in Nigeria is
weak, characterised by ineﬃcient institutions, subpar investments in education and training,
and a lack of a coherent and eﬀective education policy and a comprehensive HCD strategy.
Thus, making interventions by international institutions such as the World Bank, the UN,
and the participation of the private sector in education and training crucial. The evidence in
this article highlights the role of MNCs in supporting HCD and capacity building in Nigeria.
As this case shows that the support has targeted a range of projects focused on general
education, ICT skills training, workplace training, and capacity building.
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Abstract
This article uses a case-study approach to discuss the effects of Chinese economic engagement on three 
dimensions of human capital development: local employment, training and skill building, and knowledge 
and technology transfer. The study findings suggests that Chinese economic engagement can and does 
contribute to human capital development in Africa; however, this is dependent on certain sectoral factors 
and contextual conditions. This study advances a working hypothesis that the human capital development 
impact of Chinese economic engagement will vary across countries and sectors of the African economy. 
This working hypothesis seeks to guide further research towards developing a theoretical framework for the 
study of Chinese economic engagement in Africa and its effects on human capital development. The article 
also identifies research areas that should be further explored in order to gain a deeper understanding of the 
impact of Chinese economic engagement in Africa.
Keywords
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Introduction
China’s engagement in Africa is most visibly concentrated in the areas of trade, investment, and 
aid. Africa in the past decade has witnessed an influx of Chinese investments in various sectors of 
its economy. On the one hand, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in Africa continues 
to grow at a steady rate, as at the end of 2016, total Chinese FDI stock in Africa stood at US$40 
Billion, showing an increase of US$6 Billion from the previous year’s volume of US$34 Billion 
(Atkins et al., 2017; China Africa Research Initiative (CARI), 2018). On the other hand, there has 
been a slight decline in FDI flows from China to Africa. Annual FDI flows for 2016 was US$2.4 
Billion, a decrease from 2013 volumes of US$3.4 Billion (CARI, 2018). The decline has been 
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attributed to the slump in the value of commodities globally as well as China’s domestic economic 
slowdown (Atkins et al., 2017).
Chinese investments in Africa are increasingly diverse in terms of investment locations and sec-
tor. While resource-rich African countries tend to attract more Chinese investments, this in itself is 
not peculiar, as this is generally the case with Western investments in Africa (Chen et al., 2015). 
Having said that, the presence of natural resources is not the single determinant factor attracting 
Chinese investments. As Chen et al. (2015) finds in their study on Chinese FDI in Africa, the size 
of the domestic market and the abundance of labour, amongst other country factor endowments, 
also influences the location decisions of Chinese investments. This is evident in Chinese invest-
ments in non-resource–rich countries like Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Similarly, sec-
tor-wise, Chinese investments are not limited to the natural resources sector; in fact, the services 
sector, and, increasingly, the manufacturing sectors, attract more Chinese investments (Chen et al., 
2015).
One of the sectors with increasingly visible Chinese presence is the telecommunications sector. 
Chinese telecommunications companies have made significant inroads into the telecom sector in 
Africa. The presence of Chinese telecom giants such as Huawei and Zhongxing Telecommunications 
Equipment (ZTE) in Africa is closely tied to China’s ‘going out’ strategy, launched in 1999, the 
objective of which is to encourage Chinese enterprises to invest abroad, raising their profile and 
competitiveness in the global market (Gagliardone and Geall, 2014). The launch of the going-out 
strategy coincided with the wave of liberalisation of the telecom industry in most African coun-
tries. This created the perfect opportunity for Chinese telecom firms to invest in Africa’s telecom 
sector and for African countries to raise much needed private capital to build and upgrade their 
telecom infrastructures and transform their telecom industries.
The Chinese government contributes to financing (via loans, export credits) and supplying tel-
ecom and information communication technology (ICT) infrastructure and equipment in Africa 
through its telecom companies, most notably Huawei and ZTE (Gagliardone and Geall, 2014). For 
example, in 2006 through a Chinese export-import bank loan of US$1.9 Billion and a subsequent 
US$1.6 Billion, the Ethiopian government contracted ZTE and Huawei to overhaul their telecom-
munications systems and expand mobile phone services, and internet connectivity, respectively. 
Similar examples are visible in countries like Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Tanzania, etc. (see 
Gagliardone and Geall, 2014). Although the foray of Chinese telecom companies into African 
markets has not been devoid of competition from Western counterparts such as Ericsson, Nokia, 
Siemens, etc., a combination of competitive pricing coupled with end-to-end service provision has 
seen Chinese telecom giants, particularly Huawei, dominate the African telecom market and get 
ahead of their Western counterparts. Chinese investments in this sector contributed to a significant 
upgrade to infrastructures and increased access to mobile and internet connectivity, thus bridging 
the digital divide.
Despite the positive effects such investments could have on the African economy, the influx of 
Chinese enterprises has been welcomed on the one hand and criticised heavily on the other. African 
governments are keen on attracting Chinese investments into their respective countries with a view 
to creating jobs, providing training to locals, contributing to infrastructural development, and fos-
tering knowledge and technology transfer. Thus, these investments can contribute to socio- 
economic development in their respective host countries. However, Chinese economic engage-
ment in Africa has also triggered debates about its consequences on Africa’s development. In fact, 
its effects on human capital development (HCD) have been among the most contentious topics in 
relation to Chinese investments in Africa (King, 2013). Claims that Chinese companies import 
workers from China, rarely employ locals and offer little or no training to the ones employed, and 
subject workers to poor working conditions continue to dominate the China–Africa discourse. 
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Research that investigates these claims is essential for a better understanding of Chinese economic 
engagement in Africa and its implications on HCD.
Although Chinese economic engagement in Africa is not without its challenges, it is logical to 
argue that the engagement could potentially contribute positively to HCD, particularly in sectors 
such as telecommunications and labour-intensive manufacturing. In other words, we argue that 
Chinese economic engagement presents opportunities for HCD in Africa; however, these opportu-
nities may vary from sector to sector as well as from country to country. In investigating HCD 
opportunities presented by Chinese engagement, this paper specifically analyses how Chinese 
enterprises contribute to HCD dimensions such as local employment, training and skill building, 
and knowledge and technology transfer.
While a large number of existing studies on Sino-Africa engagement have focused on the 
nature of the relationship and the larger economic and political implications of the engagement, 
few studies have addressed HCD-related issues of Chinese economic engagement in Africa (see 
Table 1 for a summary of extant literature that addresses HCD-related issues of Chinese economic 
engagement in Africa). These existing studies discuss HCD dimensions within other wider issues 
such as trade unionisation and labour conditions (Baach and Jauch, 2009), Chinese aid in Africa, 
industrialisation (Brautigam, 2009), social and cultural dimensions of Chinese investments in 
Africa (Liu, 2009), etc. – thus, offering only a glimpse of the HCD issues within the context of 
wider topic areas but not an in-depth look into the HCD dimensions of Chinese economic engage-
ment in itself. Also lacking in these studies is a theoretical basis to analyse and understand the 
findings as related to HCD. This lack of theoretical understanding leaves much room for interpre-
tation of the findings related to HCD. These theoretical considerations are important, as they help 
us to understand, explain and reconcile the existing inconclusive evidence on the effects of 
Chinese economic engagement on HCD in Africa. This paper fills this gap by offering an in-depth 
view into the workings of a Chinese enterprise, examining its intricacies from an HCD perspec-
tive and giving theory-driven rationalisations of the findings. Additionally, this paper offers not 
just a general narrative of China in Africa, but a concrete view of HCD in the context of Chinese 
multinational enterprises in Africa. Furthermore, some other studies have focused solely on indi-
vidual HCD issues, such as employment effects of Chinese economic engagement (Tang, 2010; 
Sautmann and Hairong, 2015), knowledge transfer (Calabrese, 2017), and education and training 
(King, 2010, 2013), but there has been no research, to  my knowledge, examining the totality of 
these HCD dimensions in one study. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the HCD dimen-
sions of employment, training and skills building, and knowledge and technology transfer, thus 
presenting a full picture of the human-resource–development dimensions of Chinese enterprises 
in Africa as represented in this case. The study concludes by discussing the research and practical 
implications of Chinese economic engagement for HCD in Africa, particularly the role of multi-
national corporations (MNCs) in human capital formation.
The paper is organised as follows: the first section summarises existing literature on the effects 
of MNCs on human capital formation in host countries. The second section explains the methodol-
ogy and data collection process. The third section presents the findings, which are followed by a 
discussion of the practical and research implications of the engagement for HCD in Africa.
Analytical framework: effect of MNCs on human capital formation 
in host countries
Apart from serving as a source of capital for growth in developing countries, FDI, in the form of 
MNC operations, can facilitate HCD through interactions with the host country’s labour market 
(Majeed and Ahmad, 2008; Slaughter, 2002). This section summarises existing literature on the 
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Table 1. Current literature on Chinese engagement in Africa that addresses HCD issues.
Author Focus area Summary
King (2010)
King (2013)
China’s soft power in 
Africa; China’s HRD 
cooperation with Africa
Discusses China’s HRD cooperation with Africa and 
the human resources dimensions of Chinese business 
in Africa, giving a snapshot of how skills development 
and technology transfer are situated within different 
business settings of China in Africa.
Baah and Jauch 
(2009)
Chinese engagement 
with Africa – labour 
prospective
Examines Chinese firms’ labour practices against 
ILO’s decent work standards, unionisation, working 
conditions, and wages in Chinese enterprises in Africa
Monson (2008, 
2009)
Chinese development 
assistance to Africa 
(TAZARA Railway 
Project): impact on skills 
and technology transfer
Presents an account of labour relations between 
Chinese and Africans on the TAZARA Railway 
Project, noting an exposure of African workers to 
Chinese work ethics and new skills and technology.
Brautigam (2009) China’s engagement with 
Africa, Chinese aid in 
Africa – implications for 
development.
Dispels myths of labour practices of Chinese 
enterprises in Africa. Presents accounts of vocational 
training within China’s aid-financed construction 
in African countries, and short-term training of 
Africans under the FOCAC agreements. Notes the 
involvement of private firms in setting up training 
institutes in African countries and capacity building in 
manufacturing sectors in Eastern Nigeria.
Liu (2009) Socio-cultural 
dimensions of Chinese 
investments in Africa
Analyses interactions between Chinese companies and 
African labour through a cultural lens.
Tang (2010) Employment, workforce 
localisation and labour 
relations in Chinese 
enterprises in Africa
Examines the impact of Chinese enterprises on local 
employment in Angola and DRC Congo, and the 
factors affecting workforce localisation of Chinese 
enterprises in those countries.
Corkin (2012) Chinese companies 
linkages in Angola
Examines Chinese construction companies in Angola 
from a local-linkages perspective. The study further 
examines skills and labour relations within the context 
of Chinese construction companies in Angola.
Shen (2013) Chinese private 
investments in Africa
Examines private Chinese investments in Africa, 
and considers the policy implications for labour and 
migration issues.
Sautmann and 
Hairong (2015)
Employment, workforce 
localisation in Chinese 
enterprises in Africa
Based on a study of over 400 Chinese enterprises and 
projects in Africa, the authors examine workforce 
localisation of Chinese enterprises in Africa, 
concluding that workforce localisation is already well 
developed in Chinese enterprises in Africa. Discusses 
the implications for employment and labour standards 
in Africa.
DRC Congo: Democratic Republic of the Congo; FOCAC: Forum on China–Africa Cooperation; HCD: human capital 
development; HRD: human resource development; ILO: International Labour Organisation; TAZARA Railway Project: 
Tanzania–Zambia Railway Authority.
relationships among FDI, human capital formation, and education in developing countries, particu-
larly at a time when developing countries have adopted an increasingly favourable view towards 
FDI and MNCs. Studies from an international business perspective on human capital and MNCs 
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are also reviewed. Drawing on these studies, this paper focuses on three dimensions through which 
foreign MNCs can facilitate HCD: local employment, training and skill building, and knowledge 
and technology transfer.
Local employment
In countries characterised by relatively scarce capital and abundant labour, the employment crea-
tion effects of foreign MNCs are particularly important (Brancu and Bibu, 2014). Foreign MNCs 
contribute to job creation through direct employment of locals, and indirectly through the creation 
of a local supply chain, which ultimately contributes to the job creation process (Peng, 2014). In 
fact, studies suggest that MNC contribution to indirect employment is typically more significant 
– it may even outweigh that of direct employment (Lall, 2000; Miranda, 1994). Crucial to realising 
indirect employment creation is the presence of substantial linkages between MNCs and local 
firms. By promoting both forward and backward linkages with local companies and industries, 
where foreign MNCs subcontract to local companies, host countries can boost economic activity 
and thus job creation.
The job creation effects of foreign MNCs is one of the reasons that countries seek to attract 
inward FDI. FDI impact on local employment creation may be more positive when it is a greenfield 
investment, as the MNC creates new jobs (Brancu and Bibu, 2014). Not only do they create jobs, 
they also often pay higher wages than domestic firms, particularly in developing countries (Aitken 
et al., 1996). Fosfuri et al. (2001) posit that MNCs use higher wages to attract and retain talent and 
prevent high labour turnover, which could potentially lead to knowledge spillovers that benefit 
local competitors. Further, MNCs tend to offer more training than their domestic counterparts 
(Abdullah, 1994; McKendrick et al., 2000; Ritchie, 2002; Tan and Batra, 1995), particularly in 
industries that require higher levels of skills and technology, thus giving employees more opportu-
nities for skill and knowledge acquisition and upgrade. Thus, a large Chinese MNC operating in a 
high-tech sector in Africa, particularly as a greenfield investment, can not only generate jobs but 
also deliver better training opportunities and higher wages than domestic firms. Accordingly, to 
investigate the employment effects of Chinese economic engagement in Africa, this study exam-
ines both direct job creation and possible indirect employment.
Training and skill building
According to Tan and Batra (1995), enterprises are an integral means of skill development, as they 
provide the largest share of training in most countries, and the training supplied matches the labour 
market demands. O’Donnell and Blumentritt (1999: 196) note that training is a mechanism for 
‘transferring product and process technology and for building the technical and managerial skills 
of the subsidiary’s local workforce’. Apart from their employees, MNCs also train the employees 
of their customers, subcontractors and suppliers (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2002). Trainings can be 
formal or informal and can be delivered on the job, in classrooms or via seminars, formal school-
ing, international training courses, education, etc. The training effects of MNCs are particularly 
crucial for developing countries, characterised by relatively weak public education systems that 
result in an equally weak knowledge base (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2002).
Evidence suggests that MNCs carry out more training than local private firms do (Te Velde, 
2002), although the type and duration vary depending on the mode of entry, the industry, size and 
time horizon of the investment, type of operations, motivation for the investment, and local condi-
tions (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2002). For example, MNCs in service sectors focus on strengthening 
the skills and expertise of their employees (Blunch and Castro, 2005). MNCs in high-technology 
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industries or those requiring an educated workforce tend to provide more employee training (Tan 
and Batra, 1995; Te Velde, 2002). Some MNCs also contribute to general education and training in 
their host countries through grants, scholarships, voluntary assistance at different levels of educa-
tion, and setting up of public education centres (Te Velde, 2002). This is often done as part of the 
MNCs’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiative in the host country or projects to develop 
skills and knowledge. For example, Te Velde (2002) notes that as a part of its CSR in Nigeria, Shell 
increased its investments in community development by providing secondary and tertiary scholar-
ships as well as vocational training to locals from the communities it operates in.
Given the training effects of large MNCs, particularly those operating in high-tech sectors, the 
potential for Chinese enterprises operating in this sector to contribute to skill development via 
training in Nigeria is quite high. In relation to training and skill building, this paper investigates the 
contributions of Chinese enterprises particularly to Africa’s formal and informal training as well as 
to general education.
Knowledge and technology transfer
Spillovers of knowledge, technological expertise, and management are not only benefits of inward 
FDI (Slaughter, 2002); they are also the primary expectations of host countries from MNCs. MNCs 
are regarded as catalysts of technology transfer from developed to developing countries (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2010). However, such diffusion of 
technologies is rarely a planned objective of the MNCs; instead it occurs through external effects 
or spillovers (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2002). Technology transfer to host countries can occur 
through employee training and knowledge transmission that helps local suppliers improve the 
efficiency and quality of their supplies (Saggi, 2004). According to Botelho and Pfister (2011: 
211), business linkages between ‘MNCs and SMEs [small and medium enterprises] can allow 
small local producers to benefit from an exchange of relevant information and technical knowl-
edge, promote production efficiency, production growth and market diversification, among other 
benefits’. Knowledge and technology transfer can occur through vertical or horizontal spillovers 
(Blyde et al., 2005).
Knowledge and technology transfer via horizontal spillovers. ‘Horizontal spillovers’ are intra-
industry spillovers between firms in similar stages of the production process. They typically involve 
transfer of sector-specific knowledge that would benefit the foreign firm’s local competitors. One of 
the common mechanisms of knowledge diffusion from MNCs to local firms is via labour turnover/
mobility (Glass and Saggi, 2002). According to Slaughter (2002: 13), ‘if at least some of the knowl-
edge particular to foreign affiliates is embodied in their labour force, then as affiliate employees 
leave to work for domestic firms this knowledge may move as well’. MNCs often provide their 
employees with regular training on the job to help them keep up with the latest technology and 
industry advancements. When these employees leave the MNC, the knowledge and skills acquired 
may spill-over to local firms that they may join or to the firms they may start (Kokko, 1994).
Labour turnover is more common and perceived more favourably in some sectors, such as high-
tech, than in others. Highlighting the peculiarities of the high-tech industry, Shankar and Ghosh 
(2013) assert that ‘the first distinguishing feature is the persistence of substantial employee turno-
ver’. They add that labour turnover is particularly high among high-ability workers than less pro-
ductive employees. Another distinguishable feature of labour turnover in high-tech industries is 
that it is perceived as a positive development; thus, no stigma is attached to it, unlike in traditional 
labour markets. This supports the notion that labour turnover and the consequent transfer of techni-
cal knowledge and skills has played a role in the success of many high-tech companies (Shankar 
and Ghosh, 2013). Given the high turnover rate experienced in the high-tech sector and the 
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subsequent knowledge spillovers, one might posit foreign MNCs operating in a high-tech sector 
may likely experience knowledge transfer via labour turnover. This study aims to determine if 
there has indeed been a flow of knowledge via labour turnover through the operations of Chinese 
enterprises in Nigeria.
Knowledge and technology transfer via vertical spillovers. ‘Vertical spillovers’ are inter-indus-
try spillovers between firms in customer–supplier relationships. They are likely to involve the 
transfer of general knowledge, instead of sector-specific knowledge, which would benefit the sup-
pliers or customers of foreign firms. Research has found that technology transfer often occurs 
through linkages between MNCs and local suppliers (Batra and Tan, 2002). Close linkages between 
the two create an environment where the local suppliers and customers can assimilate some tech-
nology and skills from the MNC (Porter, 1980).
According to Botelho and Pfister (2011), ‘business links between MNCs and small and medium-
sized enterprises can allow small local producers to benefit from an exchange of relevant information 
and technical knowledge, promote production efficiency, production growth and market diversifica-
tion, among other benefits’. Informally, local firms learn from MNCs via trade shows, marketing, 
supplier/distributor discussions and training, and exposure to MNCs’ products, technical support and 
reverse engineering (Slaughter, 2002). In their study based in Thailand, Wisarn and Bunluasak (1995) 
found that local supplier firms acquired a basic knowledge of product, quality control, and process 
technology through their interactions with MNCs. Thus, substantial linkages between MNCs and the 
local industry may serve as an avenue for knowledge transfer and technology diffusion.
Thus, to the extent that Chinese enterprises have an active network of local partners, suppliers 
and clients, opportunities for knowledge spillovers are likely. This paper aims to explore the link-
ages between Chinese firms and local firms in Nigeria, and how these linkages have enabled the 
flow of knowledge and technology to the local industry.
Methodology
A case-study approach was selected for this study because case studies allow for knowledge build-
ing through in-depth observation of a phenomenon, within a contextually rich environment (Schell, 
1992). In this paper, the case study provides a deeper understanding of the processes and channels 
by which MNCs contribute to HCD in host countries and, in particular, how one Chinese MNC 
contributes to HCD in Africa.
The studied MNC, Huawei Technologies Ltd., is the leading telecom equipment manufacturer 
in the world and the leading Chinese MNC operating in Africa’s telecom industry. Huawei was 
selected because of the nature of its business and the position and extent of its operations in Africa. 
Huawei began operating in Africa in 1998 as a complete solutions provider starting with Kenya; 
today it has offices in 13 African countries, and a presence established in most of the 54 African 
states. Huawei has been highly successful in Africa, building a reputation of being a ‘preferred low 
cost yet high quality mobile network builder’ (Chang et al., 2009). Huawei has dominated the 
African market with a combination of superior pricing, customer service and brand awareness 
strategy (Chang et al., 2009). The company is the market leader in terms of market share, ahead of 
popular brands such as Ericsson, Nokia, and its Chinese counterpart, ZTE. Huawei has embedded 
itself in the largest telecom market in the world in diverse ways such as building and managing 
telecom backbone infrastructures, managing telecom networks, offering solutions to network oper-
ators and businesses, and selling products such as mobile phones and tablets to consumers. Huawei 
uses its business in Africa as a training ground to become a global brand, using three channels of 
Policy, Local Investment, and Marketing (Chang et al., 2009). It prides itself on its ability to lever-
age its products and resources to connect with development policy in Africa.
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Its operations in Nigeria are particularly significant, because Nigeria represents the largest 
telecom market in Africa. The telecommunication sector has increasingly become a significant 
sector for its economy. This is particularly true following the government’s plan to diversify the 
economy, with the sector as of Q1 2018 contributing up to 9.19% to the nation’s gross domestic 
product (Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC), 2018). The presence of heavyweight 
global telecom equipment companies such as Huawei, Ericsson, Siemens, and ZTE in Nigeria 
has been pivotal to the transformation of the Nigerian telecom industry, leading to much-needed 
upgrades to infrastructures, increased capacity, accessibility, and coverage. Huawei entered the 
Nigerian market in 1999, establishing its West African headquarters in Lagos. Since entering 
the Nigerian market, Huawei has played a critical role in upgrading the country’s ICT infra-
structure. It has become the leading telecom network equipment provider in terms of market 
share, and the firm has worked with various network providers, the Nigerian government, and 
other stakeholders in the sector to upgrade the country’s ICT infrastructure.
The telecom industry was selected because this sector has seen a substantial flow of Chinese 
investments. Further, the telecom industry is a knowledge-intensive high-tech sector and one that 
is seldom studied in relation to Chinese economic engagement in Africa and its implications for 
HCD. This case study can potentially offer insights into other MNCs in the ICT industry from 
emerging economies operating in developing countries.
The findings in this study rely mainly on interview data and on-site observations carried out by 
the author from March to April 2016 at Huawei’s offices in Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria. Twenty-nine 
semi-structured interviews were conducted. Participants were selected using purposive sampling 
and the snowball technique. This ensures that individuals with an important perspective on the 
topic being studied were selected (Mason, 2002; Robinson, 2014). Details of the interviewed par-
ticipants are presented in Table 2. The interviews explored Huawei’s contributions to HCD in 
Nigeria via the dimensions of local employment, training and skill building, and knowledge and 
technology transfer. The questions also addressed the policy measures and actions of the Nigerian 
government in leveraging FDI for HCD in the telecom sector.
Transcripts from the interviews were manually coded and analysed in line with the theory-
driven conceptual framework presented earlier. The interview transcripts were also thoroughly 
examined to gain useful insights into the three HCD dimensions. Excerpts from the interviews 
have been used to shed light on these key concepts and how they manifest in this case. 
Interview data were supplemented by other documents such as company reports, press releases, 
training reports, and policy documents. The supplementary documents were sourced from 
Huawei’s extensive website and its in-house magazine called ‘Huawei People’, all available in 
English. Further, policy documents and industry data were sourced from a government agency 
in Nigeria, namely the Office for Nigerian Content Development (ONC). The document 
review focused on retrieving critical information about government policies on HCD in the 
ICT sector (e.g., local content in ICT policy documents) and Huawei’s training programmes 
and CSR initiatives. These documents were also used to supplement and triangulate data 
obtained from the interviews.
Findings and analysis
The main objective of this work is to investigate opportunities for HCD within Chinese economic 
engagement using the case study of Huawei technologies, a large Chinese MNC in Nigeria. The 
paper examines the following: the employments effects of Huawei’s operations in Nigeria, its con-
tributions to skills development, and instances of knowledge and technology transfer via labour 
turnover and linkages between Huawei and local firms.
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Local employment
The job creation opportunities that MNCs bring are especially important to developing countries 
such as Nigeria, plagued by high unemployment rates. Given the influx of Chinese FDI into 
Nigeria, it is expected that Chinese enterprises will generate employment, among other benefits, 
for the local populace. Findings indicate that Huawei pursues a workforce localisation strategy in 
Table 2. Details of interview participants and schedule.
Code Affiliation/role of 
interviewee
Number of 
interviewees
Location Interview 
format
Date of data 
collection
Government
R1,2 Federal Ministry of 
Communications 
Technology
2 Abuja Face to face 
(individual)
30 March 30; 7 
April 2016
R3 National Communications 
Commission
1 Abuja Face to face 8 April 2016
R4 Federal Ministry of Trade 
and Investment
1 Abuja Face to face 6 April 2016
R5, R6 Federal Ministry of Labour 
and Productivity
2 Abuja Face to face 
(paired)
4 April 2016
R7 One Stop Investment 
Centre
1 Abuja Face to face 29 March 2016
R8, R9, R10 Nigerian Investment 
Promotion Corporation
3 Abuja Face to face 
(individual)
29 March 2016
R11,12 National Information 
Technology Development 
Agency
2 Abuja Face to face 
(individual)
6 April 2016
R13,14 Office of National 
Content in ICT
2 Abuja Face to face 
(individual)
30–31 March 
2016
T1, T2, T3, T4 Trainee – 1000 Girls in 
ICT Training programme
4 Remote 
contact
Skype interview 17 June–22 July 
2016
R15 UNILAG Student Affairs 
Official
1 Lagos Face to face 22 March 2016
S1, S2 Beneficiaries of Huawei-
UNILAG Scholarship
2 Remote 
Contact
Skype 16 June 2016
Huawei
R16, R17, R18 Ex-employees 3 Remote 
contact
Skype 2 August 2016–19 
May 2017
Current employees
R19, R20 Engineer 2 Lagos Face to face; 
Skype
15 March 2016; 4 
October 2016
R21 Manager 1 Lagos Face to face 15 March 2016
R22 Training Centre Manager 1 Abuja Email 
communication
10 May 2016
R23 Trainer 1 Abuja Face to face 
(individual)
7 April 2016
Total number 
of interviewees
29  
ICT: information communication technology; UNILAG: University of Lagos.
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Nigeria, which is reflected in their labour practices. The company currently employs about 1000 
employees in Nigeria, out of which more than 70% are locals. The Chinese MNC recruits host 
country nationals (HCNs) into both expert (engineering and technical) and non-technical/adminis-
trative positions. It also offers opportunities for career development based on employee perfor-
mance. Although the data collected are not adequate to assess the creation of indirect employment 
by Huawei’s operations in Nigeria, they do reveal that the Chinese MNC under study here has an 
active network of local suppliers and partners. During interviews at Huawei’s Lagos office, R21 
shared that the company’s supply chain currently includes over 500 local partners (suppliers, sub-
contractors). Given the Chinese multinational’s engagement with local suppliers and partners, the 
indirect employment creation effects in this case are most likely as significant as its direct employ-
ment effects (as suggested by Miranda, 1994).
Huawei’s labour practices in Nigeria have also been influenced by factors such as industry type, 
regulatory environment pertaining to work permits and expatriate quotas, presence of skilled 
labour, the firm’s strategy, and its size and scale of operations. Firstly, Huawei is a large MNC 
operating in a high-tech sector with its West African headquarters in Lagos. This implies that its job 
creation potential in Nigeria will be high, as large MNCs tend to hire more than their local coun-
terparts (Abdullah, 1994; McKendrick et al., 2000; Ritchie, 2002; Tan and Batra, 1995). Secondly, 
because Huawei operates in a high-tech industry, its requirement for skilled employment will also 
be high. Moreover, Nigerian policy on local content (The Office for Nigerian Content Development 
in ICT (ONC), 2013) and expatriate quotas permits the hiring of skilled expats only in the absence 
of local capacity. Interviews conducted at the Huawei HQ in Lagos revealed that this Chinese 
MNC has been successful in hiring locals as a majority of its workforce in Nigeria. A respondent 
(R21) credits this to the influx of foreign-educated Nigerians returning to the country, enticed by 
the opportunities. The respondent explained, ‘…a lot of people are coming back to Nigeria to work 
here because this is a booming economy. So I don’t think that is a challenge for us, we have enough 
highly sufficient skills’. These returnees or ‘repats’ have been satisfying the personnel needs of not 
only Huawei but other MNCs operating in Nigeria.
Studies have shown that MNCs not only create jobs but also actively provide education and 
training in host countries (Majeed and Ahmad, 2008). Interviews with current and former employ-
ees revealed that jobs at Huawei include a high component of both formal and informal employee 
training, forming one of the reasons that HCNs opt to join the company.
Training and skill building
While most MNCs provide some training to their local employees, the nature and duration vary 
depending on a number of factors, such as mode of entry, industry, size and time horizon of the 
investment, type of operations, motivation for the investment, and local conditions (Blomstrom 
and Kokko, 2002). This is true for Huawei. This Chinese MNC contributes to training and skill 
development in Nigeria’s telecom sector via multiple routes: internal employee training activities; 
training for clients and partners; and training programs in partnership with the Nigeria government. 
To date, over 50,000 people have been trained at Huawei’s training centre in Abuja (R22). The 
centre serves Huawei employees in Nigeria and the West African region. Interview responses from 
former and present employees confirmed that Huawei offers regular training, including classroom 
and on-the-job training sessions. In fact, the learning and training opportunities offered by the 
company are among the reasons that many choose to join that Chinese MNC (R16, 17, 18, 19, 20).
During an interview at the headquarters in Lagos, interviewee R21 emphasised that continuous 
training and learning is crucial in the industry. Both Huawei and its employees actively ensure they 
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are up to date with the latest technology relevant to their operations. Below is an excerpt from 
R21’s response:
For the staff of Huawei, they are likely to get trained every year, because…our company is a technological 
company[,] meaning that everybody in this organisation needs to learn fast. This is a basic request for our 
employee[s], everybody needs to be a big learner…you need to adapt to the technology…you need to 
know [all] the new things about this industry[,] so we need to [constantly] learn [new things] ourselves…
the company will also provide training for us. We have a training centre in Abuja…it was established in 
2006…it’s for the whole region, not only Nigeria but for West Africa covering certain countries[,] and we 
provide training for our staff [there].
These responses are in line with studies that show that training is a crucial component for MNCs 
operating in high-tech sectors (Tan and Batra, 1995; Te Velde, 2002). The rapid development of 
new technologies and innovations in the sector requires new skills and competencies and necessi-
tates continuous employee training (Te Velde, 2002). To remain competitive, MNCs in such sectors 
rely on highly skilled workers and therefore invest considerably on employee training. Huawei 
participates in training programs every year, and its centre has become a crucial training ground for 
employees of partner firms, telecom operators, clients, Nigerian youths, and government employ-
ees (R21). Broadly, the trainings provided cover ICT deployment, telecom equipment operation, 
management training and general ICT solutions.
Huawei’s training activities in Nigeria are also linked to its CSR objectives. This Chinese MNC 
actively collaborates with the Nigerian government and other relevant agencies for its training 
activities, with the aim of contributing to social development. Huawei has collaborated with the 
Nigerian government on two major training initiatives. In 2013, Huawei carried out the first multi-
phase initiative: 1000 Girls in ICT Training programme. As part of the programme, 1000 young 
women were trained in technical ICT and soft skills. Stage 1 entailed two days of ICT training for 
1000 trainees; Stage 2 consisted of five days of Huawei-certified datacom associate training for 
200 short-listed trainees; Stage 3 entailed a 2-month internship for 50 trainees; and finally, Stage 4 
consisted of a week-long training session in Shenzhen, China, for the 20 best trainees from the 
initial pool of 1000 trainees. The programme was concluded in 2016.
The second CSR initiative, ICT For Change-Nigeria 2000 Youth ICT Training, aims at training 
young graduates from engineering and ICT on specialist ICT and telecom skills for use in different 
sectors such as banking, power, oil and gas, manufacturing, information technology, telecom, and 
e-governance. The manager at Huawei (R21) said the following about the program:
We do not want to just make some noise. We really want to give them training and skills to enable them to 
find a good job in the ICT industry. Of course, Huawei also would provide some employment opportunities 
for them and also give recommendations for those people.
As part of its CSR activities, Huawei has also collaborated with tertiary educational institutes in 
Nigerian universities, namely the University of Lagos and the African University of Science and 
Technology, Abuja (an affiliate of Nelson Mandela Institute). The firm provides scholarships and 
technical support and donates laboratory equipment (R21). This is an example of the direct link 
between FDI and higher education in host countries, which, according to Blomstrom and Kokko 
(2002), often manifests in the provision of scholarships to students and active support of university 
development and other related institutes. Huawei’s training activities in Nigeria have extended to 
include Nigerian government officials. In September 2016, Huawei, in coordination with the 
Nigerian government, organised a 15-day training course in China for eight government officials. 
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The training was designed as a ‘train-the-trainer’ programme to equip participants with the knowl-
edge and skills necessary to competently carry out training programmes in their home country.
Huawei’s training activities for non-employees shows the MNC’s willingness to engage with 
the government and Nigerian public. This is in agreement with the observation by Te Velde (2002): 
MNCs, as part of their CSR activities in their host countries, invest in community development 
projects, including formal education and training.
Knowledge and technology transfer
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2002), 
MNCs are the world’s most important source of research and development activity: they often pos-
sess more technological capability than most developing countries. Their potential to generate 
technological spillovers in host countries is valuable particularly to developing countries, where 
FDI is one of the most important sources of technology transfer (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2002; 
Glass and Saggi, 2002). Knowledge and technology transfer occurs through many routes such as 
demonstration effects, labour turnover, and vertical linkages.
Knowledge and technology transfer via horizontal spillovers. When employees leave, they 
carry with them the knowledge, skills and know-how gained at their previous firm. Labour mobil-
ity is thus a channel by which knowledge and technology from an MNC is transferred to a local 
enterprise in the host country (Glass and Saggi, 2002). Shankar and Ghosh (2013) assert that high-
tech industries, characterised by high labour turnover, enable the efficient transfer of technology. 
Given the relatively high turnover rate in the ICT industry, it is possible for some level of knowl-
edge and technology transfer to occur via labour turnover in the case of Huawei. Interviews with 
former employees of Huawei confirmed this. Training and experience obtained by Nigerian 
employees from Huawei have proven valuable, enabling them to further their careers in other tel-
ecom companies. A former Huawei employee R16, who worked for 6 years at the Lagos head 
office as a Wireless 2G and 3G engineer, capitalised on his Huawei experience to obtain a higher 
paid position at another mobile telecom infrastructure company. He said, ‘my experience with 
Huawei has been so beneficial knowledge-wise, working with Huawei gave me a holistic knowl-
edge of telecom… [it gave me] an edge at my current job’. Other Huawei ex-employees (R17 and 
R18) shared similar accounts: the skills and experiences they gained at Huawei helped their career 
progression at other firms. For instance, R17 joined a competing telecom MNC as a consultant 
engineer and a subject matter expert after leaving Huawei. Markusen (1991: 19) summarised this 
phenomenon in the following words:
It is difficult to prevent knowledge from being transferred to the local employees of the firm who work 
with and observe the technical and managerial techniques of the firm. After some initial learning period, 
the workers become capable of opening a rival firm or of transferring their knowledge to new firms in 
related industries. This becomes a positive externality effect for the local economy arising from the 
presence of the multinational.
These findings support previous research (Lampert and Mohan, 2016; Mohan and Lampert, 2013) 
indicating that Nigerian employees have benefited professionally from their experience at Chinese 
telecommunications companies. It is important to note that skill and knowledge transfer from 
MNCs to HCNs could also be in the form of soft skills and work attitudes, which are not sector-
specific, and as such, easily transferable. A former intern at Huawei (T3) – a participant of the 1000 
Girls in ICT Training programme – who was unemployed at the time, was interviewed. She con-
sidered her internship at Huawei as her first real employment experience outside her compulsory 
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national youth service year. T3 believed that her association with Chinese culture and approach to 
work would serve her well in the future because it helped her ‘develop a hardworking attitude’. 
These experiences confirm how Chinese economic engagement can indeed contribute to HCD in 
Africa. Exploring and understanding skill transfer via labour turnover, particularly in high-tech 
sectors, could offer better insights into knowledge and technology diffusion in the context of 
China–Africa relations.
Knowledge and technology transfer via vertical spillovers. According to Batra and Tan (2002), 
technology transfer occurs via linkages between multinational companies and their local suppliers. 
Close links allow local suppliers and customers to assimilate some technology and skills from the 
MNC (Porter, 1980), and these, in turn, help the local suppliers improve the quality and efficiency 
of their services or products (Botelho and Pfister, 2011; Saggi, 2004). Huawei’s supply chain in 
Nigeria includes over 500 local partners, who provide management services, engineering services 
(civil work, external plant and telecom equipment engineers), auxiliary equipment, logistics, vehi-
cle services, etc. The firm’s considerable international and local experience has enabled it to build 
and consolidate its local supply chain network. Moreover, its decision to engage local suppliers 
aligns with its localisation strategy. Further, as a market-seeking MNC (Gugler, 2008), Huawei 
needs strong local links to adapt its products and services to the local conditions (Botelho and 
Pfister, 2011). Huawei’s business in Nigeria is such that the company deals constantly with local 
suppliers and clients who purchase their products and solutions. R21 elaborates on the company’s 
linkages with local suppliers and partners as follows:
Talking about local partners, we have a lot. I cannot get the specific figure[s], but I can tell you that we 
have more than 500 local partners working with us, because in our philosophy we are trying to build an 
ecosystem in the ICT industry not only for the telecom operators or for Huawei to grow our business, but 
also for the end users to benefit from the telecommunication services and our partners. To give a very 
simple example, there are some partners who are building the base stations, who are providing the 
[inaudible], deploying the cables for us. All of these jobs are done by Nigerian companies, so we focus on 
the planning of the business. We work with our partners in the telecom industry…we also purchase a lot 
from [the] local markets that we need to deploy our projects… all these jobs can be done by Nigerian 
companies[,] so we are outsourcing them to the Nigerian companies.
MNCs often provide their suppliers with technical and managerial training to improve their overall 
capabilities in the value chain (Botelho and Pfister, 2011). Huawei’s archival data and reports show 
that the company has defined clear guidelines for procurement requirements and audits to ensure 
that suppliers are up to industry standards and adhere to the code of conduct required in the elec-
tronic industry. Huawei also conducts training conferences on quality for its partners and suppliers 
across the world. For example, in 2014 Huawei organised the ‘Nigeria Supplier Quality Conference’, 
which was attended by 106 core supplier firms (Huawei, 2014). This conference is a part of 
Huawei’s supplier development programmes, which facilitate idea exchange, value integrations, 
and quality and service enhancements for mutually beneficial MNC–supplier relationships. This 
signifies some form of knowledge and technology transfer, which, according to Botelho and Pfister 
(2011), ‘not only includes the technical support and training activities but also means informing 
and educating suppliers regarding product and process standards…’. Investing in the skills and 
capabilities of local suppliers and partners makes good business sense, as it improves the local 
procurement process and ensures that the firm spends less in hiring external expertise – thus reduc-
ing operating costs and strengthening local partnerships. The prominence of local firms in Huawei’s 
supply chain and its supplier development programmes is indicative of considerable backward 
vertical linkages with local suppliers. This sets the stage for productivity spillovers to occur.
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Batra and Tan (2002) argue that vertical spillovers tend to occur between firms in a customer-
supplier relationship, typically via exposure to MNC products and services, provision of technical 
support by MNCs to clients, supplier/distributor training, and discussions leading to knowledge 
transfer that enhances the productivity and capabilities of the firms involved (Slaughter, 2002). 
Forward linkages, according to Jindra et al. (2009: 168), include ‘all downstream relationships 
developed between foreign subsidiaries and customers, (sales) agents and distributors in a host 
economy’. Access to or the use of an MNC’s advanced products, inputs and services can enhance 
the productivity of domestic firms (Driffield et al., 2002; Miozzo and Grimshaw, 2008). This study 
supports the above argument: Substantial forward vertical linkages have developed because of 
Huawei’s interactions with its clients (telecom operators) in Nigeria. For example, in 2013, 
Globacom Nigeria, a domestic telecom operator, contracted Huawei, for USD$750 Million, to 
upgrade its entire telecom infrastructure network for the launch of 4G/LTE services (Telegeography, 
2013). This upgrade has enabled Globacom to (a) provide better, more-reliable services to more 
than 25 million subscribers in Nigeria; (b) increase its network capacity; (c) grow its subscriber 
base; and (d) ease network congestion, and offer cheaper tariffs (Telegeography, 2015). Thus, 
Globacom’s move has produced far-reaching effects on the productivity of the entire mobile eco-
system in Nigeria.
The introduction of new technology is beneficial not only to Huawei’s clients – telecom opera-
tors – but also to a larger ecosystem of industries, businesses and individuals in Nigeria who are 
clients of these operators. For example, in the agricultural sector, increase in mobile penetration 
has improved agricultural production and distribution (Groupe Spéciale Mobile Association 
(GSMA), 2015). Further, the spillover effects of technology transfer have drastically changed the 
mobile ecosystem, as evidenced by the job-creation effect of mobile expansion. According to a 
GSMA (2015) report, 118,600 jobs have been created for airtime dealers and retailers operating out 
of supermarkets, technology stores, and small independent points of sale. Additionally, businesses 
are increasingly using mobile apps, websites, and short message services (text messages) to reach 
more customers. Nigerian retailers are increasingly using the internet to drive up their sales vol-
ume. In fact, online purchases are said to have increased by 15%, and 60% of online buyers having 
made purchases on their mobile phones from 2013 to 2014 (Aginam, 2014). These developments 
have been supported by the development and maintenance of critical telecom infrastructures by 
firms such as Huawei. They have contributed to increased digital penetration and the productivity 
of mobile operators and service providers in Nigeria. The introduction of new technology also 
ensures benefits for the wider telecommunications ecosystem, including the mobile operators’ 
value chain and everyday use by individual Nigerians.
Responding to a question on Huawei leveraging its resources for development in Africa, R21 
stated that the MNC has been successful in introducing new technology and upgrading existing 
infrastructures. These developments have not only helped telecom companies increase their pro-
ductivity but have also led to lower tariffs for the end users. These results support the assertion by 
Kimura et al. (2011): Private investments in Africa’s telecommunications sector have led to infra-
structural upgrade and an increase in broadband penetration, which have contributed significantly 
to economic growth in various countries.
Conclusions and implications of Chinese economic engagement 
for HCD in Africa
This paper investigated the opportunities for HCD inherent to Chinese economic engagement, 
using Huawei’s operations in Nigeria as a case study. The paper examined three HCD dimensions: 
local employment, training and skill building, and knowledge and technology transfer. Findings 
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showed that Huawei is an active provider of employment for HCNs and has achieved a workforce 
localisation rate of 70% in Nigeria. This Chinese MNC is actively engaged in training not only its 
employees, but also employees of its suppliers, partners, and clients, apart from Nigerian youths 
and government employees. Further, as part of its CSR efforts, Huawei has contributed to general 
education in Nigeria, providing scholarships, training, and laboratory equipment to two universi-
ties. Additionally, the MNC partnered with the Nigerian government for skill development and 
training of Nigerian youths via two training programmes: 1000 Girls in ICT Training and ICT For 
Change. Interview responses showed that the MNC has facilitated skill and technology transfers 
via labour turnover and vertical linkages. That is, training and experience obtained by Nigerian 
employees at Huawei have proven valuable for their career advancement outside the firm. Huawei 
has over 500 local partners in its supply chain and plays an active role in supplier development 
programmes, organising supplier quality conferences and delivering training programmes for local 
suppliers, partners and clients.
The case of Huawei in Nigeria’s telecom sector highlights the opportunities for HCD present in 
the operations of Chinese enterprises in Africa. However, these opportunities may not be realisable 
across the board – they are subject to certain sectoral factors and contextual conditions, such as 
sectoral differences, institutional frameworks in host countries, firm profile and strategy, labour 
quality in the host country, etc. The practical and research implications of this study’s findings are 
numerous (see Table 3 for a summary of the findings and practical implications). While there is a 
growing body of research on Chinese enterprises in Africa, very few studies capture the interac-
tions between these enterprises and their host countries in relation to HCD (King, 2013). Our study 
fills this gap, but more research is needed to explore the impact of Chinese economic engagement 
on HCD, particularly across different sectoral and contextual conditions.
This study’s findings contain some practical implications. Firstly, there is a clear need for 
African governments to attract and steer Chinese investments into crucial sectors of their econo-
mies to reap benefits for HCD. Government policies and measures are crucial for effectively lev-
eraging these investments for development. While most African governments have relaxed their 
investment policy regimes to attract FDI, to maximise the benefits for HCD they also need to 
encourage MNCs to upgrade their operations (to include value-added production processes) and 
actively promote linkages between MNCs and local firms. This will allow for better knowledge 
and technology diffusion. This study showed that the Nigerian government uses a local content 
policy and expatriate quotas to encourage MNCs operating in the ICT sector to employ more 
HCNs, contribute to HCD, and create value for the local ecosystem. In addition, the government 
should actively collaborate with Chinese enterprises to route investments and CSR contributions to 
the appropriate avenues, including training and skill-building programmes for the youth. Further, 
partnerships between MNCs such as Huawei and local tertiary institutions should be encouraged 
so that locals and graduates have the relevant skills needed to gain employment with these MNCs. 
The role of Africa’s governments in this engagement cannot be over-emphasised. Gu (2009: 585) 
summarises this sentiment as follows: “from the African perspective, in the final analysis, whether 
or not the development impact of Chinese private investment in Africa can be effectively realised 
rests with African governments and the wider policy[-]making community[,] including civil 
society”.
The study findings also highlight an important drawback in the extant research on HCD impli-
cations of Chinese economic engagement in Africa: While there is conflicting evidence in support 
of and against Chinese economic engagement in Africa (Ado and Su, 2016) and its impact on HCD 
(King, 2013), there are no theoretical underpinnings to the explanation of the findings. Hence, this 
paper poses some questions that can guide future research and act as the basis for developing a 
theoretical framework. Our paper advances the following working hypothesis: The HCD impact of 
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Chinese economic engagement will vary across different sectors of the African economy and 
across countries. For example, capital-intensive sectors are likely to offer more opportunities for 
training and technology transfer than labour-intensive sectors. Further, capital-intensive industries 
are more likely to benefit from HCD; employees will be provided competency-enhancing training 
for business reasons rather than for altruistic purposes. Likewise, the scope for local employment 
generation could be potentially higher in labour-intensive sectors than in capital-intensive sectors. 
Labour-intensive industries are more likely to benefit through direct employment. In other words, 
the host country’s and the host industry’s characteristics are the key factors determining the HCD 
impact of Chinese economic engagement, and these are highly likely to differ across sectors and 
industries. This working hypothesis raises the following research questions, which, if addressed, 
can contribute to a conceptual framework to guide comprehensive research on the HCD impact of 
Chinese economic engagement in Africa:
x  Which sectors are more likely to benefit and suffer because of Chinese economic engage-
ment in terms of HCD, and why?
x  What sectoral and contextual factors enable or constrain HCD through Chinese economic 
engagement?
x  In what ways do host government policies enable or constrain HCD through Chinese eco-
nomic engagement?
x  Do African governments leverage Chinese economic engagement for HCD in Africa, and if 
so, how?
x  In what ways do home country policies enable or constrain HCD through Chinese economic 
engagement?
x  In what ways do Chinese MNCs’ organisational strategies or policies enable or constrain 
HCD in Africa?
These questions and the working hypothesis provide an opportunity to examine holistically the 
impact of Chinese economic engagement on HCD in Africa, and a range of research methods could 
be utilised in future studies to answer these questions. The qualitative case-study approach was the 
preferred method for this study. It affords an empirically rich, context-specific account of the 
implications of Chinese economic engagement for HCD in Africa. Due to the important nature of 
context in this study, the case-study approach also gives the opportunity to delve into context-
specific factors that may influence HCD contributions of Chinese enterprises in Africa. Having 
said that, the nature of the study sample size makes it difficult to generalise the results to Chinese 
enterprises in other industries and countries. This, however, further stresses and supports the work-
ing hypothesis proffered in this study that the HCD impact of Chinese economic engagement in 
Africa will vary across industry sectors and countries due to the differences in sectoral and contex-
tual conditions. Further studies could test this by carrying out a comparative study on a wider 
sample featuring Chinese enterprises in different sectors and different countries. Additionally, a 
mixed-method approach could be appropriate when looking at a wider scope of study. For exam-
ple, the use of large-scale surveys coupled with in-depth interviews for multiple-country cases, 
with multiple organisations in different industrial sectors. Researchers can utilise large-scale sur-
veys designed to capture and compare the role that factors such as sectoral conditions, organisa-
tional strategy and contextual conditions play, and to what degree they influence the impact of 
Chinese enterprises on HCD in Africa. In addition to that, in-depth interviews will help gain deeper 
insights into the survey results. As emphasised by King (2013), detailed studies that consider the 
wider investment climate and the crucial role of ‘African agency’ are necessary to understand 
Chinese FDI and its impact on Africa’s industrialisation and HCD.
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